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I. INTRODUCTION
Early antitrust analysis developed in a setting of enormous economic and
political change. Between the close of the Civil War and the start of the First World
War, American productive capacity soared, economic concentration and collusion
increased tremendously, and conflict between labor and capital intensified greatly, as
large-scale corporate capitalism increasingly displaced a familiar, decentralized small
business economy.' These massive changes evoked varied responses from both
jurists and legislators, as they did from Americans more generally. 2 In large measure,
however, judges and legislators developed and applied their diverse approaches to
antitrust and other issues within the broad theoretical confines of a widely accepted
general frame of reference, which embodied certain fundamental perspectives on
politics, economics, and judicial methodology.
Progressive Era judges commonly perceived themselves to be guardians 3 of a
free political and economic order that naturally tended to produce harmonious, just,
and optimal results for both individuals and society at large. State and federal jurists
believed that this political and economic order was potentially threatened by the rapid
and profound changes of the era and sought to meet this threat through continual,
1. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITAUSM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, TnE
LAW, AND POLmCS (1988); H. THORELUI, THE FEDERAL ANTrmUST Poucy: ORIGINATION OF AN ArERICAN TRADmON 54-96,
235-308 (1955).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 199-266.
3. See, e.g., S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-VELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFuCr IN AMERICAN
TnouGr 1865-1901, at 140 (1964); L. FkiEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 361 (2d ed. 1985).
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close scrutiny of public and private developments potentially subversive of the es-
sential bases of American freedom and prosperity. Laissez-faire constitutionalism
provided the theoretical vehicle for scrutiny of governmental developments. Above all
other branches of contemporary adjudication, this body of jurisprudence most clearly
reflected and reinforced the political and economic vision at the center of late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century judicial activity in general. In a very fundamental
sense, Progressive Era antitrust analysis constituted the "flip side" of laissez-faire
constitutionalism or, more accurately, its essential logical complement. While laissez-
faire constitutionalism addressed the potential dangers arising from the most prominent
governmental innovations of the time, antitrust analysis addressed the potential dan-
gers arising from the most profoundly disturbing private innovations of the time. As
a result of this complementarity, close examination of contemporary constitutional
theory powerfully illuminates the theoretical foundations not only of Progressive Era
constitutional jurisprudence, but also of early antitrust analysis as well.
This Article seeks to contribute to such illumination through an extensive
exploration of historical developments that have been given little or no attention in
most recent accounts of early antitrust history. Concentrating almost exclusively on
federal developments, 4 leading antitrust scholars repeatedly have minimized the role
of general economic philosophy in early antitrust analysis, 5 and have labeled
particular formative era approaches the unfortunate, if predictable, outcome of
ignorance of economic theory. For example, in describing the historical development
of antitrust jurisprudence in his landmark book The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at
War with Itself,6 Robert H. Bork has declared:
Law tends to arrive at basic answers before the right questions have been asked. Disputes
that must be decided arise before there is a theory to handle them, so that the participants
in the litigation often do not perceive the implications of a decision either way. By the time
the real question is perceived, if it ever is, an answer has not only been given but has become
dogma, and it is too late. 7
As an earlier article explains at length, however, important aspects of the historical
record severely undercut such a "theoretical vacuum" interpretation of early antitrust
analysis.8 The fact that this historical interpretation has generated so little scholarly
dissent reflects an ongoing irony in current antitrust discourse.
4. On the relatively little scholarly attention to early state antitrust developments, see May, Antitrust Practice and
Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 495, 498, 505 (1987).
5. See id. at 553-61, 589 & n.466 (discussing this interpretative tendency in leading recent accounts of antitrust
history). For examples of this tendency, see, for instance, L. FRmDAN, supra note 3, at 465 (declaring that the Sherman
Act "hardly reflected any coherent economic theory at all"); T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OFREGULATION 78 (1984) (stating
that Americans fearful of the trusts had "only their personal sensibilities and traditional political ideologies to guide
them"); Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEo.
L.J. 1511, 1560 (1984) (declaring that "[niot until the antitrust synthesis of the 1940s fused Populist ideology with
oligopoly learning did economic models define legal norms").
6. R. Boar, THE ANTrrRusT PAR.Aox: A Policy AT WAR wrm IrSELF (1978).
7. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
8. See May, supra note 4, at 541-93 (describing the nature and impact of contemporary economic theory in early
antitrust analysis in the context of United States Supreme Court and state court treatment of constitutional challenges to
state antitrust legislation). See also Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219 (1988);
Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HAsrIos L.J. 285 (1989)
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After a decade of profound change in scholarly perspective,9 judicial analysis, O
and federal enforcement policy,I antitrust scholars still disagree vigorously over core
antitrust goals and methods,' 2 and continue to embrace diverse political and
economic visions.' 3 On the eve of the centennial of the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 14 differing analysts still repeatedly invoke quite varied understandings
of original congressional intent' 5 and early doctrinal development 6 to buttress their
respective approaches to modern antitrust law.
In significant part, the current diversity of historical interpretation persists,
despite the constant emphasis on antitrust origins, because observers primarily
concerned with modern federal antitrust issues have heavily de-emphasized the
broader theoretical context within which early antitrust law developed. In doing so,
antitrust scholars have left a highly valuable source of potential illumination and
clarification relatively unexplored.
This Article seeks to provide a somewhat more complete picture of the nature of
general theory in the Progressive Era and its impact on formative era antitrust
(examining the tension between competition and property logics in early congressional and judicial approaches to federal
antitrust analysis).
9. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936 (1987); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Micn. L. REv. 213 (1985)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy].
10. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9, at 954-56.
11. See, e.g., id. at 944-54; Pitofsky, Comment: Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAt.F. L. REv. 817, 818-27
(1987).
12. See, e.g., Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALm. L. REv.
263 (1986) [hereinafter Arthur, Farewell]; Brietzke, The Constitutionalization of Antitrust: Jefferson, Madison,
Hamilton, and Thomas C. Arthur, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 275 (1988); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mic. L.
Rev. 1696 (1986); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9; Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, supra note 9.
13. See, e.g., Fox, The Politics of Lav and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 554 (1986); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, supra note 9.
14. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)). The Act became law on July 2, 1890.
15. Some scholars assert that Congress passed the antitrust laws to promote a number of economic, social, and
political goals and that current practice should further all of these ends. See, e.g., 1 E. KUMEri, FEnP.~AL Aerrrusr LAW
§ 4.18 (1980); Fox, supra note 13, at 563-67, 584-85 (1986); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9. Professor Robert Lande
has urged that while Congress had multiple economic, social, and political goals in mind in 1890 and 1914, it primarily
sought to attack unfair wealth transfers from consumers to sellers resulting from supracompetitive pricing, and in cases
of conflict, subordinated all other goals to this primary aim. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASrmos L.J. 67 (1982). Scholars associated with the
"Chicago School" of antitrust analysis contend that Congress should be understood to have established a single goal of
"consumer welfare" optimality or societal wealth maximization, perhaps reflecting a budding appreciation of later
twentieth century allocative efficiency insights. See, e.g., R. BotK, supra note 6, at 50-71, 91; Bork, Legislative Intent
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECoN. 7, 10-11 (1966); Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 1702-03. Finally,
some scholars recently have adopted a "statutory" approach and argue that while knowledge of historical context and
contemporary attitudes and values is essential, the question of Congress' original general goals should be given less weight
in current jurisprudence than is commonly urged. Instead, these scholars advocate a greater reliance on early congressional
debate indications of the specific types of conduct most in the mind of congressmen in 1890 and 1914, finding particular
congressional concern for price fixing, monopolistic mergers, predatory exclusion, or "cartelization." See Arthur,
Farewell, supra note 12, at 275, 285 -89; Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL.
L. REv. 1163 (1988) [hereinafter Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law]; Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the
Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. Rev. 1125, 1126, 1129-31, 1136-38, 1140-421 (1985). See also infra text
accompanying notes 354-56.
16. See, e.g., R. Botb, supra note 6, at 21-47; Arthur, Farewell, supra note 12, at 292-306; Brietzke, supra note
12, at 301-13; Goldschmid, Horizontal Restraints in Antitrust: Current Treatment and Future Needs, 75 CAL,,. L, REv.
925, 926 (1987); Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALF. L. REv. 835, 836-38
(1987).
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analysis. The Article pursues this goal by broadening the usual focus of historical
inquiry in two respects. First, as already noted, the Article explores the nature of
laissez-faire constitutionalism in some detail, not only because of its complementary
relation to early antitrust jurisprudence, but also because it offers a valuable
"window" on the contemporary political and economic theory that was central to
antitrust as well as constitutional analysis. Second, the Article explores the early
impact of general theory not only in federal antitrust thinking, but also in state
legislation and adjudication. State developments constituted a very important aspect
of Progressive Era antitrust activity17 that has long been neglected in scholarly
accounts of the period.' 8 Examination of these developments strikingly illuminates
the nature of early antitrust analysis in general, and provides considerable insight into
the interrelationship between laissez-faire constitutional thought and antitrust reason-
ing in the minds of Progressive Era judges who were intensely concerned with the
growth and application of both of these bodies of jurisprudence. Following an
examination of early congressional intent and federal antitrust jurisprudence, the
latter portion of the Article accordingly focuses on the historical record in two state
jurisdictions well known as unusually strong contemporary centers of both laissez-
faire constitutionalism and antitrust adjudication: New York and Missouri. 19 The
record of active development and implementation of both constitutional and antitrust
analysis in these states greatly helps to highlight theoretical perspectives that were
widely influential in contemporary federal and state antitrust analysis, but that were
not always articulated as clearly or explicitly elsewhere.
Part II of this Article examines the nature, development, and pervasiveness of
late nineteenth and early twentieth century laissez-faire constitutionalism. It describes
the parallel and interconnected patterns of political and economic theory reflected in
laissez-faire constitutional thought and the way that these theoretical perspectives
shaped constitutional philosophy in general and concerns over unequal "class"
legislation and paternalism in particular. This Part stresses the diversity of American
views on contemporary political and economic change and the particularly strong
commitments to traditional values and visions that judges maintained in the midst of
altered social circumstances. It describes the major economic changes of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and then goes on to discuss the variety of
traditional and nontraditional ways in which Americans responded to these changes
and the manner in which early antitrust debate and agitation arose within this
economic and intellectual setting.
Part III examines the influence of traditional political and economic theory in the
congressional enactment of federal antitrust legislation in 1890 and 1914. This Part
concludes that these political and economic principles established a powerful frame
of reference for congressional antitrust analysis, and finds that recognition of this
influence casts doubt on recent interpretations of original congressional intent.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 433-38.
18. See May, supra note 4, at 497-98, 505.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 439-49, 609-66.
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Part IV explores the impact of traditional theory in the thinking of the leading
judicial theorists of early Sherman Act jurisprudence and places the leading analytical
approaches of William Howard Taft, Rufus Wheeler Peckham, and Edward Douglass
White within the larger context of contemporary political and economic thought and
judicial methodology. Part V then offers an introduction to the examination of
contemporary antitrust analysis in state courts and legislatures.
Part VI begins this examination of contemporary state analysis by exploring the
judicial development of restraint of trade doctrine in New York and Missouri prior to
the 1890 enactment of federal antitrust legislation. Finding that the courts in these
states were far from unambiguously committed to a policy of competition by 1890,
this Part stresses the variations in nineteenth century case law among states and over
time. Part VII then examines popular, legislative, and executive responses to
accelerating cartelization and concentration and notes the general extent and character
of antitrust and restraint of trade litigation in New York and Missouri during the three
decades following the passage of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act.
Part VIII explores the theory and practice of state antitrust and restraint of trade
jurisprudence between 1890 and 1918. Detailing the state courts' strong support for
antitrust policy in general, this Part examines the way that state judges sought to
develop antitrust doctrine so as to protect basic rights of economic opportunity,
property, and contract while at the same time seeking to promote economic
competition, growth, and political freedom. Noting that state judges emphasized key
ancillary/nonancillary restraint distinctions somewhat more than did the United States
Supreme Court during these decades, Part VIII nonetheless finds state judges to have
been less concerned with articulation of a single overall general standard of analysis
than were contemporary Supreme Court jurists. This Part discusses the state courts'
consistent condemnation of cartel behavior despite an increasingly ambivalent
attitude toward tighter forms of economic combination. It then goes on to explain
how the judges' rights-based orientation and strong commitment to competition
powerfully shaped contemporary analyses of concerted refusals to deal, exclusive
dealing, and resale price maintenance.
The Article finally concludes by exploring the growing divergence of constitu-
tional and antitrust analysis since the First World War. This final section contrasts
formative era theory with current antitrust analysis, and notes the relevance of early
antitrust history in modern policy and practice.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. State Power and Private Right in Contemporary Constitutional Adjudication
The constitutional principles of substantive due process, economic liberty, and
liberty of contract first gained strong support in state courts during the 1880s,
achieved United States Supreme Court acceptance by the 1890s, and dominated
[Vol. 50:257
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constitutional law doctrine thereafter for the remainder of the Progressive Era. 20 The
jurists who embraced these core principles of "laissez-faire constitutionalism" 2'
conceded the importance of both state power and private right and sought to clarify
the legitimate, constitutional scope of both state authority and private freedom.
On the one hand, state and federal jurists upheld considerable regulatory
authority. State courts2 2 and the United States Supreme Court2 3 repeatedly acknowl-
edged traditional state police power to protect public health, safety, welfare, and
morals. In addition, the Supreme Court consistently supported state authority to
regulate the rates charged by businesses "affected with a public interest." 2 4 Indeed,
the Court did so over loud and long conservative criticism of its decision in Munn v.
Illinois,25 which upheld state regulation of Chicago grain elevators constituting a
"virtual monopoly" despite the fact that those ordinary, noncorporate firms had not
been granted any special power or privileges by the state, 26 a precondition for rate
regulatory power in the eyes of critics of the decision. 27
On the other hand, late nineteenth century state and federal judges increasingly
stressed the unconstitutionality of arbitrary government deprivation and redistribution
of private property,2 8 and enlarged the definition of property entitled to due process
protection to include not only physical objects and land, but also an expanding range
of intangible market interests and values. 29 By the 1890s the Supreme Court, for
20. Important discussions of the development and nature of these doctrines and related ideas include S. FINE, supra
note 3, at 126-64; C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. CooLEY, CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1954); A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BEL.z, THE
AMERICAN CoNSTrrTnON: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 397-418, 454-68 (6th ed. 1983); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CmsIS
AND THE RULE OF LAw: ArrnuoDE oF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A
Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAw & HisT. RE-v. 293 (1985);
Hovenkamp, Tile Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379 (1988) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Political Economy]; Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. Am.
HST. 751 (1967); McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AmI. HisT. 970 (1975); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J.
454 (1909). On property as "the central value of American constitutional policy" in this period, see Siegel,
Understanding tile Lochner Era: Lessons from tile Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L.
REv. 187, 187 (1984).
21. On the ambiguities in the phrase, and the variations in its meaning as used by various scholars, see Jones, supra
note 20, at 752; Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court,
1888-1921, 5 LAW & HisT. REv. 249, 251 n.5 (1987). See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J.
Am. Hisr. 63, 67 & n. 12 (1985) (describing the range of more or less expansive state court interpretations of the police
power, but noting statements and holdings emphasizing the substantiality of the power made by even such relatively
conservative state courts as those of Illinois and New York).
23. See, e.g., J. SFMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTsRE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIErY,
1890-1920, at 77-78 (1978).
24. See, e.g., C. JACoBs, supra note 20, at 164; J. SF..ONCHE, supra note 23, at 22; Siegel, supra note 20, at 206
& n.85.
25. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
26. See id. at 130-31.
27. On the doctrinal controversy, which persisted for more than 50 years, see McCurdy, supra note 20, at 995-98;
Siegel, supra note 20, at 199-207.
28. See, e.g., Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96
U.S. 97, 102 (1878); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 vall.) 655, 664 (1875); S. FIE, supra note 3, at 141, 143; A.
KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, supra note 20, at 405; Benedict, supra note 20, at 323, 325, 331.
29. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 141, 150; C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 24-25; M. SK.LAR, supra note 1,
at 49; Siegel, supra note 20, at 210-12; Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of
the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980).
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example, held that due process of law required judicial review of rates set by
regulatory bodies30 or by legislatures31 themselves, in order to ensure not only fair
procedure, but also the "substantive" right to a "reasonable" level of financial
return on investment approximating competitive free market value. 32
Constitutional due process protection for the reasonable earnings of regulated
businesses formed part of a broader pattern of due process protection for economic
gains and opportunity. Many of the essential elements of this more general
conception of economic freedom received powerful early expression in the United
States Supreme Court in Justice Stephen Field's seminal 1884 concurring opinion in
the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. 33 In condemning a state grant of
monopolistic slaughterhouse privileges, Justice Field repeated the themes of his
earlier Slaughterhouse Cases dissent, 34 and emphasized the interrelationship of
liberty, labor, and property. Justice Field stressed that the inalienable rights
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 35 included
the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful
business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which
may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest
enjoyment. 36
Proclaiming the centrality of this aspect of American freedom, Justice Field drew
support from the words of Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations:37
It has been well said that, "The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is
the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The
patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder
his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to
his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property .... -38
Beginning in the mid-1880s, state courts increasingly invoked Justice Field's
Supreme Court sentiments, 39 the kindred opinions of Justice Joseph Bradley,n°
existing similar state court precedents, 4 1 and the scholarly work of Thomas M.
30. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
31. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
32. See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HAREiSON & H. Bsx.z, supra note 20, at 407; Siegel, supra note 20, at 231-32. On
the change from a largely procedural to an increasingly substantive interpretation of due process more generally, see S.
FINE, supra note 3, at 141, 150; J. SFMONCHE, supra note 23, at 16-23. But cf. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism
in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 59 (1987) [hereinafter Horwitz, Republicanism and
Liberalism] (stressing the continuities in early and late nineteenth century constitutional thought in general). On the
competitive free market value measure of property rights, see also infra note 147.
33. 111 U.S. 746, 754-60 (1884) (Field, J., concurring).
34. 83 U.S. (16 Vall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
35. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
36. Butchers' Union, 111 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., concurring).
37. A. SMrr, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TE WNEA.TH OF NAToNs (1776).
38. Butchers' Union, 111 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., concurring) (quoting A. Shtrm, supra note 37, at bk. I, ch. 10).
39. See, e.g., S. FIE, supra note 3, at 150; A. PAUL, supra note 20, at 13.
40. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 160; C. JACOBs, upra note 20, at 52, 55, 66, 96, 161.
41. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106, 107 (1885) (citing the earlier decisions in Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74
N.Y. 509 (1878), and Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)).
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Cooley42 and Christopher G. Tiedeman, 43 to support establishment of a thoroughgo-
ing laissez-faire constitutionalism as the standard for judging social and economic
legislation. In numerous cases over the next two to three decades, 44 state high courts
again and again proclaimed the fundamentality of private property protection and
economic opportunity, along with the related, newly formulated principle of liberty
of contract. 45
The United States Supreme Court fully accepted these due process principles as
mainstream doctrine by the close of the 1890s. 46 Justice Rufus Peckham, for a
unanimous Court, gave famous expression to the new orthodoxy when he explained,
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,47 that the term "liberty" as used in the fourteenth
amendment 48
means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be
free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 49
For federal and state jurists who thus conceded the fundamental importance of
both state regulatory power and private economic freedom, the critical question
became one of definition and scope: What restrictions on private possession and
activity were within the limits of state power, and which restrictions went beyond
those limits and infringed upon constitutionally protected private property and
economic liberty? Judicial efforts to resolve this recurring, central question impli-
cated additional related questions regarding the respective institutional roles of courts
and legislatures and the perceived dangers of government activism.
Repeatedly, when social and economic legislation was challenged, state and
federal jurists sought to determine whether particular measures were legitimate,
"real" exercises of state police power or simply a guise5 o for unequal "class" or
42. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 151-52; C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 27-32, 49, 64, 161; Jones, supra note
20. Cooley's often-cited treatise, which ultimately went through eight editions, see C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 29, Irst
appeared in 1868 as T. COOLEY, TREATSE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEa1sLAntVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERIcAN UNION (1868).
43. See, e.g., S. Fma, supra note 3, at 152-54; C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 58-63, 64, 161. Professor
Tiedeman's treatise was first published in 1886 as C. TIEDEmAN, A TREATISE ON mE LIMrrATONS OF PotIC POWER IN Tm
UNrrED STATES (1886).
44. Leading state cases included, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895); Millett v. People, 117
I11. 294 (1886); Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N.E. 1126 (1891); State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S.W.
781 (1895); State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S.W. 350 (1893); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
(1911); People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 59 N.E. 716 (1901); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885); Godcharles
& Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 A. 354 (1886); State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S.E. 285 (1889), overruled
in White v. Raleigh Wyo. Mining Co., 113 W. Va. 522, 168 S.E. 798 (1933).
45. An explicit articulation of the principle of liberty of contract reportedly first appeared in an 1884 Illinois
Supreme Court opinion, Jones v. People, 110 11. 590 (1884). See C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 44.
46. On the Supreme Court's acceptance of these doctrines in the 1890s, see, for example, S. FINE, supra note 3,
at 149; C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 85-93.
47. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
49. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
50. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56, 61, 64 (1905); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)
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"special" legislation 51 constituting favoritism toward a particular majority or
minority group, pernicious redistribution, 52 and, perhaps, misguided paternalism. 5 3
In seeking to make such judgments, federal and state jurists strikingly exhibited both
"activism" and "restraint."
On the one hand, as due process challenges proliferated, contemporary federal
and state judges greatly expanded their review of legislative activity and struck down
an unprecedented number of statutes. 54 Moreover, contemporary jurists did act
innovatively in elaborating such constitutional doctrines as substantive due process
and liberty of contract. 55 To many observers, federal and state judges also appeared
to act legislatively when they undertook their own reexaminations of factual contexts
to determine whether particular statutes were reasonable in their purposes and in the
means chosen to achieve those purposes.5 6 To a very large extent, however, federal
and state judges continued to assert, and to believe, that their role remained a
fundamentally nondiscretionary one: to determine the limits of relevant legislative
powers and individual rights in order to distinguish "real" exercises of such powers
and rights from mere sham and aggression.5 7
The famous case of Lochner v. New York58 provides a good illustration. In that
case, the Supreme Court reexamined the factual context of bakeshop conditions in
order to determine whether a state maximum hours law was
a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or . . . an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his
personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family[.] 59
(Harlan, J., for the Court, declaring: "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere
pretenses"); State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 177, 31 S.W. 781, 783 (1895); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (1885) (declaring
"under the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private property cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the
determination of the legislature is not final or conclusive"); S. FINE, supra note 3, at 161; C. JAcos, supra note 20, at
27, 161; Siegel, supra note 20, at 210 n.107. Similarly, in striking down afederal statute prohibiting carriers in interstate
commerce from entering into anti-union "yellow dog contracts," the Court stressed that the statute was passed "under
the guise of regulating interstate commerce." Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
51. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 315-16, 22 S.W. 350, 351-52 (1893); S. FINE, supra note 3, at 160;
Benedict, supra note 20, at 298, 304-31.
52. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 305; Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. Ry. 679,
684 (1984) [hereinafter Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography]; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at
386.
53. See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting, declaring, "The paternal
theory of government is to me odious"); State ex. rel. Garth v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, 322-23, 45 S.W. 245, 251 (1898)
(Gantt, C.J., for the court, declaring "[p]atemalism is a plant that should receive no nourishment upon the soil of
Missouri"); Godeharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431,437, 6 A. 354, 355-56 (1886); State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va.
179, 186, 10 S.E. 285, 287 (1889), overruled in White v. Raleigh Wyo. Mining Co., 113 W. Va. 522, 168 S.E. 798
(1933); Soifer, supra note 21.
54. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 345, 355-56, 358-63.
55. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 141, 150; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 383. But cf.
Benedict, supra note 20, at 326, 331 (stressing the continuities in early and later nineteenth century constitutional
thought); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism, supra note 32, at 59 (same).
56. See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BEmz, supra note 20, at 415-16, 455-58.
57. On the nondiscretionary ideal in contemporary jurisprudential theory, see McCurdy, supra note 20, at 973,
982-83, 987, 995; Siegel, supra note 20, at 192-93. See also, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S.
677, 701 (1896) (reiterating that in the exercise of its police power, "the legislature is vested with a large discretion,
which, if exercised bonafide for the protection of the public, is beyond the reach of judicial inquiry").
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. Id. at 56.
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In striking down the law, however, Justice Peckham, for the Court, stressed:
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature.
If the act be within the power of the State it is valid, although the judgment of the court might
be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: Is it
within the police power of the State? and that question must be answered by the court.
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-the power of the State to
legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere
assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not
necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means
to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held
to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.60
This "nondiscretionary," sharp separation of the sphere of state police power
from the realm of private right paralleled similar contemporary efforts to establish the
line separating federal commerce authority from state police power, 61 and to fix the
border between the respective rights of one private citizen and those of another. 62
Forswearing ostensibly more discretionary balancing of interests and policies, jurists
adhering to such a conception of their role envisioned the critical task of boundary
demarcation as an essentially "objective" process based largely on deduction from
settled fundamental principles that were inductively discoverable, for example, in the
established body of common law or the Constitution itself.63 As time went on, critics
on and off the bench increasingly questioned such jurisprudential ideals, particularly
as it became more and more clear that formalistic techniques of boundary definition
could be readily adapted to justify quite different and inconsistent delineations of state
power and of private rights. 64 Over time, such mounting skepticism prompted
increasing acceptance and utilization of various interest-balancing approaches instead
of techniques of formal categorization. 65 On a more theoretical level, these doubts
generated the alternative perspectives of "sociological jurisprudence" and, ulti-
mately, the legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s. 66 During the Progressive Era itself,
60. Id. at 56-58.
61. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895):
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation
between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed . . . and
acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent they may appear to be, had better be borne, than the risk be run,
in the effort to suppress them, of more serious consequences by resort to expedients of even doubtful
constitutionality.
62. See, e.g., Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in
PROFESSIONS A D PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AstEsI(CA 70, 87-98 (G. Geison ed. 1983); Kennedy, Toward an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc'Y
3 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought]. See also, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 836-1066
(discussing judicial efforts to delineate respective rights in cases challenging various concerted refusals to deal and vertical
agreements).
63. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 62, at 88-89; Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
PouMcs oF LAw 24 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Siegel, supra note 20, at 193.
64. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 62, at 94, 106; Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought, supra note 62, at 12-14
(discussing the different results reached by Justices Peckham and Harlan in Lochner, despite their acceptance of a common
conceptual framework).
65. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 62, at 94; Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, supra note 52, at 686.
66. On sociological jurisprudence, see A. KELLY, W. HAntSON & H. BELz, supra note 20, at 466-67. On legal
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however, the nondiscretionary ethic and the tendency to think in terms of separate
spheres of powers and rights retained considerable power for a great many jurists.
In general, state judges not only developed these theoretical and methodological
tenets of laissez-faire constitutionalism earlier, but also pushed their application
somewhat further than did the United State Supreme Court, 67 at least prior to the
1920s. 68 Moreover, individual judges varied considerably in their specific application
of these principles, reflecting at least in part varying sympathies toward labor or
business, or toward government regulation in general. 69 State and federal jurists did
declare unconstitutional a disproportionate number of labor statutes. 70 Yet, state and
federal decisions never displayed a rigidly probusiness bias. 71 Contemporary state and
federal judges rejected the great majority of constitutional challenges they considered72
and, indeed, upheld most labor enactments as well, 7 3 except for explicitly pro-union
measures such as bans on "yellow dog contracts." 74 State courts, moreover, displayed
markedly increased tolerance for progressive legislation as time went on.75
Despite such judicial diversity and change, however, laissez-faire constitutional
theory never ceased to define the relevant agenda of issues and principles in
Progressive Era constitutional adjudication. 76 Widely differing jurists continued to
accept the legitimacy of the core principles of substantive due process, economic
liberty, and liberty of contract even as they debated their application and increasingly
found challenged legislation to be in harmony with them. 77 In other words, while
contemporary courts did not embody strident "laissez-faire" hostility to legislative
innovation, they consistently did adhere to "laissez-faire constitutionalism" as it
refers to the body of jurisprudential theory based on the core principles of substantive
due process, economic liberty, and liberty of contract. 78 This continuity in constitu-
tional theory reveals a great deal about contemporary jurisprudence more generally,
realism, see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DFsiocRATIC THEORY: SCtENnTIc NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78
(1973).
67. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 39, 49, 85, 93.
68. On the conservative shift in United States Supreme Court constitutional opinions during the 1920s, see A.
KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, supra note 20, at 462-64; A. PAUL, supra note 20, at 228; J. SEtONCHE, supra note
23, at 419-26.
69. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 84; Urofsky, supra note 22, at 65-67, 88-91.
70. See, e.g., C. JAcous, supra note 20, at 64.
71. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 362; Benedict, supra note 20, at 296-98, 311, 331; Hovenkamp,
Political Economy, supra note 20, at 386-90.
72. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 360-63; C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 24; A. KELLY, W. HaRLsOm
& H. BELz, supra note 20, at 416; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 23, at 424-34; Urofsky, supra note 22.
73. See, e.g., Urofsky, supra note 22, at 89.
74. See, e.g., J. SEMONCHE, supra note 23, at 430-31; Urofsky, supra note 22, at 90.
75. See, e.g., C. JACOBs, supra note 20, at 93-94; Urofsky, supra note 22, at 81-82.
76. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 24; A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, supra note 20, at 454, 455-56;
A. PAUL, supra note 20, at 235-36.
77. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 76. See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
for the Court, stressing that while the members of the Court had disagreed over the final result in Lochner, they did not
dispute the principle of liberty of contract itself).
78. The confusion in terminology apparently arose because "Progressive" historians used the term "laissez-faire
constitutionalism" to stress the conservatism and believed antigovernment, probusiness bias of late nineteenth and early
twentieth century jurists. The phrase has continued in use even though recent scholarly writing has challenged the
Progressive historians' interpretation of judicial biases. See, e.g., Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, supra note
52.
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for laissez-faire constitutionalism embodied and strongly reinforced political, eco
nomic, and methodological perspectives whose power extended far beyond the realn
of constitutional adjudication itself.
B. Political and Economic Perspective in Contemporary Jurisprudence
1. The Interrelation of Political and Economic Theory
Public and private law jurisprudence during the Progressive Era simultaneously
reflected both the libertarian ideals of nineteenth century American political
liberalism 79 and the main themes of American classical economic theory.8 0 While
historians and legal scholars continue to debate the relative influence of these two
traditions, 8' it ultimately is not possible to explain contemporary legal theory in
general, or laissez-faire constitutionalism in particular, as fundamentally the product
of one of these two bodies of thought rather than the other. The two traditions cannot
be segregated from each other because American classical economic theory was not
merely implicitly, 82 but explicitly and centrally, a libertarian philosophy.
American political liberalism was most broadly premised on a belief in the
inherent right of individuals to maximum freedom of thought and action consistent
with the equal rights of others, and it asserted that a political system fully recognizing
these rights was optimal for both individuals and society as a whole. 83 Americans
always conceived of economic autonomy and opportunity as an important aspect of
this broader freedom of thought and action, 84 and American politics focused
prominently on economic issues and principles throughout the nineteenth century. 85
For Americans concerned with questions of economic policy and development,
classical economics offered a powerful central vision of rights and economic freedom
that paralleled and extended the central, more general vision of political liberalism.
79. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20.
80. See, e.g., C. JAcoBs, supra note 20, at 24; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20.
81. Historians and legal scholars continue to disagree over the relative impact of political and economic theory in
Progressive Era legal thought and continue to accept one or the other as the dominant causative force. For example, some
scholars have posited that constitutional law scrutiny of state regulation and, particularly, condemnation of unequal
"class" or "special" legislation rested on a "libertarian rather than economic basis." Benedict, supra note 20, at 304.
Others have argued, conversely, that such constitutional principles were "fundamentally about economic theory, not
about imperfections in the legislative process." Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 393,
82. See Benedict, supra note 20, at 298, 305.
83. On the varieties of liberalism and the changes in liberal thought over time, see, for example, L. HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADIoON IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATioN OF AMEmCAN PoLmcAL THouoGr S CE THE REVOLUrIoN (1955); R.
Smt, LIERALIS.M AND AMERICAN CONSTTVI1ONAL LAw (1985); R. UNGER, KNOw,.DGE AND PoLmcs 63-103 (1984);
Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,
74 J. Am. HIsT. 9 (1987); Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Ws. L. REv. 975.
84. See, e.g., Kloppenberg, supra note 83, at 15-16, 26-29 (discussing various liberal conceptions of the nature
and importance of economic autonomy and opportunity and the changes in these conceptions over time).
85. See R. HomSrADmTR, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERiCAN PoLMcS
AND OTnER ESSAYS 188, 205 (1965) [hereinafter R. HoFsTADTER, Antitrust Movement]. See also, e.g., S. FINE, supra note
3, at 3-25 (discussing pre-Civil War developments); M. KEllER, AFFAis oF STATE: PUBLIC LIF IN LATE NINETEENTH
CENTURY A.mtERmcA 162-96, 371-408 (1977) (discussing post-Civil War developments).
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2. The Natural Laws and Just Harmonies of Classical Economics
Although American classical economic writers repeatedly disagreed on various
nalytical details, they agreed that economic life was based on the operation of a
mall number of fundamental, natural laws, 86 which they frequently equated with
livine law as well. 87 Three laws played a particularly important role in the deductive
;cience88 of Political Economy.8 9 Classical economic writers insisted, first, that an
ndividual's labor gave that person a natural property right in whatever he or she
produced. As Wayland and Chapin's economics textbook, 90 the college textbook
most widely read in later nineteenth century America, 9 1 explained:
The exertion of labor establishes a right of Property in the fruits of labor, and the idea of
exclusive possession is a necessary consequence. Personal rights begin with the conscious-
ness of individual being and of individual achievement; and the idea of labor expended in the
production underlies directly or indirectly the property-right to anything. Originally the thing
produced belongs to him who produced it by an intuitive conception of right, and the act of
appropriation is as instinctive as the act of breathing.92
The presence of such individual property rights laid the foundation for the operation
of the second crucial natural law, the "possibility and the right of Exchange." 93
86. On American classical economic thought, see, for example, 3 J. DORFMAN, THE EcoNOMtiC MIND IN AM ERICAN
CIvILzATION (1949) (reviewing classical as well as other variants of American economic thought between 1865 and 1918);
S. FoNE, supra note 3, at 5-18, 47-79. Wayland and Chapin's leading text, for example, declared that all of economic
science was based on only "four fundamental laws," which it specified in the space of four short paragraphs. See F.
WAYLAND, THE ELEMtENTs OFPoLricAL ECOOMY 4-6 (recast by A. Chapin 1878). While classical economists shared a
natural law orientation, they disagreed somewhat in their precise description and enumeration of such laws. For example,
Julian M. Sturtevant declared that economic science ultimately was based on the single fundamental law that "[el very
man owns himself, and all which he produces by the voluntary exertion of his own powers." J. Srx-vMerr, EcoNo.ics
ORTHE SCIENCEoF .THI 1(1877). At other points in his text, however, Sturtevant referred to additional, related natural
laws as well. See, e.g., id. at 8, 50, 147. See also, e.g., A. WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A MANUAL OF PoLncAL
ECONOMY. ESiiRACINO THE LAws OF TRADE, CURENCY, ANo FINANCE 23 (7th cd. 1874).
87. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 52; H. WOOD, THE PoLrncAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAw 19 (1894)
(declaring "Natural Law is but another name for the methods of the Creator"); Benedict, supra note 20, at 299;
Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 419-20.
88. Classical economic writers repeatedly stressed the genuinely scientific nature of the field. See, e.g., F.
WAYLAND, supra note 86:
Political Economy is that branch of Social Science which treats of the production and application of wealth to
the well-being of men in society. It is a branch of true science.
By Science, as the word is here used, we mean a Systematic arrangement of the lavs which God has
established, so far as they have been discovered, of any department of human knowledge.
Id. at 4. See also, e.g., P. BoLLE, AmSERICAN THoUrr IN TRANsmoN: THE IMPAcT OF EvoLUTONARY NATuRAusm,
1865-1900, at 71-73 (1969); F. Bowss, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmcAL EcoNoMY APPULED TO THE CONDmON, THE
RESOURCES, AND THE INSITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 3 (3d ed. 1863); S. Nmco~m, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 21 (1886); J. STURTEVANT, supra note 86, at 1, 52; A. WALKER, supra note 86, at 4; H. WooD, supra note 87,
at 16-17.
89. During the Progressive Era, the field of economic writing continued to be designated as "Political Economy,"
indicating not only the study of economic relations within the political, as opposed to household, unit, see F. WAYLAND,
supra note 86, at 3-4, but also at least connoting the substantial interrelationship of political and economic issues. See,
e.g., A. PERRY, ELEstErs oF POUTICAL EcONomY 66-67 (1873); M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 6.
90. F. WAYLAND, supra note 86.
91. See R. HOSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwis si IN AMERICAN THouHT 145 (rev. ed. 1959) [hereinafter R. HopsrAorSt,
SOCIAL DARwINIssi].
92. F. vAvLAND, supra note 86, at 5. See also, e.g., J. STuRTEvANT, supra note 86, at 1-3.
93. F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 5. On the centrality of exchange in contemporary political economy, see A.
PERRY, supra note 89, at I ("Political Economy is the Science of Exchanges, or, what means just the
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The unimpeded operation of these two natural laws generated tremendous
individual and social benefits. The individual parties to each free exchange both
necessarily gained from it, or else would not have participated in the exchange. 94
Society as a whole gained as the number of mutually beneficial transactions
multiplied. 95
Exchange activity multiplied greatly through specialization and division of
efforts. Each individual benefitted by concentrating on what he or she could do best,
producing as much of that good or service as possible, and then exchanging it for
desired goods or services produced more efficiently by others. 96 Such specialization
spurred innovation 97 and expanded output, 98 and thus made possible a maximum
number of exchanges. 99 Consequently, it not only enlarged individual gains but also
dramatically magnified national prosperity as well.'CI
Within this natural economic world of unimpeded production and exchange, the
disparate interests of consumers, capital, and labor were coordinated and ultimately
harmonized through the operation of the powerful and pervasive natural law of
competition. Francis A. Walker, president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology1 01 and the first president of the American Economic Association, 102
expressed well the centrality of this force when he declared that "rightly viewed,
perfect competition would be seen to be the order of the economic universe, as truly
as gravity is the order of the physical universe, and to be not less harmonious and
beneficent in operation.' ' 0 3
Although economic scholars often insisted that economics was a positive, and
not a normative, science,' 0 4 both academic and popular texts repeatedly asserted that
freely competitive production and exchange powerfully tended to produce just results
consonant with God's will and the dictates of morality.105 As long as individuals were
not impeded in their free pursuit of economic opportunity, 06 abnormally high prices
and returns temporarily prevailing in any particular market would attract new
entrants. Such new entry would expand available supply, intensify horizontal
same, the Science of Value."). See also S. Nnwco. m, supra note 88, at 7, 57-58,447-48; A. PERRY, supra note 89, at
70, 72, 125, 134-35; J. SrOuRTvANr, supra note 86, at 8; A. WAF.KER, supra note 86, at 77-81.
94. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 62, 81, 135, 136. See also S. NEwcomB, supra note 88, at 7, 447-48.
95. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 125-26, 136.
96. See, e.g., id. at 130-36; J. SnnRcrvANT, supra note 86, at 38; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 102-03, 271-72.
97. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 136.
98. See, e.g., id. at 66, 136; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 102.
99. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 66, 136.
100. See, e.g., S. Nuvco.B, supra note 88, at 57-58; A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 66, 134, 136; F. WAYLAND, supra
note 86, at 56.
101. See S. Fmu, supra note 3, at 74.
102. See H. THoRELIu, supra note 1, at 120.
103. F. vALKER, POLITCAL EcONOMY 263 (3d ed. 1888). See also, e.g., J. SRmAEvsrr, supra note 86, at 52-53;
H. WooD, supra note 87, at 36 ("The old adage that 'competition is the life of trade,' is well founded.").
104. See, e.g., F. Bowarv, supra note 88, at 33; A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 61-62. See also S. FtNE, supra note
3, at 56.
105. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 62, 64, 125, 129; F. WAY.AND, supra note 86, at 6-7, 181; H. WooD,
supra note 87, at 19, 61. See also Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 Am. U.L. REV. 939, 949 (1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought].
106. See, e.g., F. Bowl's, supra note 88, at 216, 225, 229; F. WAY.AND, supra note 86, at 174.
1989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:257
competition, and force prices downward until supply and demand once again
achieved an equilibrium generating fair, normal prices and returns. 10 7
Economists differed somewhat in their descriptions of the prices and returns
produced by this process. Yet, late nineteenth century American academic and
popular exponents of classical economics widely shared the vision articulated, for
example, by Wayland and Chapin:
Assuming that there is, as there ought to be, free competition in the processes of
Exchange, as in the processes of Production, the perturbations of value caused by variations
of demand and supply continue only during a period, which cannot exceed the length of time
necessary for altering the supply. Under the pressure of competition, demand and supply
always rush to an equilibrium; but the condition of stable equilibrium is when things
exchange for each other according to their cost of production, or at what is fitly called their
natural value.10 O
When economic writers analyzed production costs and market values in more
detail, they focused preeminently on the contributions of labor.' 0 9 Classical econo-
mists declared that the long run competitive equilibrium prices of all goods tended to
107. See, e.g., F. BOWEN, supra note 88, at 241:
[I]f the gains in one department of enterprise are notoriously above the average,--if it is even suspected by a
multitude of sharp-sighted observers, who are on the lookout for such opportunities, that they exceed the
average,--more capital is at once attracted into the employment, till, by the competition of the capitalists with
each other, the rate of Profit is reduced to the common standard in other enterprises.
See also id. at 215-16, 225.
Nineteenth century writers varied somewhat in their focus when they talked about competition in economic life.
Some writers used the term to refer partly or even primarily to vertical relationships, especially the relations between
employers and employees. See, e.g., A. WALKER, supra note 86, at 21 (declaring that labor and capital are "competitors"
and that the "competition of labor and capital never ceases; but it respects the bond of union in which only each has its
own full development"). See also Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEx. L. REv. 919,
936 (1988) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies] (discussing such scholarly tendencies). Nineteenth century
economic writers in general, however, concentrated heavily on horizontal rivalry when they spoke of competition. See,
e.g., S. Newcom, supra note 88, at 248, 250, 448 ("If the makers [of an article] charge too much for it, other makers
will compete and thus lower the price."); H. Wooo, supra note 87, at 36 (declaring that competition in the business world
"consists either in giving a better article at the same price, or as good a one for less"). Indeed, at least one leading writer
took pains to stress the horizontal rather than vertical character of competition, even in the context of relations between
labor and capital. See J. STuRTEvANr, supra note 86, at 158 ("It should also be borne in mind, that the competition which
determines wages ... is the competition of labor with labor, and not of labor with capital.").
The strength of prevailing horizontal conceptions also was reflected, for example, in one of the leading late
nineteenth century judicial articulations stressing the importance of vertical rivalry. In his famous 1896 dissent in
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting), Oliver Wendell
Holmes explicitly acknowledged the longstanding policy in favor of horizontal business competition. See id. at 106-07,
44 N.E. at 1080-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting). He conceded, indeed, that some people believed that the nonhorizontal
rivalry between employers and workers could not similarly be deemed "competition," and precisely for this reason he
suggested that such vertical rivalry might be referred to as the "free struggle for life" rather than "free competition."
See id. at 107, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). On Holmes' views on competition as a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, see infra note 411.
108. F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 269-70. The text went on to explain, more precisely, that this production cost
measure of a good's natural value referred specifically to "the cost value of the most costly portion of it which the market
demands." Id. at 269. Academic and popular writers widely accepted this theory of "natural" or "normal" values and
prices. See, e.g., J. CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTEREST AND PROFTS 16-17, 69-70,
77-79 (1899) (finding the theory basically sound, but incomplete and often violated by real world conditions deviating
from perfect competition); H. WOOD, supra note 87, at 69. See also May, supra note 4, at 572-88 (describing the
characteristics of natural value theory and its influence in formative era antitrust jurisprudence); Siegel, supra note 20,
at 244-59 (discussing the power of natural value ideas in the theory and practice of late nineteenth and twentieth century
United States Supreme Court rate regulation review, and the impact of the decline of these ideas). Not all classical
economic writers approved of natural value theory, however. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 263.
109. See, e.g., Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 944-45; Siegel, supra note 20, at 244-45.
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be proportional to the total amount of labor employed in their production" o either
directly, in the form of services, or indirectly, in the form of capital embodying prior
services. Ilt Accordingly, all individuals tended to receive for their own services or
goods an equivalent, proportional return per relevant unit of contributed effort,
l
"
2
measured in terms not only of time but also of comparative productivity. 113 As a
result, economic writers concluded, consumers," 4 owners of capital,115 and provid-
ers of labor" 6 all gained the benefit of prices and returns that not only were natural,
but also just. As Francis Bowen, for example, explained in his major text, The
Principles of Political Economy Applied to the Condition, the Resources, and the
Institutions of the American People:117
110. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 41, 46, 65 (noting the "law of distribution.., that the value of the
completed product will be divided among its producers in exact proportion to the labor bestowed by each"); id. at 238
(declaring "in the last analysis... the creation of all value can be traced to labor alone"); A. PEaRY, supra note 89, at
106 (noting the "tendency in value to proportion itself to the aggregate of the onerous human efforts represented in a
service"); A. \VALKER, supra note 86, at 18; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 14, 20. Scholarly explanations of the labor
theory of value sometimes began with an acknowledged oversimplification. No party to an exchange, it was said, would
sacrifice more hours of effort, in service for another or in production of an exchangeable commodity, than the number
of hours of effort he or she received back directly in services or indirectly in goods embodying another party's labor. If
one received less hours of labor effort in return, it would be better to avoid exchange and instead spend that lesser number
of hours producing the desired services or goods oneself. See, e.g., F. BowE,, supra note 88, at 46-47. In practice,
however, such competitive self-help entry into new endeavors was not a viable alternative to "overpriced" exchange in
each individual instance. Differences of established skill levels, for example, often precluded one party from recreating
a service or good with as little labor as it took the other party to the exchange to produce it. See, e.g., id. at 47; Kennedy,
Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 944. Instead, marketwide proportionality of prices to labor inputs tended
to be ensured in practice by the more general forces of competition already noted. Wherever returns to labor expenditure
were disproportionately high, new competitors entered and forced the level of returns downward. Wherever labor received
disproportionately low returns, competitors would start to exit, causing supply and competition to decline and returns to
rise. In the end, competition would tend to equalize returns per unit of labor throughout the economy. See, e.g., F.
BowiEN, supra note 88, at 47; Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 944-45.
111. See. e.g., F. BowEn, supra note 88, at 65, 238 ("Capital itself is created by labor, and may be called
consolidated or invested labor. It consists of the economized or reserved fruits of previous labor, so that Profits are only
the compensation of former industry, just as Wages are the compensation of present industry."); id. at 272; A. WALKER,
supra note 86, at 19. Assimilation of the production contribution of land, the third classic factor of production, proved
somewhat more problematic, yet economic writers worked hard to bring rents within the labor theory of value as well.
See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 238; Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 948.
112. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 118. See also Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105,
at 945.
113. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 41 (explaining in connection with the labor theory of value that "[t]he
only measure of such labor is its comparative efficiency"). In addition, economists noted that cash wage payments did
not fully reflect the net return actually received by various laborers, because this was affected as well by such additional
circumstances as educational requirements for the employment, the onerousness or pleasantness of the job, and the
certainty or uncertainty of reward. See, e.g., id. at 216-23; J. SrTmu-vAN'r, supra note 86, at 180-84; A. WALKER, supra
note 86, at 260-62.
114. See, e.g., F. BowErs, supra note 88, at 57; H. WooD, supra note 87, at 126 ("Without State interference,
business policy and competition are each constantly forcing the rates for service towards the normal standard, or to such
a point as is natural and fair.").
115. See, e.g., H. WooD, supra note 87, at 69 ("There is a fair and normal value at which supply and demand meet,
to the mutual advantage of producer and consumer.").
116. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 57 (noting, for example, that competition generates "a fair
compensation" for retailers); A. PERRv, supra note 89, at 208 ("Workmen who are intelligent, prudent, skilful, will
infallibly get their due."); F. VAYLAND, supra note 86, at 174 ("If competition were universallyfree andfair ... [it
would adjust the customary rate of wages at that golden mean which would ensure a comfortable support to laborers and
adequate profits to employers."); H. WooD, supra note 87, at 30, 93 ("The law of compensation is untiring in finding
the specific gravity of every person, and in meting to him his desserts.").
117. F. BowEN, supra note 88.
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[C]ompetition is the general rule; and the effect of unrestrained competition is to distribute
the value of a product equally among its various producers, leaving neither to any of them,
nor to the consumer, any just ground of complaint. Each receives in exact proportion to the
labor which he has bestowed; the labor of all was equally necessary to present the article in
its finished state; and he who finally consumes it, therefore, justly pays all by rendering an
equivalent amount of labor.""
Conditions of freedom, allowing full, unimpeded operation of natural economic
law, thus generated both justice and harmony among individuals and groups in the
economy."t 9 Rejecting the pessimism of much of British classical economic
theory, 2 0 American writers stressed not only a harmony of producer and consumer
interests achieved through natural, fair prices, but also a fundamental harmony of
interest between labor and capital, notwithstanding increasing contemporary indica-
tions of apparent conflict. Labor and capital each needed the other in order to create
new commodities' 2' and, economic writers noted, "high wages and high profits often
go together, and tend to produce each other."' 122 Wage increases boosted labor
productivity and therefore generated greater profits.' 2 3 At the same time, greater
profits led to the payment of higher wages. 124 As Arthur Perry explained: "When the
matter is sifted to the bottom, it is seen that capital is as much interested in the
prosperity of labor, as labor is interested in the prosperity of capital. All legitimate
interests are in harmony."1 25
Realization of this harmonious, just world of natural, free, competitive
production and exchange critically depended on the security of economic liberty and
property, and the protection and availability of bargaining activity. Individuals would
not most vigorously and fully take advantage of efficient specialization with an eye
toward later competitive exchange unless they could freely choose their own
callings, 26 felt safe from external expropriation of the products of their own labor,127
118. Id. at 52. See also, e.g., A. WALKER, supra note 86, at 282.
119. As the popular writer Henry Wood proclaimed: "Viewed in itself... the present economic order, with all its
inherent laws, is beneficent. Commerce, per se, is altruistic." H. WOOD, supra note 87, at 43. See also, e.g., S.
NEwcomii, supra note 88, at 5 (declaring that economic processes are those of "a single harmonious system").
120. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 404-31.
121. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 272.
122. Id. at 240. See also A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 227.
123. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 227 ("If... as they undoubtedly do, high wages tend to make the
workmen more intelligent, industrious, frugal, and inventive, they are not a loss to the capitalist, but a gain. Larger gross
returns are thereby secured.").
124. See, e.g., F. BowEr, supra note 88, at 240 ("When a capitalist is making large profits, he is eager to extent
[sic] his business, to employ more hands, and consequently he offers higher wages."); A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 227;
J. STuRTEvArr, supra note 86, at 173.
125. A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 228. Or, as Wayland and Chapin put it, labor and capital "are natural partners,
and if not interfered with, will spontaneously seek each other as birds mate in the spring for a happy, fruitful union." F.
WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 107. Amasa Walker even more strongly attacked the belief
that hatred and retaliation are the normal relations of capital and labor, and that mutual distrust and hurtfulness
are inevitable in all the developments of industry. Such a belief blasphemes against the harmonies of
Providence,-is sightless before the glorious order of man and nature. It was the popular faith in such a principle
of hurt, not help, between the two great divisions of industrial power, that effected the Revolution in France.
A. WALKER, supra note 86, at 22.
126. See, e.g., A. PERRy, supra note 89, at 134; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 102, 271.
127. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 76, 78, 127; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 99 (declaring that when
private property is threatened "production languishes, industry diminishes, and the richest soil fails to support its few and
impoverished inhabitants").
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and fully expected the opportunities for genuinely free exchange to remain open. 128
Artificial interference with these natural rights and laws of labor, property, and
exchange necessarily would diminish the just results that these laws otherwise would
generate for both individuals and society at large. 129
3. Security, Freedom, and State Power in Political
Liberalism and Classical Economics
Security from interference with natural right formed an essential complement to
the theme of freedom in both American political liberalism 130 and classical econom-
ics. Neither tradition embraced the harsher, and considerably less influential,
131
visions of late nineteenth century Social Darwinism. These more dominant traditions
did not envision a world of ceaseless social warfare or boundless individualist rivalry,
but instead posited a moral world of maximum freedom for individual activities not
hurtful to others. 132 The state was necessary precisely because unrestrained individual
pursuit of self-interest posed a potential threat to the life, liberty, property, and
happiness of other individuals. 133 The state's legitimate and essential role was to
identify and deter forms of the pursuit of self-interest that exceeded the scope of
individual natural freedom and that threatened the legitimate interests and basic rights
of other individuals. 134
Late nineteenth century political and economic discussions of security and
freedom paralleled and supported each other. Economic principles frequently colored
political perspectives.1 35 At the same time, economic writers proclaimed that the
128. See, e.g., F. VAYLAND, supra note 86, at 272.
129. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 134-36. See also Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105,
at 947.
130. See, e.g., R. UoE, supra note 83; Singer, supra note 83, at 980-84.
131. See, e.g., R. BANNISTER, SOCIAL DARWNts.sm: SCENCE AND MYTH IN ANGLO-AMEFRICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 3-13
(1979); Benedict, supra note 20, at 21; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 417-20.
132. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 112-25; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 417-20
(on economic thought); Singer, supra note 83, at 980 (on liberalism). This basic vision found expression in law, for
example, in the fundamental maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus ("so use your own as not to injure another").
See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 60-61 (describing the emphasis that the treatise writer Christopher G. Tiedeman
placed on this maxim). See also infra text accompanying note 636.
133. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 83, at 67, 69, 71-72; Singer, supra note 83, at 980.
134. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 83, at 980-82. As Wayland and Chapin's text emphasized:
[Als all men are not influenced in their conduct by moral and religious principles, it is necessary that aggression
be somehow prevented, and violations of property, in so far as possible, redressed. Hence the importance of
wholesome and equitable laws, of an independent and firm judiciary, and an executive, which shall carry the
decisions of law faithfully into effect.
F. \VAIeAND, supra note 86, at 100. See also, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 78-79; S. NEwco.tn, supra note 88, at
449.
135. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Justice Field's juxtaposition of the Declaration of Independence and
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in his Butchers' Union concurrence, see supra text accompanying notes 35-38, was a
striking expression of a much more pervasive tendency. The Missouri Constitution of 1875, for example, made the
interrelation of economic and political visions of freedom and security even more explicit in its own bill of rights when
it paraphrased the words of the Declaration of Independence to proclaim
[t]hat all constitutional government is intended to promote the general welfare of the people; that all persons
have a natural right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that to give security
to these things is the principal office of government, and that when government does not confer this security,
it fails of its chief design.
Mo. CO NsT. of 1875, art. II, § 4.
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principles they posited were an aspect of the broader totality of basic American
political rights. As Arthur Perry explained in his widely read book 136 Elements of
Political Economy: 137
The great struggles of mankind in all history past have been around three points as centres:
first, freedom of person; second, freedom of opinion; third, freedom of exchange. In
consequence of the struggle around the first point, personal slavery has now mainly
disappeared from the earth; in consequence of the struggle around the second point, the
freedom of opinion, and especially of religious opinion, has gained great victories in all
lands, although much remains to be done before its complete triumph is assured; while, in
consequence of the struggle around the third point, one barrier after another has been thrown
down, one monopoly after another has been conquered, until it is pretty generally
acknowledged at present that freedom of exchange is just as sacred as freedom of person and
of opinion, and the struggle will certainly never cease until the liberty of contract and
delivery, subject only to conditions of morals, health, and revenue shall be international and
universal.13
Security of the natural rights of labor, property, and exchange required state
enforcement of the legal rights of liberty, property, and contract. 139 Property was
insecure unless protected from theft, 140 for example, and the freedom and frequency
of exchange could not be ensured without controls on private duress and fraud141 and
redress for breaches of bargains once made. 142 Late nineteenth century classical
economic writers pointed prominently to particular additional threats to labor,
property, and exchange that they believed needed special attention as well.
"Guild-like" trade union restrictions on free entry into particular trades assertedly
threatened grievous harm to individual liberty of calling. 143 Both property and free,
just exchange were threatened by anticompetitive combinations designed to raise
wages' 44 or prices' 45 artificially, even though such efforts were believed typically to
fail in the long run in the face of the natural forces of competition. 146 Normal
competition itself could not be deemed inconsistent with the natural property rights
of individuals, however, even if it lessened some individuals' wages or profits,
because full and free competition tended to guarantee a just equivalency of return in
all exchanges and therefore protected the right that each individual naturally had in
his or her own labor and productions. 147
136. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 433 n.269.
137. A. PERRY, supra note 89.
138. Id. at 143.
139. See, e.g., id. at 66-67; Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 949.
140. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 23, 30, 79; F. WMAYLAND, supra note 86, at 99.
141. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 99, 174.
142. See, e.g., id. at 99.
143. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 228-29; J. SrRmveANT, supra note 86, at 163-64; A. VALKER, supra
note 86, at 271-72; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 105, 177.
144. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 110, 177; H. WOOD, supra note 87, at 30, 40, 84-85.
145. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 179-80; H. WOOD, supra note 87, at 28, 40, 61-63.
146. See, e.g., A. VALKER, supra note 86, at 273, 283; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 179-80; H. WooD, supra
note 87, at 29, 40, 63-64, 66-67, 71-72, 85.
147. See supra text accompany notes 110-18. Individuals had no property right to any greater return than this
normal return that they would tend to receive under conditions of full and free competition. This core understanding of
competitive exchange value as a measure of property right was crucial not only in classical economic thought, but also
in Progressive Era United States Supreme Court due process review of rate regulation. On this point, see Professor
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As long as legislatures, executives, and courts acted simply to enforce and
protect natural rights, state action would remain the essential facilitator of natural law
and not its enemy. 148 Removal of such "stumbling blocks" as vice and crime, for
example, did not create but prevented "interference with the natural order of
things."' 149 "Legislation directed to this end," Francis Bowen declared, "is only a
legitimate carrying out of the laissez-faire principle." 150 Arthur Perry summed up
well this vision of the inherent nature of rights and the fundamental need for neutral
state action to protect them when he proclaimed simply: "rights are objective realities
that can be enforced in the courts."'
5
'1
If, however, the state departed from neutral support of natural rights it, too,
could become a dangerous source of oppression and economic decline.152 Identifi-
cation of the appropriate limits of government power constituted the critical recurring
question of late nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutional adjudication. In
repeatedly affirming and applying the core constitutional principles of economic
liberty, substantive due process, and liberty of contract,153 Progressive Era judges
sought to ensure that state action supported rather than threatened the corresponding
natural rights of labor, property, and exchange that were fundamental to liberal
political theory and classical economic thought alike.
4. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism and Political, Moral, and Economic Theory
Judicial application of these core principles of laissez-faire constitutionalism in
general, and judicial apprehension of the dangers of unequal class legislation and
paternalism in particular, repeatedly reflected a powerful intermixture of intercon-
nected political, moral, and economic ideas. Antipathy to unequal class or special
legislation 54 reflected a long-standing political libertarian concern 55 strongly shared
by American classical economic writers.' 56 The heirs of Jacksonian liberalism 157 and
the American proponents of classical economics deemed such governmental favor-
itism and discrimination to be at once politically oppressive, ethically repugnant, and
Stephen A. Siegel's very helpful discussion in Siegel, supra note 20, at 231-32, 244-63. As time went on, the theoretical
grounds for tolerating the private losses from competition did receive somewhat greater scrutiny in jurisprudential
philosophy, however. See, e.g., Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1894); Singer, supra note
83, at 1011-13, 1031-34. On late nineteenth and early twentieth century distinctions between "normal" and "abnormal"
competition, see infra note 251 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought, supra note 105, at 949-50.
149. F. BowEN, supra note 88, at 23-24.
150. Id. at 24.
151. A. PERY, supra note 89, at 110.
152. On such concerns within liberalism, see, for example, R. UroE, supra note 83, at 70-75; Singer, supra note
83, at 980-82. On this concern in American classical economic thought, see, for example, F. BowrE, supra note 88, at
78; A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 135; F. VAYLAND, supra note 86, at 100-02.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 20-78.
154. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
155. See Benedict, supra note 20.
156. See, e.g., F. BoweN, supra note 88, at 225-28; A. PERRy, supra note 89, at 210-12; F. VAYLAND, supra note
86, at 102-07, 111.
157. It was this specific variant of the American liberal political tradition that proved to be particularly influential
in laissez-faire constitutionalism. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20.
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economically pernicious, regardless of who it benefited;15 8 and they warned of both
special interest domination 59 and redistributive leveling by popular majorities. 60
Political and economic writers declared unequal class or special legislation politically
intolerable because it perverted the state's proper role as neutral umpire protecting the
equal rights of all.' 61 They declared it immoral because artificial, redistributive
assistance to some at the expense of others amounted ethically to theft, 162 and they
declared it abhorrent economically because deviation from neutral support of basic
rights necessarily impaired the optimal, just outcomes of natural economic law.' 63 In
addition, enactment of unequal special legislation favoring some groups or persons
assertedly spurred other groups to demand comparable legislative benefits. 16 4
Ultimately, the process would lead to corruption 65 and a battle for control of the state
itself.' 66 In the end, the most powerful groups would triumph and displace liberal
republican government with plutocratic tyranny. 67
Economic and political theorists prominently highlighted grants of monopoly
business privileges 168 and protective wage and hour legislation' 69 among the various
types of regulation and promotion they condemned as unequal "class"
legislation.' 70 In their discussions of such measures, economic writers pointed to
important, additional harms beyond the general political, moral, and economic
dangers already noted. Economists emphasized, for example, that establishment of
artificial monopolies impaired economic liberty,' 7 1 thereby reducing productive
investment in the affected trade 172 while it simultaneously reduced output'7 3 and
158. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 211; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at I11; Benedict, supra note 20, at
306-13, 319; Jones, supra note 20, at 755-56.
159. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 311-12, 314-19; Jones, supra note 20, at 755-56.
160. See, e.g., Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism, supra note 32, at 60.
161. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 305, 311-12, 319; Jones, supra note 20, at 756.
162. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 105; Benedict, supra note 20, at 305; Kennedy, Law in Economic
Thought, supra note 105, at 947.
163. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 317-18, 22 S.W. 350, 352 (1893) (stressing that if courts did not
declare unequal "'class" legislation unconstitutional, "it is difficult to see an end to such legislation, and the government
becomes one of special privileges, instead of a compact 'to promote the general welfare of the people' "); id. at 316, 22
S.W. at 352; A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 210-11; F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 110-11; Benedict, supra note 20, at
312-13.
165. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 311.
166. See, e.g., People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 694 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting), unreported
opinion subsequently published in connection with the case of People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 68 (1889) (Peckham, J.,
dissenting) (declaring that to uphold rate regulation of the sort involved in this case "is to provide the most frequent
opportunity for arraying class against class; and, in addition to the ordinary competition that exists through all industries,
a new competition will be introduced, that of competition for the possession of the government").
167. See Thomas Cooley's famous warning in People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 487 (1870), that "when the State
once enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those
most likely to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger." See also, e.g.,
W. LErwN, LAW AND EcONOIC POLIcY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUrioN OF THE SHERr.tAN AN'eTrrRus Acr 66 (1965); Benedict.
supra note 20, at 311-12.
168. See, e.g., A. PERRy, supra note 89, at 138-39; A. WALKER, supra note 86, at 255; F. WAYLAND, supra note
86, at 104-05; Benedict, supra note 20, at 314-21, 328.
169. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 211; F. VAYLAND, supra note 86, at 111.
170. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 305-26 (surveying the various types of government promotion and
regulation attacked as unequal "class" or "special" legislation).
171. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 102-04.
172. See id. at 104.
173. See, e.g., id. at 14.
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innovation,' 74 impaired free exchange,' 7 5 and increased prices. 176 As a result, the
consumer not only suffered a loss in wealth, but in addition became subject to "the
mere will of his oppressor."1 77
Similarly, legislative limitation of wage and hour terms potentially harmed not
only employers but also employees themselves. As previously noted, American
classical economists believed that, ideally, where there was free mobility of labor, the
interests of capital and labor were in harmony and competition would guarantee both
workers and employers a just return. 178 Although they granted that real world
conditions often varied from this theoretical ideal, 79 classical thinkers nevertheless
believed that wage and hour regulation likely would do more harm than good. Most
fundamentally, they believed that government lacked sufficient wisdom to determine
appropriate bargaining terms. 180 In addition, classical theorists reasoned that devia-
tions from natural law potentially harmed at least some workers because it lessened
the exchange options of workers who might have found legislatively barred terms to
be advantageous.' 8 Moreover, those classical economists who still subscribed to the
"wage-fund" theory' 82 concluded that any artificial increase in wages for some
workers necessarily meant reduced wages for some other laborers183 or, ultimately,
for all workers in general 184 because a limited "wage fund" would remain constant
or would shrink as increased wages reduced capital investment and long-term
productivity and earnings. 85
Finally, even if workers gained advantages in better wages or hours, special
legislation threatened individual workers and society at large with harm from the
corrosive effects of paternalism. Progressive Era jurists, particularly in the state
courts, repeatedly condemned paternalism' 86 as an especially severe threat to the
essential self-reliant, independent individualism underlying Protestant morality,' 87
liberal politics, 88 and classical economics. 8 9 The strongest statements came in state
court opinions in the 1880s and 1890s.' 90 In a classic early instance, the Pennsylvania
174. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 139.
175. See, e.g., id. at 138.
176. See, e.g., id.; F. VAYAeND, supra note 86, at 14, 104-05.
177. F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 105.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
179. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 174.
180. See, e.g., A. PERRY, supra note 89, at 211 ("Legislatures are not wise enough.., to say, for example, how
much wages capitalists should pay, or how many hours per day adult laborers shall work. To attempt to regulate any such
things as these by legislation is an economic abomination.").
181. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 20, at 308.
182. On the wage-fund theory in general and the intense disagreements among American economists on this issue,
see Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 431-37.
183. See Benedict, supra note 20, at 308.
184. See Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 20, at 433, 437.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., S. FRNE, supra note 3, at 5, 118-25; H. THOR a , supra note 1, at 566; Hovenkamp, Political
Economy, supra note 20, at 412-17, 419.
188. See, e.g., S. Ftx, supra note 3, at 5.
189. See, e.g., id. at 47-73.
190. See. e.g., State ex rel. Garth v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, 322-23, 45 S.W. 245, 251 (1898); State v. Loomis,
1989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court, for example, condemned a "scrip" statute that required wages to be
paid in lawful money, declaring it to be "an insulting attempt to put the laborer under
legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his
rights as a citizen of the United States."191 The severity of the threat that paternalism
posed to both free political institutions and American prosperity was perhaps best
expressed by Chief Justice John B. Gantt of the Missouri Supreme Court. Condemn-
ing a tax-supported scholarship fund as illegitimate government favoritism toward the
state university students who would benefit from it, 192 Chief Justice Gantt explained:
Paternalism, whether State or Federal, as the derivation of the term implies, is an assumption
by the government of a quasi-fatherly relation to the citizen and his family, involving
excessive governmental regulation of the private affairs and business methods and interests
of the people, upon the theory that the people are incapable of managing their own affairs,
and is pernicious in its tendencies. In a word it minimizes the citizen and maximizes the
government. Our Federal and State governments are founded upon a principle wholly
antagonistic to such a doctrine. Our fathers believed the people of these free and independent
states were capable of self-government; a system in which the people are the sovereigns and
the government their creature to carry out their commands. Such a government is founded
on the willingness and the right of the people to take care of their own affairs and an
indisposition on their part to look to the government for everything. The citizen is the unit.
It is his province to support the government, and not the government's to support him.
Under self-government we have advanced in all the elements of a great people more rapidly
than any nation that has ever existed upon the earth, and there is greater need now than ever
before in our history of adhering to it. Paternalism is a plant that should receive no
nourishment upon the soil of Missouri. 93
Traditional fears of the political, moral, and economic consequences of
excessive government activism ultimately prompted those judges most heavily
influenced by these fears to suggest, at least rhetorically, the continued relevance of
the old "political maxim that the government governs best that governs least"; 194 for
as the New York Court of Appeals, for example, declared in its 1885 opinion in In
re Jacobs,195 improper government interferences in economic affairs "disturb the
normal adjustments of the social fabric, and usually derange the delicate and
complicated machinery of industry and cause a score of ills while attempting the
removal of one.' 1 96
115 Mo. 307, 319-20,22 S.W. 350, 353 (1893); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431,437, 6 A. 354, 355-56 (1886);
State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188, 10 S.E. 288 (1889).
191. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431,437, 6 A. 354, 355-56 (1886). Striking down a similar law three years
later, the Court of Appeals of West Virginia also warned of paternalism even while reiterating the essentiality of the state
and its relation to natural law:
No one questions the position that, unless the government intervened to protect property and regulate trade,
property would cease to exist, and trade would exist only as an engine of fraud; but this does not authorize the
government to do for its people what they can do for themselves. The natural law of supply and demand is the
best law of trade.
State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 184, 10 S.E. 285, 287 (1889).
192. See State ex rel. Garth v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, 320-26, 45 S.W. 245, 250-52 (1898).
193. Id. at 322-23, 45 S.W. at 251.
194. People ex rel Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 14, 59 N.E. 716, 726 (1901).
195. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
196. Id. at 115. Classical economic writers repeatedly reiterated such warnings. See, e.g., F. BowEN, supra note 88,
at 22-23; A. PEurY, supra note 89, at 67, 135-37.
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Even if the problems posed by a particular instance of government impropriety
were not severe, failure firmly to enforce the constitutional principles identifying the
limits of legitimate government activity would open the door to much more
extensive, and collectively more dangerous, impropriety. As the New York Court of
Appeals noted in its decision in In re Jacobs:
Such legislation may invade one class of rights to-day and another to-morrow, and if it can
be sanctioned under the Constitution, while far removed in time we will not be far away in
practical statesmanship from those ages when governmental prefects supervised the building
of houses, the rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed and the reaping of grain, and
governmental ordinances regulated the movements and labor of artisans, the rate of wages,
the price of food, the diet and clothing of the people, and a large range of other affairs long
since in all civilized lands regarded as outside of governmental functions.' 97
C. Traditional Theory and New Realities in Progressive Era America
The sentiments expressed in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence affirmed
a powerful political and economic orientation that remained widely influential in late
nineteenth and early twentieth century American thinking. At a time of dramatic
political and economic change, this traditional vision of a natural, rights-based order
strongly tending to maximize opportunity, prosperity, justice, harmony, and freedom
provided a basic frame of reference for a great many observers as they sought to
understand and respond to the ongoing processes of national transformation. 198
This is not to suggest that late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinking
displayed only little variation. That most certainly was not the case. 199 Some
Americans embraced these traditional perspectives much more readily, completely,
and steadfastly than did others. Indeed, the substantiality of contemporary change led
many observers to reject particular traditional views in favor of new, alternative
visions, especially bureaucratic and technocratic ones, as time went on. 20° Moreover,
considerable intellectual diversity prevailed even among the large number of
Americans who still adhered to the core ideas of political liberalism and classical
economics, for these observers frequently disagreed on the proper application of
general theory and often invoked these ideas in substantially differing and sometimes
contradictory ways. 201 For example, while many Americans repeatedly attacked
197. Jacobs, 98 N.Y. at 114-15.
198. On the continuing power of such traditional perspectives during this period, see R. HoFsTADTER, Antitrust
Movement, supra note 85, at 196; M. SInAR, supra note 1, at 54, 77-78, 85; Keller, The Pluralist State: American
Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930, in REGULATION I PERsPECTIVE 56, 65, 68, 69 (T. McCraw
ed. 1981).
199. On the diversity of American ideological and practical responses to late nineteenth and early twentieth century
economic change, see R. BANNISTER, supra note 131; P. BoIFR supra note 88; J. DorMiAN, supra note 86; S. FINE, supra
note 3, at 29-400; R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwINIS.I, supra note 91; W. LErWIN, supra note 167, at 53-77, 81-85; E.
Pu.CELL, supra note 66; H. THORea, supra note 1, at 108-63, 309-68; M. WHrrE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAiNsr FORmAutm. (1976); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 133-63 (1967); May, supra note
4, at 561-71.
200. See, e.g., R. WIEBE, supra note 199, at 145-63.
201. See, e.g., May, supra note 4, at 568-71 (describing the similar invocation of natural law or natural process
ideas in otherwise differing Progressive Era analyses of the origins of the "trusts").
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major new political202 or economic20 3 developments as an alarming perversion of
traditional principles, many contemporary observers asserted that the prominent new
patterns of political and economic life could be harmonized with traditional
precepts. 2o4 In addition, observers sharing the same general theoretical orientation
sometimes produced differing statements of essential theory not because of funda-
mental analytical disagreement, but simply because particular factual circumstances
created pressure to stress certain theoretical elements more heavily than others. 20 5
Finally, individual Americans frequently added still further to contemporary analyt-
ical variety by embracing various older and newer perspectives at the same time,
sometimes at the cost of thoroughgoing logical consistency. 20 6
As already noted, in the midst of such diversity, late nineteenth and early
twentieth century judges tended to adopt a comparatively "conservative" stance and
strongly reaffirmed familiar political and economic perspectives in response to
rapidly changing circumstances. 20 7 Repeatedly, contemporary judges invoked Jack-
sonian liberal political ideals emphasizing limited state involvement in economic
matters and the dangers of unequal "class" legislation,20 8 even while legislators and
chief executives enacted and implemented new forms of regulation and protective
legislation on an increasing scale.20 9 Similarly, Progressive Era judges frequently
reaffirmed basic classical economic principles premised on a world of small-scale
proprietary capitalism and emphasizing entrepreneurial opportunity, free exchange,
202. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 29-164 (describing such contemporary criticisms of late nineteenth century
legislation).
203. The antitrust philosophy of Louis Brandeis, for example, provides a striking illustration of such a stance.
Brandeis repeatedly reaffirmed a traditional small-scale capitalist vision despite the increasing concentration of American
industry, declaring "bigness" to be the result of interference with the natural, beneficent processes of economic life. He
explained:
It will be found that wherever competition has been suppressed it has been due either to resort to ruthless
processes, or by improper use of inordinate wealth and power. The attempt to dismember existing illegal trusts
is not, therefore, an attempt to interfere in any way with the natural law of business. It is an endeavor to restore
health by removing a cancer from the body industrial. It is not an attempt to create competition artificially, but
it is the removing of the obstacle to competition.
Diagnosis shows monopoly to be an artificial, not a natural, product. Competition, therefore, may be
preserved by preventing that course of conduct by which in the past monopolies have been established.
L. BRANDEIS, Competition, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF Louts D. BRtANDEIS 115-16, 123-24 (0.
Fraenkel ed. 1934) [hereinafter L. BRADrEIS, Competition].
204. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (describing state and federal jurists' increasing acceptance of
Progressive Era legislative innovation despite their continued adherence to the traditional general principles embraced in
laissez-faire constitutionalism). See also M. SKAAR, supra note 1, at 33-40 (describing Progressive Era efforts to meld
"corporate capitalism and the American liberal tradition"); id. at 34.
205. For example, persons heavily influenced by the traditional perspectives of political liberalism and classical
economics sometimes emphasized the importance of individual freedom of action especially strongly when the overall
political and economic order posited by traditional theory did not seem seriously imperiled by such an emphasis. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying notes 487-513, 542-608. At other times, when private collusive or predatory activity appeared
to loom as a more serious danger to the labor, property, or exchange rights of others or seemed to threaten more seriously
the natural processes of competition, judges and other observers stressed more heavily the limits on individual freedom
of action, the rights of others, and the integrity and vitality of competition itself. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes
667-68, 690-709.
206. See, e.g., R. WIEB, supra note 199, at 152-53.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85, 152-97.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53, 154-97.
209. See, e.g., L. FRtIEMAN, supra note 3, at 439-63.
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and vigorous competition, 2 10 even while concentrated corporate capitalism grew
increasingly dominant,211 anticompetitive combinations proliferated,2 12 and profes-
sional economists themselves turned away from classical economic theory in
substantial numbers. 213
For some jurists, continued adherence to traditional principles was premised on
a hope that the forces of political or economic change might be reversed, or at least
slowed. 2 14 Other judges more readily accepted the inevitability, or even the
desirability, of changed political and economic circumstances but believed that these
basic principles still remained operative and essential even in a radically transformed
national environment. 21 5
D. The Economic and Intellectual Origins of Early Antitrust Law
Judges and other Americans greatly concerned with the maintenance of
economic liberty, the security of property, and the integrity of the natural processes
of competitive, free exchange in the face of the potential threats posed by
governmental innovation cared no less about these same basic principles and values
when the perceived threats arose from private activity. As noted already, tradition-
ally-minded observers firmly believed that private as well as governmental
impropriety imperiled basic rights and endangered the normal, beneficent operation
of natural economic laws. 216 During the Populist and Progressive Eras, Americans
widely perceived massive impropriety in contemporary private economic innovation
and feared that this activity was severely threatening basic rights and the natural
economic order.
In the post-Civil War decades, an expanded national transportation2 17 and
communications 218 network facilitated the geographic extension2 19 of markets and
allowed firms in many industries to increasingly take advantage of the greater
economies of scale 220 made possible by the numerous technological breakthroughs2 21
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While these developments generated
substantial new advantages and opportunities, they simultaneously posed severe
difficulties as well. New production technologies and expanded operations often
demanded heavy fixed investments222 and created a situation of periodic, severe
210. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49, 79-197.
211. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 43-47.
212. See, e.g., H. THoRtEIu, supra note 1, at 63-96, 254-308.
213. See, e.g., P. BoyLER, supra note 88, at 84-93; J. DositAt, supra note 86, at 160-212; S. FNE, supra note
3, at 198-251; H. THoRna, supra note 1, at 118-22. A number of leading economists who left classical theory for the
.new" or "historical" school approaches of the 1880s, however, largely returned to core principles of classicism, albeit
with important additions, in the "neoclassicism" of the 1890s and later years. See infra text accompanying notes 265-66.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34, 139-51.
217. See, e.g., H. THORtt1u, supra note 1, at 64.
218. See, e.g., id.
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., T. McC.Aw, supra note 5, at 73; H. THOMEUz, supra note 1, at 64.
221. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 65; H. THoRsaJ, supra note 1, at 63-64.
222. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 66; H. THosst .j, supra note 1, at 66.
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"overcapacity" or "overproduction" in many lines of commerce.223 As a result,
competitive rivalry in various forms intensified22 4 and threatened the viability of
many firms, 225 as businesses with fixed investments not easily transferred to other
uses struggled to maintain market share and recover at least something beyond their
variable expenses. 226 In the face of such threats of "overproduction" and "cutthroat
competition," American firms in great numbers sought protection through various
forms of mutual cooperation, 227 ranging from such "loose" combinations as simple
cartels or pools, 228 to such tighter combinations as trusts, holding companies, and
mergers, 229 which simultaneously offered possibilities of new productive efficiencies
not achievable through simple "loose" arrangements. 230
Americans witnessing these developments widely agreed that the new economic
patterns raised fundamental questions about the future of American political and
economic life. 231 Such questions lay at the heart of early antitrust discourse, which
focused fundamentally on the extent to which basic, traditional principles and
realities would be maintained, adapted, modified, or displaced in the face of the
powerful contemporary currents of private economic innovation. These foundational
issues remained central in American public affairs for a quarter of a century,2 32
becoming a major focus not only of legislative 233 and judicial234 activity, but also of
state235 and national electioneering, most prominently in the three-way presidential
contest between Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson in
1912.236
Contemporary observers disagreed on major issues of antitrust policy in large
measure because they disagreed on the naturalness, inevitability, and legitimacy of
particular new patterns of economic activity. A great many Americans perceived
important efficiencies in new large-scale corporate operations and accordingly
approved of much or all of the contemporary increase in economic concentration.23 7
Such approval often reflected a theoretical adaptation rather than any wholesale
223. See T. McCgAw, supra note 5, at 65-68; M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 54.
224. See H. THOREILI, supra note I, at 67-68 (discussing diverse forms of intensified competition including not only
price cutting but also, for example, bribery and the dissemination of false rumors about competitors).
225. See id. at 67.
226. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 66-67; H. TnORrt 11, supra note 1, at 67.
227. See T. McCtAw, supra note 5, at 66, 72; H. THORELLI, supra note 1, at 68, 72-85.
228. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 68, 72; H. TtORtotLu, supra note 1, at 73-76.
229. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 72; M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 44-47; H. TnoRELu, supra note 1, at 76-85.
230. See, e.g., T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 72, 325 n.23.
231. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 34 (stressing the fundamentality of contemporary antitrust issues and
noting that at bottom these issues centered on whether "corporate capitalism and the American liberal tradition [could]
be mutually adapted the one to the other").
232. See id. at 33-34.
233. See, e.g., W. LErWIN, supra note 167, at 85-99; H. THoRELu, supra note 1, at 155-56, 164-232, 352-53;
May, supra note 4, at 498-500.
234. See, e.g., W. L EwIN, supra note 167, at 82-83, 143-55, 161-84, 218-37, 253-65; H. THOR.ELu, supra note
1, at 432-99, 596-604.
235. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 662, 665.
236. See, e.g., R. HOFSTAOTER, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 204, 207-08; R. WatE, supra note 199, at
214-18.
237. See, e.g., R. HOFSTAD"ER, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 192.
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rejection of traditional orientations.2 38 Defenders of concentrated corporate capital-
ism frequently declared, for example, that natural competitive processes still could be
counted on to produce normal, beneficent outcomes even when the greater efficien-
cies of large-scale enterprise led to concentrated markets, asserting that potential
competition would operate powerfully to restrain big business behavior.23 9 Similarly,
observers who rejected the static natural law ideas of classical economics did not
entirely reject a natural law orientation, but frequently invoked a dynamic form of
natural law to proclaim new economic concentration the beneficent outcome of
natural industrial evolution. 24°
Many contemporary Americans departed rather more substantially from tradi-
tional ideas and approved of "loose" combinations as well, condoning cartels or
pools on the ground that full-blown competition sometimes did more harm than good
under modern conditions. 241 Antitrust defendants, for example, vigorously urged this
distinctly "nonclassical" perspective in early Sherman Act cases before the United
States Supreme Court. 242 While the Supreme Court firmly rejected such
arguments,2 43 a number of late nineteenth century common law opinions, 244 and
several lower federal court decisions245 in the early to mid-1890s, demonstrated
considerable sympathy for such views and upheld particular "loose" arrangements
over common law or Sherman Act challenges. Although approval of such agreements
often rested on a belief that changed circumstances justified a departure from
traditional analyses, 246 even defenders of collusive, price-affecting activities often
explained their position as merely a modification of still valid traditional principles,
declaring that cartel arrangements could constitute a legitimate self-help remedy for
abnormally occurring deviations from natural economic processes and outcomes. 247
238. See M. S.LAR, supra note 1, at 33-40 (summarizing leading efforts to adapt traditional conceptions to an
economy dominated by concentrated corporate capitalism).
239. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, supra note 167, at 76-77; H. TuOsLI, supra note 1, at 123,129 (describing such ideas
in the thought of John Bates Clark and George Gunton); Giddings, The Persistence of Competition, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 62,
65-67 (1887).
240. See May, supra note 4, at 568-70.
241. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 17, 33, 53.
242. See, e.g., Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337, 351-52 (1904); United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 321, 330-31 (1897).
243. See, e.g., Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 337-38; Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 338-39.
244. See, e.g., Central Shade Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 9 N.E. 629 (1887); Skrainka v. Scharring-
hausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 (1880).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290 (1897);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 76 F. 895 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), aff'd mem., 89 F. 1020 (2d Cir. 1897), rev'd, 171
U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Nelson, 52 F. 646 (D. Minn. 1892). See also Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28
F. 553 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886) (common law case). But see United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 46 F.
432 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891) (condemning a price-fixing combination under the Sherman Act).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 321 (1897) (relating the argument of
defendants that competition among contemporary railroads generated "entirely different economic results" than did
competition in other lines of business due to the unique nature of railroad property).
247. Consider, for example, the antitrust sentiments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals expressed in the leading
Kentucky ease of Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703 (1909), overruled in Gay
v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 849, 179 S.W. 1051, 1058 (1915). As a prior article explains in detail, in the early years of the
twentieth century the Kentucky Court of Appeals relied directly on basic classical economic theory to develop a distinctive
test for judging price fixing and output limitations under state antitrust law. Under this test, collusive efforts were held
lawful as long as the resulting prices did not deviate from the "real" or "natural" value posited in classical economic
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A great many contemporary Americans, however, viewed both concentration
and cartelization with considerably less equanimity.248 In large numbers, they
concluded that increased economic concentration often arose unnaturally from
illegitimate forms of private rivalry or combination, 249 or from improper governmen-
tal favoritism,250 rather than from normal competitive processes251 or the greater
efficiency of the businesses that came to dominate particular markets. At the same
time, Americans widely reasserted a heightened, traditional hostility to cartelization
as such price-enhancing activity proliferated in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century America.252 Believing older common law approaches inadequate to meet the
newly increased dangers of concentration and cartelization,253 these observers called
for new antitrust legislation as an essential new means to better protect a traditionally
conceived political and economic order at a time of mounting private misconduct2 4
theory. See, e.g., Owen County Burley Tobacco Soc'y v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 149-51, 107 S.W. 710,714 (1908);
May, supra note 4, at 547-49, 575-84. The Kentucky court stressed that this standard would not condenw, for example,
cooperative efforts by farmers to raise abnormally and unfairly depressed prices back up to the "real value" level. See,
e.g., Owen County, 128 Ky. at 151, 107 S.W. at 714. As the court explained in International Harvester, it was perfectly
legitimate for farmers to reduce output collectively at a time of "overproduction":
[Olversupply would reduce the selling value to a level below the normal. If a concerted action of producers
resulted in only a normal supply of a commodity reaching the markets, the normal demand would maintain
normal prices. Such action is necessary, or at least seems wise both as it affects the producer and the general
public. Violent depressions of a market that result in heavy losses are hurtful to everybody, because they tend
to disturb the natural equilibrium of business, and reflect harmfully, or are likely to, upon every other branch
of commerce. The general public can not be benefited by disaster to any legitimate business. Conditions that
are stable, assuring, and reasonably profitable are best for everybody.
International Harvester, 131 Ky. at 576-77, 115 S.W. at 711.
248. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADT.R, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 189, 193, 198, 203, 208; W. L.m'xv, supra
note 167, at 70, 265, 269, 270-78; M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 54-55, 85; H. THoRasw, supra note 1, at 162-63.
249. Louis Brandeis, for example, forcefully expressed this perspective during the 1912 presidential election
campaign when he declared:
Competition... may be preserved by preventing that course of conduct by which in the past monopolies have
been established. If we had in the past undertaken by appropriate legal and administrative machinery to prevent
our financiers and others from carrying out agreements to form monopolies; if we had seriously attempted to
prevent those methods of destructive or unfair competition, as are manifest in "cut-throat competition"--
discrimination against customers who will not deal exclusively with the combination; if we had made any
persistent, intelligent effort to stop advantages gained by railroad discrimination, espionage, or the practice of
establishing "fake independents," or to stop those who have secured control of essential raw material from
denying business rivals access to it-few of the trusts, of which we now complain, would have come into
existence, or would, at all events, have acquired power to control the market.
L. Bt.A'oDSzs, Competition, supra note 203, at 124. See also id. at 115, 117; M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 54-55, 85; W.
WILsON, THE NEw FREEDoNt 165-81 (1913).
250. See, e.g., W. Lmvm, supra note 167, at 76; H. TnoRELtu, supra note 1, at 124; May, supra note 4, at 570.
251. Antitrust advocates sometimes referred to "unfair," "ruthless," or "cutthroat" competition in a way that
suggested a form of rivalry differing only in degree from the normal forms of competition posited by classical economic
theory. It is important to understand, however, that antitrust proponents widely tended to view disfavored, abnormal forms
of competition as different in kind from ordinary competition, somewhat as physical destruction of a competitor's plant
or inventory would have been considered different in kind. Louis Brandeis, for example, explained:
Believers in competition make no suggestion that traders be compelled to compete. They ask merely that no
trader should be allowed to kill competition. Competition consists in trying to do things better than someone
else; that is, making or selling a better article, or the same article at a lesser cost, or otherwise giving better
service. It is not competition to resort to methods of the prize ring, and simply "knock the other man out." That
is killing a competitor.
L. BRANDEis, Competition, supra note 203, at 115.
252. Heightened concern for price fixing and for such related practices as pooling, output limitation, and territorial
division is evident, for example, in the passage of numerous state antitrust statutes specifically attacking such activities.
See J. DAvIss, T usT LAws AND UNFAIR COMPEITMON 164-82 (1916).
253. See, e.g., R. HoFSrADER, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 197.
254. See, e.g., id. at 196-97.
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While early antitrust law thus reflected a strong continuing faith in the basic
perspectives of conventional nineteenth century theory, it did not originate because of
any newly heightened concern for competition expressed by professional economists
themselves. These scholars, indeed, generally disapproved of antitrust legislation, 255
declaring it to be unnecessary, 256 ineffectual, 257 or counterproductive. 25 8 Economists
adhering most closely to classical orthodoxy remained wary of extensions of
government power, and generally believed that natural forces would tend to correct
new distortions in economic life without the need of expanded government
intervention. 259 The "historical" or "new" school approaches that rose to promi-
nence in the 1880s in opposition to classical theory, and that sparked the 1885
establishment of the American Economic Association, 260 generally did not support
antitrust legislation significantly more strongly. 261 In fact, "historical" or "new"
school economists frequently proclaimed that modern conditions rendered competi-
tion wholly or partially obsolete as a governing principle. 262 Echoing sentiments
expressed, for example, by contemporary proponents of the Social Gospel, 263 these
younger economists frequently urged a new ethic of cooperation to replace older
ideals of rivalry, at least in important sectors of the American economy. 264 As
historians repeatedly have observed, when some leading "neoclassical" economists
later did express strong concerns for the maintenance of competition, their views
largely reflected a movement back toward classical principles265 and a belated
conjunction with popular antitrust sentiments that had previously developed on the
basis of traditionalist premises. 266
Such traditional perspectives greatly influenced not only popular proponents of
new antitrust measures, but also the federal and state legislators who enacted such
provisions and the judges who applied them. The early antitrust analyses of
congressmen and federal jurists discussed in the next two Parts of this Article strongly
displayed the power of traditional theory. The state legislative and judicial analyses
255. See, e.g., W. LE"WiN, supra note 167, at 75-77; G. Snoti., The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly,
in THE ECO\O oST AS PRFAcHER, AND OT ER ESSAYS 41-42 (1982); H. THOR. U, supra note 1, at 120-21, 567;
Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies, supra note 107, at 939.
256. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, supra note 167, at 76; H. THoREus, supra note 1, at 110, 565.
257. See, e.g., W. LErwIN, supra note 167, at 76; H. THOREm., supra note 1, at 314, 321-22, 325.
258. See, e.g., W. LErwiNt, supra note 167, at 74-75; H. THoRELu, supra note 1, at 123, 125-26.
259. See, e.g., H. WooD, supra note 87, at 66 ("Natural Law punishes its offenders without the aid of courts or
judges."). See also, e.g., H. THoREt.i, supra note 1, at 110, 565.
260. On the rise of the "historical" or "new" school and the founding of the American Economic Association, see,
for example, S. FiNE, supra note 3, at 198-251; H. ToRELU, supra note 1, at 118-22.
261. See, e.g., H. T-ORE U, supra note 1, at 120-21, 567.
262. See, e.g., Andrews, The Economic Law of Monopoly, 26 J. Soc. Sc. 1 (1890); Seligman, Railway Tariffs and
the Interstate Commerce Law. I., 2 POL. SC. Q. 369 (1887). See also S. FINE, supra note 3, at 204; H. THORELI, supra
note 1, at 123, 125, 316.
263. See, e.g., S. FiNE, supra note 3, at 200-01; H. THORLtI, supra note I, at 117-19.
264. See, e.g., S. Fn E, supra note 3, at 200-01; H. THoRFu, supra note 1, at 119.
265. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 3, at 247 (noting the "trend back to classical economic theory" in the 1890s),
id. at 251; H. THoREt.u, supra note 1, at 121, 311-12 ("Clearly .... neoclassicism was rooted squarely in traditional
liberal economics ....").
266. See, e.g., H. THoRtFui, supra note 1, at 315 (noting that the changing thinking of John Bates Clark and Richard
T. Ely "brought them-especially Clark-much closer to public opinion on the trust problem than they had been during
the previous decade").
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addressed in subsequent Parts provide striking further evidence of the strength of
these ideas and offer considerable additional insight into the variety of ways in which
general political and economic theory shaped early antitrust reasoning.
Ill. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE CURRENT
DEBATE OVER CONGRESSIONAL GOALS
The congressional debates preceding passage of federal antitrust legislation in
1890 and 1914 reflected the contemporary diversity of national antitrust sentiment.
Like other Americans, congressmen varied substantially in their reactions to
increased concentration and cartelization. Some congressmen harbored serious
doubts about the virtues of competition itself, at least in certain circumstances, and
expressed considerable sympathy for self-protection through cartelization. 267 Most
debate participants, 268 however, expressed substantial concern over anticompetitive
activity and exhibited a strong continuing belief in traditional political and economic
perspectives. 269
The debates do not suggest that a majority of congressmen in 1890, or even in
1914, had come to believe that the natural, beneficent order posited by traditional
theory was a fundamental impossibility; nor do they indicate that a majority perceived
intrinsic or inevitable conflict among the core political and economic elements that
were traditionally thought to be in natural harmony. 270 Instead, the debates appear to
indicate a widespread congressional commitment to the long-established ideals of
economic opportunity, security of property, freedom of exchange, and political
liberty, and considerable hope that antitrust law might prove to be an effective vehicle
for their substantial, simultaneous realization.
These basic ideals powerfully influenced congressional attitudes and activity
long before the onset of antitrust agitation in the 1880s. Immediately after the close
of the Civil War, for example, Senator John Sherman27' and other Republicans
267. See, e.g., 21 CONG. RFc. 2606, 2643 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Stewart); id. at 2729 (remarks of Sen. Platt); id.
at 5954 (remarks of Rep. Morse); id. at 5956 (remarks of Rep. Stewart). See also W. LmwN, supra note 167, at 97.
268. See, e.g., H. THoRELu, supra note I, at 190, 197-98, 226; Bork, supra note 15, at 22-23.
269. See generally W. Ltrrwi, supra note 167, at 85-99, 273-78; H. TnoRu.au, supra note 1, at 164-232; Bork,
supra note 15; Lande, supra note 15. Congressional invocation of common law terminology in the Sherman Act at a time
when a number of common law decisions had approved of cartel activity in certain circumstances, see supra text
accompanying note 244, does not demonstrate that a majority in Congress in 1890 similarly approved of such
anticompetitive behavior. The developed body of common law by 1890 contained conflicting strands of decisions and
offered support for both defenders and opponents of anticompetitive loose arrangements. See infra text accompanying
notes 524-608. See generally, e.g., E. KirTNtE, , supra note 15, at §§ 2.1-3.16; W. Lmwm, supra note 167, at 18-52,
77-85; H. THoRELLu, supra note 1, at 9-53. Moreover, as William Letwin, for example, has pointed out, a strong
contemporary belief prevailed among judges and lawyers that the common law generally favored competition and
abhorred monopoly. See W. LerwiN, supra note 167, at 81 & nn.3-5. The explicit congressional citations to decided case
law exhibit such a perception and were invoked primarily to support condemnation of anticompetitive behavior. Thus, in
the most prominent and detailed exposition of relevant case law, Senator Sherman cited a half-dozen recent cases by way
of illustration, yet not one of these cases supported cartelistic or other anticompetitive behavior;, indeed, the cited cases
firmly condemned such conduct. See 21 CoNo. REC. 2457-59 (1890); H. TnoR.tIu, supra note 1, at 183; Bork, supra note
15, at 22 & n.40, 25 & n.54; Clark, supra note 15, at 1143-44.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 86-153.
271. Sherman joined the United States Senate in 1861 after serving six years in the House of Representatives. See
H. THoPs Is, supra note 1, at 167.
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expressed the free labor philosophy on which their party was founded 272 in their
efforts to safeguard the fundamental rights of former slaves through the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments 273 and related legislation. 274 After the eradication of slavery had
been accomplished through adoption of the thirteenth amendment, 275 Republican
congressmen next focused not on such "political" or "social" issues as voting or
segregation, but on basic economic "civil rights," which they firmly believed to be
more fundamental. 276 Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1866277 did not address suffrage
or social segregation, but instead sought to complement the thirteenth amendment's
free labor guarantee by protecting the foundational rights of property and free
exchange, and the related rights of court enforcement and equal, nondiscriminatory
treatment in law. 278
When Senator Sherman and other congressmen debated the merits of new antitrust
legislation a quarter-century later, they did so largely within this same "tradi-
tionalist" 279 frame of reference. As the leading early proponent of congressional anti-
trust activity, 280 Senator Sherman promoted such legislation as essential protection for
basic economic rights and political freedom and expressly proclaimed his proposal281
272. See generally E. FoaER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBUCAN PARTY BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR (1970).
273. U.S. CONsT. amends. XI, XIV, XV.
274. On congressional reconstruction efforts, see H. BEI.z, E. IANCIPATION A D EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
CONSTrIUtIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WVAR ERA 47-150 (1978); M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEEMTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTs (1986); E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 228-80 (1988); H. HVtAN & W. WiEcEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITrIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at
295-303, 309-13, 386-426, 439-72 (1982); Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory
in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221 (1987).
275. U.S. Coisr. amend. XIII.
276. On the economic conception of "civil rights" at this time, and the belief that these rights were more
fundamental than "political" and "social" rights, see H. Baz, supra note 274, at 108-09, 116; H. HYMAN & W.
WtEcEK, supra note 274, at 395-98; Maltz, supra note 274, at 225-26, 250.
277. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
278. The Act declared that
all persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other ....
Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
279. The principles of economic opportunity and political freedom, as well as the related ideas of competition and
efficiency expressed in the debates, are more appropriately designated as "traditional" perspectives than "populist"
notions. Indeed, it is ironic that many of the traditional ideas reflected in formative era congressional discussion repeatedly
are labeled "populist" notions in current antitrust discourse. See, e.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPUCATION 109-112 (1978) (discussing "populist" goals in antitrust
law). The conservative United States Supreme Court Justices and state jurists who asserted such ideas as a part of
laissez-faire constitutionalism hardly seem to have been predominantly "populist" in outlook. Moreover, Senator
Sherman, the chief congressional proponent of these ideas, was someone very far removed from late nineteenth century
populist politics. In 1890 Sherman ranked as perhaps the most eminent and experienced congressional member of the
Republican Party that would resoundingly defeat the Populist-Democratic presidential crusade of William Jennings Bryan
six years later. On Sherman, see W. LETrwN, supra note 167, at 87; H. THORELLI, supra note 1, at 167. On the watershed
election of 1896, see M. KEL.ER, supra note 85, at 580-87.
280. See, e.g., H. THORE LI., supra note 1, at 226; Bork, supra note 15, at 14-15; Lande, supra note 15, at 84.
Sherman's views have been said to reflect the antitrust goals of Congress in general in 1890. See Bork, supra note 15,
at 45.
281. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in I THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES 89-90 (E. Kintner ed. 1978). As originally introduced, Sherman's bill addressed arrangements
tending "to prevent full and free competition" or tending to "advance the cost to the consumer." After several
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"a bill of rights, a charter of liberty" 28 2 designed to protect "the industrial liberty of
the citizens of these States. "283 While Sherman expressed considerable sympathy for
newly emerging patterns of corporate efficiency, he nevertheless emphasized the
fundamentality of traditional economic and political principles, and sharply distin-
guished rights-based, productive activity from the pernicious behavior his bill would
ban. In an often-cited passage, for example, he declared:
It is said that this bill will interfere with lawful trade, with the customary business of life.
I deny it. It aims only at unlawful combinations. It does not in the least affect combinations
in aid of production where there is free and fair competition. It is the right of every man to
work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on equal
terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies at the
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges. 284
Similarly, in the initial resolution that Sherman proposed and that the Senate adopted
in 1888, directing the Committee on Finance to explore and report on possible new
antitrust measures, Sherman highlighted core conventional principles when he
declared the purposes of antitrust legislation to include the preservation of "freedom
of trade and production, the natural competition of increasing production, [and] the
lowering of prices by such competition." 285
Throughout the debates, Sherman continued to embrace traditional nineteenth
century assumptions treating economic opportunity, efficiency, competition, wealth
distribution, and political liberty as all of a piece. In strongly urging the passage of
new federal antitrust legislation, Sherman did not focus on any single economic harm
alone, but instead stressed the multiplicity of economic, social, and political evils that
the increasing concentration of wealth already had generated. Evoking traditional
fears, 286 he warned:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them
all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that
has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast
combinations to control production and trade and to break down competition. These
combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corporations and reach State
authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are
imported from abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable
there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every necessity
of life.287
amendments, the bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which produced a differently worded draft, see S. 1,
51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 CONG. REc. 2901 (1890) (as amended), that subsequently was enacted into law as the Sherman
Antitrust Act. See, e.g., W. LmwN, supra note 167, at 85-95; H. THOREI , supra note 1, at 166-210. Although most
of the debates in the 51st Congress focused on earlier draft language that was different from the language ultimately
adopted, the debates nevertheless have generally been thought to reflect the goals and sentiments behind passage of the
final version. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 15, at 44-47. But see Peritz, supra note 8, at 291-313 (arguing that the final
draft language represented an important congressional policy shift from the earlier draft). On the possible inferences to
be drawn from the use of common law terminology in the final bill, and their relative persuasiveness, see supra note 269.
282. 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890).
283. Id. at 2457.
284. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 325-28.
285. 19 CoNG. REC. 6041 (1888).
286. See, e.g., W. LmwN, supra note 167, at 59-70.
287. 21 CoNG. REc. 2460 (1890).
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Sherman's perception of contemporary economic and political dangers devel-
oped within an overall conceptual framework commonly, if not universally, accepted
by other state and federal legislators. When legislators in New York supported major
new antitrust legislation in the late 1890s, for example, they explicitly detailed their
motivating economic and political vision in terms that closely mirrored the core
perspectives of political liberalism and classical economics. 28  While federal legis-
lators did not discuss general theory in comparable detail, much of the congressional
debate commentary strongly, if less systematically, displayed a similar orientation,
and traditional general theory appears to have influenced more particularized
congressional analyses substantially.
When Senator Sherman and other congressmen discussed competitive pricing,
efficiency, economic opportunity, and political freedom during the formative era,
each of these principles tended to take on a somewhat different total significance than
it does today because it fit into a different larger whole, consisting of a different
overall interrelationship among these various elements. Today these principles take
on larger meaning because of their placement within a neoclassical paradigm
stressing marginal cost and marginal revenue, consumers' surplus, and allocative
efficiency. 28 9 In 1890 or 1914 they took on larger meaning as part of a still widely
accepted classical paradigm stressing basic natural rights of labor, property, and
exchange and the labor theory of value. 290
Evidence of the power of this earlier frame of reference appears repeatedly
throughout the congressional deliberations. In both the early and later debates, for
example, congressmen frequently affirmed the rights-based and often moralistic
perspectives of traditional nineteenth century theory291 in their continual, explicit,
and pointed denunciations of supracompetitive pricing as "extortion, ' 292
"robbery," 293 and "theft." '294 When members of Congress repeatedly praised
productive efficiency even on the part of giant corporate enterprises, their comments
rested on a similarly traditional foundation. Increased productive efficiency long had
been considered an important outcome of the process of specialization associated with
the right and prevalence of exchange,295 and some degree of productive combination
of effort beyond individual activity long had been accepted as natural and legitimate
288. See infra text accompanying notes 621-51.
289. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 107-15; R. LIPsEY, P. SSTmER & D. PURVIS, ECONOMIcs 1-455 (8th ed.
1987); E. MANSrELD, MiCRoEcONOMIcS (6th ed. 1988); P. SmaatuWsoN & W. NoRDHAus, EcoNomics (12th ed. 1985).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 86-129.
291. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 86-107.
292. See, e.g., in the Sherman Act debates, 21 CoNG. REc. 2461 (1890) ("extortion which makes the people poor")
(remarks of Senator Sherman); id. at 1768 (remarks of Senator George); in the Federal Trade Commission Act debates,
Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Appendix: Statement by Senator Newlands, S. REp. No. 597,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1914); in the 1914 Clayton Act debates, 51 CoNG. Rec. 14,223 ("The chief purpose of antitrust
legislation is for the protection of the public, to protect it from extortion .... ") (remarks of Senator Thompson).
293. See, e.g., in the Sherman Act debates, 21 CoNG. Rc. 2614 (1890) (remarks of Representative Coke); id. at
3150 (remarks of Senator George); in the Federal Trade Commission Act debates, 51 CoNG. REc. 13,223 (1914) (people
"are being robbed") (remarks of Senator Lane).
294. See, e.g., in the Federal Trade Commission Act debates, 51 CoNG. Rc. 13,223 (1914) ("fraud and... theft
... being practiced upon the people") (remarks of Senator Lane).
295. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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in mainstream classical writing. 296 When congressmen in 1890 invoked this principle
to approve the new productive efficiencies of formative era corporations, they did not
necessarily abandon traditional economic theory. 297
Two efficiency-related developments beyond the "overcapacity" difficulties
already noted298 threatened to undermine faith in an economic order promoting the
full, simultaneous realization of economic opportunity, security of property, and
competitive, free exchange. One troubling situation was that of market dominance
attained solely by superior skill and efficiency without any resort to predation or
multifirm combination. The Senate debate focused on this possibility just prior to
Senate passage of the redrafted bill 299 that became the Sherman Antitrust Act. 300 In
a well-known colloquy, Senator Kenna of West Virginia asked:
Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his superior skill
in that particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the United States to whom an
order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable period, so that he is
conceded to have a'monopoly of that trade with Mexico; is it intended by the committee that
the bill shall make that man a culprit?30'
In reply, Senators Edmunds and Hoar appealed to long-established understandings of
"monopoly" to assure their colleagues that the bill would have no such effect. The
understandings they invoked reflected full acceptance of competitive efforts "to
furnish the commodity for the lowest price, ' 302 and confined the term "monopoly"
to situations of market dominance achieved through private or governmental activity
that artificially impeded free competition. Senator Edmunds stressed that in the
hypothetical posed by Senator Kenna there was "not any monopoly at all'303 because
the dealer had not improperly "bought off his adversaries" 3°4 or artificially cornered
the market by getting "the possession of all the horned cattle in the United
296. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 92 ("Some concentration of capital is . . . essential to the most
effective division of labor.").
297. Senator Sherman, for example, expressly analogized productive corporations to the productive partnerships that
had long been accepted as an important part of national economic life. In Sherman's view, both partnerships and
corporations were lawful and quite beneficial, see 21 CoNG. REC. 2457 (1890), provided that they were not illegitimately
established
with a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the
cost of the consumer. It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience,
that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.
id. Sherman perceived no competitive threat from such useful partnerships and corporations as long as "[t]he same
business is open to every other partnership" and other corporations could be formed on equal terms. Id. The "trusts,"
however, constituted an entirely different, "new form of combination.., that seeks to avoid competition by combining
the controlling corporations, partnerships, and individuals engaged in the same business, and placing the power and
property of the combination under the government of a few individuals, and often under the control of a single man ......
Id. This distinctly different kind of combination assertedly posed severe dangers that were not posed by ordinary
partnerships and corporations, and, accordingly, called for strong legal countermeasures. See id. See also infra note 319.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
299. See supra note 281.
300. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
301. 21 CoNG. REc. 3151 (1890).
302. Id. at 3152 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
303. Id. at 3151.
304. Id. at 3152.
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States. ' 30 5 Senator Hoar reaffirmed traditional theory even more explicitly, explain-
ing:
the word "monopoly" is a merely technical term which has a clear and legal signification,
and it is this: It is the sole engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men from
engaging in fair competition with him.
Of course a monopoly granted by the King was a direct inhibition of all other persons to
engage in that business or calling or to acquire that particular article, except the man who
had a monopoly granted him by the sovereign power. I suppose, therefore, that the courts
of the United States would say in the case put by the Senator from West Virginia that a man
who merely by superior skill and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or
manufacturer or artisan of any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as
well as he could was not a monopolist, but that it involved something like the use of means
which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like the
engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged in the same business.3 o6
Traditional nineteenth century economic thought focused very heavily on such
private or governmental impropriety as the source of substantial deviations from
competitive market conditions307 and acknowledged only very few situations of
"natural" monopoly. 303 Before the increasing size and significance of scale
economies created more serious impediments to new entry in a large number of
markets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economic observers
largely assumed that positions of market dominance based only on superior skill
would not severely harm opportunity or competitive pricing. Any attempt to maintain
abnormally high prices, they believed, would tend to be thwarted in the long run by
the entry of efficient new competitors. 309 The famous Senate colloquy just noted
heavily reflected this conventional nineteenth century perspective. Still influenced by
a powerful vision of economic life premised on earlier nineteenth century realities,
the participants never acknowledged, much less addressed, the possibility that
persistent market power in cattle dealing or elsewhere might arise not from private or
public misconduct but instead from new technological or distributional economies of
scale. 310
The second situation that raised potentially troubling questions for traditional
theory was the attainment of market dominance through forms of "tight" combina-
tion that seemingly generated new efficiencies even while simultaneously impairing
economic opportunity and competitive, free exchange. By the late nineteenth
century, many economists already had come to view large scale economies as a
pervasive fact of life that fundamentally and inevitably altered basic economic
patterns in many, if not all, sectors of the economy. 311 As a result, these analysts
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46, 168-77.
308. See, e.g., G. SnILR, supra note 255, at 38-41; Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, in CORPORATIONS A DoCIETY: POwER AND RESPONSIBILrY 13, 27 (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1987)
[hereinafter Horwitz, Corporate Theory].
309. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
310. See 21 CoNo. REc. 3151-52 (1890).
311. See, e.g., H. C. ADAmS, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, in Two ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAmS
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accepted the legitimacy of many market-dominating combinations and called for
public ownership or rate regulation as the essential complement for this new stage of
industrial development. 31 2 Contemporary congressmen did not yet widely share these
new perspectives, 313 however, especially in 1890 when the greatest "wave" of
merger activity still lay in the future. 314 While some congressional observers
questioned the continued viability, or even desirability, of vigorous, free competition
in at least some modern circumstances, 31 5 congressional antitrust advocates generally
stressed bad conduct as the root cause of modern economic problems and sought to
achieve a revitalized competitive order through new legislation. 316
The new prominence of private economic activity that enhanced efficiency but
seemingly impaired basic rights of labor, property, and exchange presented a
disturbing anomaly. Congressmen heavily influenced by the general perspectives of
conventional nineteenth century political and economic theory reacted as believers in
a particular paradigm quite often do when faced with seemingly contradictory
evidence. As Thomas Kuhn, for example, has pointed out in describing the power
and development of explanatory paradigms in the history of science, 31 7 it typically is
the case that believers try hard to maintain their existing paradigm by refining or
adapting it in light of anomalous new data before they discard the old paradigm for
some entirely new one. 318 Congressional supporters of new antitrust legislation
reacted to market-dominating but efficient combinations in much the same manner.
Rather than embrace any fundamentally new economic theory, they sought to
assimilate this unusual element into a traditional vision. Thus, antitrust advocates
strongly analogized such combinations to other forms of unnatural, abnormal,
artificial interference with economic life, 319 and minimized the importance of the
57 (J. Dorfman ed. 1969). See also S. FINE, supra note 3, at 224-25 (on Henry Carter Adams), 231-32 (on Richard T.
Ely); W. L'EN, supra note 167, at 74, 77; H. THoRELL, supra note 1, at 123 (on John Bates Clark), 124 (on Richard
T. Ely), 125 (on E. Benjamin Andrews).
312. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 262, at 12; Jenks, Capitalistic Monopolies and Their Relation to the State, 9
POL. Sci. Q. 486, 504-09 (1894); Seligman, supra note 262, at 373-74.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 268-69.
314. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 1, at 45-47; H. THotRLt, supra note 1, at 306, 573. See generally N.
LAMOREAUX, TRE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINEsS, 1895-1904 (1985).
315. See supra note 267.
316. See generally sources cited supra note 269.
317. See generally T. KuHN, THE STRucruRE OF ScETImsc REvoLUTIoNS (2d ed. 1970) (the seminal work on the
power of paradigms in scientific work and development).
318. See id. at 66-91.
319. As already noted, Senator Sherman, for example, treated monopolistic combinations or "trusts" as distinctly
different in kind from ordinary, productive combinations, whether in the form of partnerships or corporations. See supra
note 297. Monopolistic combinations, he believed, presented an illegitimate, artificial intrusion that posed a grave
economic threat and demanded a vigorous legal response:
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or
lower prices, as will best promote its selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down
competition and advance prices at will where competition does not exist. Its governing motive is to increase the
profits of the parties composing it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard
the interest of the consumer. It dictates terms to transportation companies, it commands the price of labor
without fear of strikes, for in its field it allows no competitors. Such a combination is far more dangerous than
any heretofore invented, and, when it embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a particular
industry in all of the States of the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any article produced,
it is a substantial monopoly injurious to the public, and, by the rule of both the common and the civil law, is
null and void and the just subject of restraint by the courts, of forfeiture of corporate rights and privileges, and
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efficiencies these combinations generated, by asserting that such efficiencies bene-
fitted only the combination members themselves and not the public at large.
320
The traditionalist perspectives reflected in early congressional commentary on
competitive pricing and productive efficiency appeared even more strongly in
discussions of economic opportunity and political freedom. Early congressional
emphasis on the maintenance of entrepreneurial opportunity, for example, heavily
reflected a traditional nineteenth century perception of small business activity that
varied substantially from common late twentieth century perspectives. Modern
antitrust scholars often view small firms largely as less efficient operators seeking
special protection at the expense of consumers. 321 For most of the nineteenth century,
however, small proprietors were considered to be the vibrant heart of economic
life,3 22 indeed, archetypical examples of the "free laborers" who were thought to be
central to the natural economic order of classical economic theory. 323 Senator
Sherman, for instance, strongly reaffirmed such traditional views when he promi-
nently proclaimed the fundamentality of free labor and substantially promoted his bill
on the ground of industrial liberty. 324 Others in Congress in 1890325 and, more
widely, in 1914326 seconded his sentiments. As Senator Burton, for example,
declared in 1914: "In our business life there must be a free field for all, and along
with this tendency toward operations on an enormous scale no policy should be
adopted or allowed under which equality of opportunity shall be destroyed or the
deserving competitor driven out of business.' '327 Or, as Senator Reed expressed it in
the same Federal Trade Commission Act debates:
in some cases should be denounced as a crime, and the individuals engaged in it should be punished as
criminals. It is this kind of a combination we have to deal with now.
21 Cor,. REc. 2457 (1890).
320. Thus, Senator Sherman emphasized:
It is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of
production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to
the consumer depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combination. It will vary in
time and place by the extent of competition, and when that ceases it will depend upon the urgency of the demand
for the article. The aim is always for the highest price that will not check the demand, and, for the most of the
necessaries of life, that is perennial and perpetual.
Id. at 2460.
321. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 46-47.
322. See, e.g., R. HomSrADTst, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 196-97, 210-11.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84.
325. See, for example, the 1890 remarks of Senator George, declaring:
It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the present system of production and of exchange is having that
tendency which is sure at some not very distant day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small
enterprises. This is being done now. We find everywhere over our land the wrecks of small, independent
enterprises thrown in our pathway. So now the American Congress and the American people are brought face
to face with this sad, this great problem: Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the great mass of the
people and concentrated in the hands of a few men. . . ?
21 CoNG. REc. 2598 (1890). See also, e.g., id. at 4100 (remarks of Representative Mason); Lande, supra note 15, at
101-05.
326. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 15, at 120-21.
327. 51 Co\,G. REc. 14,792 (1914).
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We are trying to keep the doors of competition open in this land. We are trying to keep the
highways of opportunity unobstructed. We are trying to keep it so that the feet of the men
of to-day may travel along an open path, so that all may have a fair chance to gain a
livelihood and to embark in business.3 28
Congressional comments on the symmetry of economic and political freedom
and the need for antitrust law in order to protect political liberty also reflected
long-familiar perspectives invoked in response to a newly prominent danger. The
numerous congressional declarations of alarm over the threats posed by recent
economic innovations, indeed, strongly paralleled the traditional anxieties over
government innovation that Progressive Era judges so frequently and prominently
expressed in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.
While adherents to laissez-faire constitutionalism sought to eliminate threats to
basic rights posed by unchecked public authority and government favoritism, 32
9
congressional antitrust supporters sought to block similar threats arising from
unchecked private authority and illegitimate private enhancement of economic
power. As Senator Sherman warned:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over the
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit
to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent
competition and to fix the price of any commodity. 330
While contemporary constitutional analysts denounced state paternalism as a threat to
the critical vigor of American individualism and a danger to political and economic
independence, 33' congressional antitrust advocates warned that industrial consolida-
tion likewise threatened to create dangerous permanent hierarchies of dominance and
subordination among individuals in the economic realm. Senator Cummins, for
example, pointedly expressed this fear in the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act
debates when he urged that
we must do something to preserve the independence of the man as distinguished from the
power of the corporation; that we must do something to perpetuate the individual initiative.
We often go wrong, I believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a vast
aggregation of wealth, can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can a smaller
concern, therefore it is for the welfare and the interest of the people of the country that the
commodity shall be produced at the lower cost. I do not accept that article of economic faith.
I think we can purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it involves the surrender
of the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master mind.332
While traditional political and economic theorists declared that discriminatory
special legislation bred class resentment and conflict, 333 congressional antitrust
supporters proclaimed that private economic impropriety bred artificial inequalities of
wealth generating these same evils in a parallel fashion. Thus, Senator Sherman's
328. Id. at 13,231.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 152-97.
330. 21 CoNG. REc. 2457 (1890).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 186-93.
332. 51 CONG. REc. 12,742 (1914).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
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previously quoted reference to popular agitation over a growing inequality of
condition334 was echoed in such other congressional comments as Senator Borah's
dire 1914 warning that monopolies "divide our people into classes, breed discontent
and hatred, and in the end riot, bloodshed, and French revolutions. ' 335
Finally, while late nineteenth century political theorists commonly predicted that
state favoritism would spark a battle for the control of government itself and the
ultimate subversion of liberal republican institutions, 336 early antitrust proponents
warned that the improper private attainment of disproportionate economic power could
lead to precisely the same catastrophe. Like the Jacksonian liberals who came before
them, 337 antitrust proponents feared both business domination and popular leveling.
Senator Hoar, for example, echoed Senator Sherman's declaration that the great new
combinations already "reach State authorities" 338 when he warned in 1890 that the
great monopolies constituted "a menace to republican institutions themselves. ' 339
Fears of political domination by big business were powerfully reiterated in Congress
during the 1914 Clayton Act debates, both in report language and in comments by
individual congressmen. 340 The House committee report on the interlocking direc-
torships section of the bill, for example, cautioned that "[t]he concentration of wealth,
money, and property in the United States under the control and in the hands of a few
individuals or great corporations has grown to such an enormous extent that unless
checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity of our institutions. ' 341 Similarly,
Representative Kelly expressed the sentiments of many in Congress when he declared:
Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only industrial domination but
political supremacy as well....
... Great combinations of capital for many years have flaunted their power in the face
of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt way into politics and government, they
have dictated the making of laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented
the free and just administration of law. In doing this they have become a menace to free
institutions, and must be dealt with in patriotic spirit, without fear or favor.342
334. See supra text accompanying note 287.
335. 51 CONG. REc. 15,955 (1914). Such concerns were not merely a "populist" notion utterly foreign to nineteenth
century American classical economics. As early as 1878, for example, Wayland and Chapin's leading economics text also
prominently warned of the class dangers of undue concentration of capital, declaring:
1. A general Distribution of Capital is a matter of prime importance. By this is meant such a condition of
things that the capital of a country shall be in many hands rather than few,--that laborers themselves shall have,
or be encouraged to secure some capital.... Some concentration of capital is... essential to the most effective
division of labor. But beyond this necessity, the great aggregation of capital in the possession of individuals is
disadvantageous because it leads inevitably to despotic assumption on the one hand, and to envyings and
jealousies on the other.
F. WAYLAND, supra note 86, at 92.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
338. See supra text accompanying note 287.
339. 21 CONG. REc. 3146 (1890).
340. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 15, at 129-30.
341. H. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
342. 51 Co\,N. REc. 9086 (1914).
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As previously noted, Jacksonian liberals and their intellectual heirs warned not
only of business hegemony, but also of government control by a discriminatory
popular majority, declaring that the latter condition would prompt a defensive,
victorious counterattack leading to the establishment of plutocratic tyranny.3 43
Congressional antitrust advocates warned of the reverse scenario. Artificial, illegit-
imate "trust" activity creating disproportionate private power at the expense of the
people at large, they cautioned, could spark a defensive majoritarian reaction leading
to the ultimate popular subversion of republican institutions. As Senator Sherman
warned his colleagues: "They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never
before such giants as in our day. You must heed [the people's] appeal or be ready for
the socialist, the communist, and the nihilist. '"344
Modern commentators acknowledge that the congressional debates reflect
simultaneous concerns for competitive pricing, efficiency, economic opportunity,
and political freedom. 345 Antitrust scholars frequently stress, however, that congress-
men discussed competition and efficiency significantly more often than they
discussed other concerns, 346 particularly in 1890.347 Recent interpretations of early
congressional intent also emphasize the paucity of congressional commentary
endorsing even the partial sacrifice, or "tradeoff," of some concerns for the sake of
others. 348 They further note the absence of any expressed or likely congressional
desire to entrust federal judges with an open-ended mandate to balance a "bunch of
inconsistent goals.' 34 9 On the basis of this evidence, antitrust writers widely
conclude that Congress implicitly identified the more extensively discussed concern
for competitive pricing35° or "consumer welfare" 35 1 as the dominant 352 or even
sole353 general goal of antitrust legislation. 354
These current scholarly positions heavily reflect a late twentieth century
perception of serious potential conflict among the various values and principles of
343. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
344. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
345. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 50-71; E. KiNTNEl , supra note 15, at §§ 4.1-4.18; Arthur, Farewell,
supra note 12, at 277-91; Bork, supra note 15; Clark, supra note 15, at 1136-46; Easterbrook, supra note 12, at
1702-03; Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9, at 936, 940; Lande, supra note 15.
346. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 6; Bork, supra note 15; Clark, supra note 15; Easterbrook, supra note 12;
Lande, supra note 15.
347. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 63; Lande, supra note 15, at 105-30.
348. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 66.
349. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 1703 ("Judges ought not read a statute that speaks of competition, monopoly,
and other economic terms, written against a legislative history that evinces concern for low prices and consumers' welfare,
as if Congress winked and really meant to pursue a bunch of inconsistent goals.") (footnote omitted).
350. See Lande, supra note 15.
351. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 57, 61-66.
352. See Lande, supra note 15, at 68-69 (declaring that Congress sought to promote a number of social, economic,
and political goals but that in cases of conflict it "intended to subordinate all other concerns to the basic purpose of
preventing firms with market power from directly harming consumers").
353. See R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 57, 61-66; Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 1703.
354. As Judge Frank Easterbrook recently has described early congressional intent:
The choice they saw was between leaving consumers at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the judges to protect
consumers. However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of consumers from
overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on "efficiency." ... The few references in
the legislative history to "small dealers" are a sideshow.
Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 1702-03 (footnote omitted).
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economic opportunity, competitive pricing, efficiency, and political freedom. They
also heavily reflect powerful modern concerns about the appropriate institutional role
of federal judges. Indeed, current interpretations of early congressional goals and
intentions, across the entire spectrum of scholarly antitrust opinion, tend to be
interlinked heavily with conceptions of the proper role of antitrust judges and,
particularly, the appropriate limits of judicial discretion. Scholars who believe that
Congress established multiple general goals tend to accept the necessity and
legitimacy of more substantial judicial discretion 35 5 than do scholars who believe in
a narrower reading of congressional aims and intentions. 356 In short, modern antitrust
analysts tend to accept the inevitability of a choice between multiple congressional
goals and broad judicial discretion on the one hand, and narrower congressional
intentions and more limited judicial discretion on the other.
These current perspectives and concerns seem problematic as a guide to
historical understanding of formative era antitrust thought, for reliance upon them
projects modem questions and assumptions into a substantially different climate of
opinion. In particular, the continual search for Congress' original choice or priorities
among competing general goals seems to miss a central point. In 1890 and 1914 a
majority of congressmen appear to have implicitly or explicitly believed what modern
commentators uniformly cannot accept: that all of these goals of opportunity,
efficiency, competition, fair distribution, and political freedom were central, largely
consistent, and capable of vigorous implementation through "nondiscretionary"
judicial decisionmaking.
To the extent that traditional economic perspectives still held sway, it is difficult
to accept the inferences urged in recent accounts of early legislative intent. Classical
economic theory centrally and strongly asserted that the various economic, social,
and political elements now conceived of as largely independent and inevitably
conflicting were in fact naturally in harmony and crucially interdependent,35 7 and,
indeed, that the optimal realization of the full benefits of economic opportunity,
competition, and political freedom tended to depend upon the simultaneous presence
and vigor of one another.358 Accordingly, if most congressmen in 1890 or 1914
explicitly or implicitly embraced the powerful general principles of classical theory,
as it seems likely they did, it appears unlikely that their disproportionate attention to
pricing concerns and silence on tradeoffs necessarily indicates a desire to protect only
one part of the natural system while leaving aside or sharply subordinating the rest.
Heightened discussion of supracompetitive pricing or monopolistic mergers may
simply indicate that congressmen in 1890 perceived such activity to be the most
prominent and most immediately threatening danger to the natural economic order
and the fundamental natural rights of labor, property, and exchange. While they may
have been particularly agitated over these forms of private artificial interference with
355. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9; Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, supra note 9.
356. See, e.g., R. BoP., supra note 6, at 72-89; Arthur, WorkableAntitrustLaw, supra note 15; Easterbrook, supra
note 12, at 1703.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 86-125.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
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natural economic processes, their use of generic prohibitions of restraints of trade at
least arguably indicates their more general, fundamental concern to eliminate any
private activity artificially restraining or impeding the natural laws of trade as they
understood them. Simultaneously, the use of general common law terms seemingly
indicates their desire to leave to the courts the "objective" task of more precise
identification of artificial restraints, 359 a task they likely assumed could and would be
accomplished through the orthodox, "nondiscretionary" judicial methodology of the
time. 360 When circumstances changed and other dangers, such as exclusion of small
firms, appeared to loom comparatively larger, congressmen devoted more attention
to these dangers in the 1914 antitrust debates, 36' even while substantially retaining the
same traditional background frame of reference in which various elements today
believed to be inconsistent or subversive largely continued to be perceived as
harmonious and simultaneously essential. The general absence of discussion of
"tradeoffs" likely reflects, in short, not an implicit, but largely unarticulated,
preference for the aspects of natural economic life most extensively discussed, or a
failure to recognize the inevitability of conflict because of ignorance of economic
theory, but the logical outcome of an economic theory that powerfully insisted that
in general no tradeoffs were necessary or desirable.
Once Congress had established new legislation to preserve economic essentials,
it became the responsibility of federal judges, and ultimately of the United States
Supreme Court, to carry out this mandate. As already noted, the traditional political
and economic outlook repeatedly reinforced in contemporary constitutional adjudi-
cation formed the general theoretical framework for this judicial enterprise through-
out the formative era. The leading judicial theorists of early federal antitrust law
displayed particularly striking evidence of the power of this perspective in their
antitrust analyses both on and off the bench, and it is to the thought of these leading
theorists that this Article now turns.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SHERMAN Acr
During the formative era, debate over the appropriate standard for Sherman Act
analysis revolved chiefly around three proposed general formulations. 362 Judge
William Howard Taft's ancillary/nonancillary framework announced in the case of
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 36 3 offered a powerful approach for
359. As Senator Sherman declared during the 1890 debates:
I admit it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This
must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare
general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the
law, as the courts of England and the United States have done for centuries. This bill is only an honest effort
to declare a rule of action ....
21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
361. See, e.g., R. Borne, supra note 6, at 63-66; Lande, supra note 15, at 106-30.
362. For accounts of the federal debate, see R. Born, supra note 6, at 21-47; W. Lvni, supra note 167, at
143-265; H. THORELu, supra note 1, at 445-77.
363. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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distinguishing beneficial from economically harmful arrangements.3 64 Yet, while it
may have been influential or at least suggestive of developing patterns in other
contemporary antitrust litigation, Taft's general standard was never explicitly
approved or embraced by any of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
during these years.3 65 Instead, Supreme Court debate centered chiefly around the
well-known alternative formulations advocated by Justice Rufus Peckham on the one
hand, and Justice Edward Douglass White on the other. While the "every direct
restraint" standard advocated by Justice Peckham prevailed initially, 366 increasing
judicial doubts regarding this test were apparent by 1904,367 and Justice White's
alternative interpretation banning only "unreasonable restraints of trade" finally
triumphed in the Court's 1911 opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.368 In
their early formulations, these two standards were invoked to support differing
practical results.369 As ultimately explained and defended over time, however, these
standards became increasingly similar in the patterns of condemnation and approval
they produced, and at least arguably seemed to evolve in the direction of Taft's
ancillary/nonancillary methodology. 370
In their respective approaches to antitrust analysis, Judge Taft and Justice
Peckham adhered to traditional political and economic theory somewhat more firmly
than did Justice White, who sometimes strayed significantly from classical reasoning
and assumptions. The approaches of all three jurists displayed an essential common-
ality, however, for all three jurists still sought to distinguish harmful from beneficial
activity within a largely traditionalist frame of reference centrally concerned with
individual rights and the proper "nondiscretionary" delineation of state and federal
power.
364. See, e.g., R. BoRKs, supra note 6, at 26 (Taft's opinion "must rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest,
antitrust opinions in the history of the law."); Arthur, Farewell, supra note 12, at 271-72; Carstensen, The Content of
the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the 'Rule of Reason' in Restraint of
Trade Analysis, 2 INst. LEO. STUD. WoRKmG PA ERS Vol. 6, 87-89 (1987); Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal
Restraints, 75 CAU.F. L. R v. 893, 893 (1987). For a description of Taft's approach, see infra text accompanying notes
460-71.
365. But see H. THoRTU , supra note 1, at 470 (arguing that in not objecting to Taft's analysis when Addyston Pipe
came before the Supreme Court itself, Justice Peckham implicitly approved that analysis).
366. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
367. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 360-64 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring) (declaring that,
contrary to his prior belief, the test should be whether trade was restrained unreasonably).
368. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
369. Justice White, for example, would have upheld the agreements struck down by Justice Peckham, for the
majority, in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
370. As time went on Justice Peckham clearly explained that classic reasonably ancillary arrangements did not come
within the scope of the "every direct restraint" test. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68
(1898). In articulating the meaning of the "rule of reason" in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White stressed as fundamental
issues the inherent nature and effects and the purpose of any challenged agreement in such a way that the rule of reason
could be understood to be rather similar to Judge Taft's reasonably ancillary/nonancillary test, see Standard Oil, 221 U.S.
at 58, although the opinion's ambiguous language was open to a variety of interpretations. See also United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). Chief Justice White asserted in Standard Oil that the rule of reason
as announced in 1911 was essentially equivalent to the earlier directlindirect restraints test. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S.
at 66. Taft himself found the Standard Oil opinion to be in accord with his own view of common law restraint of trade
analysis and principles. See W. TAFr, THE ANTI-TRUST Act ArD THE SuPREME CouRt 89-96 (1914) (hereinafter W. TAFr,
THE Ar-ri-Thusr AcT].
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In numerous off-the-court speeches, William Howard Taft explained that
economic life had progressively developed in human history37 1 on the basis of natural
law372 through an increasing recognition of the fundamentality and interconnected-
ness of property rights and individual liberty. 373 Taft's antitrust views evolved as an
application of this more general theoretical perspective. In his 1914 book, The
Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court,374 Taft characterized the Sherman Act as an
important safeguard for basic economic rights and political freedom and heavily
stressed that recent Sherman Act jurisprudence had developed within the larger
context of judicial concerns and methodology embodied in contemporary constitu-
tional adjudication. The Sherman Act, Taft declared, "qualified three important
phases of what we include in the general term 'individual liberty'-the right of
property, freedom to contract, and freedom of labor.''3 75 The Act, he noted, had
attacked various methods of "suppressing competition and controlling prices" which
"had resulted in the building of great and powerful corporations which had, many of
them, intervened in politics and through use of corrupt machines and bosses
threatened us with a plutocracy.' '376
After an extended discussion of the common law of restraints of trade in his first
chapter, 377 Taft proceeded to explain the fundamental analytical and institutional
setting of restraint of trade and antitrust jurisprudence in his second chapter. The
chapter appropriately was entitled: General Function of Constitution and Courts in
Protection and Limitation of Individual Rights of Property, Contract, and Labor.378
In this chapter, Taft forcefully recapitulated the core ideas of nineteenth century
political liberalism and classical economic theory as the essential frame of reference
for antitrust analysis. He declared, for example, that
the benefit of society as a whole is only consistent with the full opportunity of its members
to pursue happiness and their individual liberty. This, in its broadest and proper sense,
includes freedom from personal restraint, right of free labor, right of property, right of
religious worship, right of contract. 379
37 1. See Solvick, The Pre-Presidential Political and Economic Thought of William Howard Taft, 43 Nw. Ouio Q.
87 (1971).
372. See, e.g., W. TAFr, FOUR ASPECts OF Civic Dtrr 11-12 (1906) [hereinafter W. TAFT, Civic Dory].
373. For example, in 1906 he noted that:
The right of property has played quite as important a part in the development of the human race as the right of
personal liberty. Indeed the two rights are so associated in the struggle which man has had to make in taking
himself out of the lower animals and lifting himself to his present material and spiritual elevation that it is hard
to separate them in an historical discussion.
Address by W. Taft, Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama (Apr. 4, 1906) (William Howard Taft Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) (quoted in Solvick, supra note 371, at 87). Elsewhere, Taft described the basis of the
fundamental right to property and its historic origin, explaining that when man "began to live in a social state with his
fellows, he recognized, dimly at first but subsequently with greater clearness, that the laborer should have and enjoy that
which his labor produced." W. TAFt, Civic Dry, supra note 372, at 15-16.
374. W. TAFr, THE Atrr-TRusT AcT, supra note 370.
375. Id. at 2-3.
376. Id. at 4. See also id. at 33.
377. See id. at 6-26.
378. Id. at 27.
379. Id. at 37.
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Emphasizing the nondiscretionary nature of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence, 3 0 Taft praised the Court's recent interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment rights of labor, property, contract, and personal freedom. 38' Noting
particularly the Court's opinion in Holden v. Hardy382 upholding a maximum hours
law for miners, Taft declared:
This shows the state of mind and the view of its duty in which the Supreme Court has
approached the construction of the anti-trust law and the recognition that it has given to the
fact that under the changes of business and social conditions limitations of the Constitution
affecting the right of property, the right of free contract, and the right of free labor may be
qualified in a limited way without a breach of individual liberty and without removing or
disregarding the fundamental ancient landmarks set by the Constitution of the United States.
It is not that the court varies or amends the Constitution or a statute, but that, there being
possible several interpretations of its language, the court adopts that which conforms to
prevailing morality and predominant public opinion. 383
The basic rights of labor, property, and contract were no less fundamental
concerns in the jurisprudence of Justices Peckham 384 and White.385 Justice Peckham,
indeed, presented almost the ideal type of an "old conservative" 386 profoundly
alarmed by the contemporary expansion of both governmental activity and industrial
combination. 387 No one on the New York Court of Appeals or on the United States
Supreme Court exceeded his vigor in proclaiming and applying the tenets of
laissez-faire constitutionalism in such cases as Allgeyer v. Louisiana388 and Lochner
v. New York, 389 or in his much cited, extended dissent in the unreported New York
case of People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh,390 subsequently published in connection with
the later, better known case of People v. Budd.391 In that dissent, for example, Judge
Peckham sharply attacked state rate regulation of companies that had not received any
special governmental privileges 392 and strongly criticized the United States Supreme
Court's 1877 opinion in Munn.393 Exhibiting a philosophical embrace of rugged
individualism and equal opportunity, 394 Judge Peckham condemned the Munn Court
380. Id. at 42.
381. See id. at 42-43.
382. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
383. W. TAFT, THE ANTI-RusT Acr, supra note 370, at 47.
384. See generally Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham: The Police Power and the Individual in a Changing
World, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 47.
385. See generally R. HIHSAW, EDwARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAIT (1981).
386. See Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, supra note 52, at 685 (describing Justice Peckham's approach
to Sherman Act analysis in these terms).
387. See Duker, supra note 384, at 47, 50, 59.
388. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
389. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
390. 22 N.E. 682 (1889).
391. 117 N.Y. 1, 34-71, 22 N.E. 670, 682-95 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting). Judge Gray dissented along with
Judge Peckham in Budd. In doing so, he specifically referred to, and concurred in Judge Peckham's Walsh dissent, and
Judge Peckham's opinion from that earlier case was published in the New York Reports following Judge Gray's opinion.
See id. at 34-71, 22 N.E. at 682-95.
392. Id. at 39-43, 66-67, 22 N.E. at 684-85, 693 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
393. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
394. See Duker, supra note 384, at 50.
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for invoking the old, paternalistic views of Lord Hale395 and for ignoring "the later
and, as I firmly believe, the more correct ideas which an increase of civilization and
a fuller knowledge of the fundamental laws of political economy, and a truer
conception of the proper functions of government have given us at the present
day."
39 6
Justice Peckham's antitrust opinions reflected his complementary antipathy to
nongovernmental threats to individual liberty and property. His comments on the
opportunities and independence of small businesses in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association397 were not an analytical "slip" 398 but an expression of
ideas that were central to his embrace of laissez-faire constitutionalism. Justice
Peckham echoed much wider currents of traditional economic thought399 when he
expressed his great concern for "small but independent dealers who were familiar
with the business and who had spent their lives in it, and who supported themselves
and their families from the small profits realized therein,"400 and his alarm at the
transformation of "an independent business man, the head of his establishment, small
though it might be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation." 40 1 Justice
Peckham believed that contemporary economic impropriety threatened not only
individual freedom and opportunity, but also the property and exchange rights of
others, and did not see railroad cartelization as lawful, self-protective activity, even
at a time of assertedly ruinous competition. 402
Justice White viewed the railroad companies' activity much more sympatheti-
cally. In his well-known dissent in Trans-Missouri Freight Association,403 he
expressed approval of the defendants' cooperative rate-setting efforts404 and strongly
disagreed with Justice Peckham's articulated antitrust standard. he warned that
Justice Peckham's approach posed a severe danger to both freedom of contract
395. Budd, 117 N.Y. at 44-48, 22 N.E. at 686-87 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
396. Id. at 47, 22 N.E. at 687 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
397. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
398. See R. Botu, supra note 6, at 25 (so describing Justice Peckham's invocation of these concerns).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 86-153.
400. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 324.
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., id. at 339 (rejecting a claim that collective price fixing was simply an extension of each company's
individual right to charge reasonable rates, declaring, "Competition will itself bring charges down to what may be
reasonable, while in the case of an agreement to keep prices up, competition is allowed no play"); id. at 331-35, 339-42.
Like Senator Sherman, see supra notes 297, 319 and accompanying text, Justice Peckham believed that the establishment
of anticompetitive combinations differed fundamentally from normal economic development, even though he conceded
that the latter sometimes caused similar social dislocations as "the necessary accompaniment of all great industrial
changes." Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 323. He explained:
It is wholly different, however, when such changes are effected by combinations of capital, whose purpose
in combining is to control the production or manufacture of any particular article in the market, and by such
control dictate the price at which the article shall be sold, the effect being to drive out of business all the small
dealers in the commodity and to render the public subject to the decision of the combination as to what price
shall be paid for the article.
Id. at 323-24.
403. Id. at 343-74 (White, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 371 (White, J., dissenting) (declaring the defendant railroads' agreement to be consistent with the policy
of the Interstate Commerce Act, and therefore of the Sherman Act as well, because it "simply provides for uniform
classification, and seeks to prevent secret or sudden changes in the published rates").
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and the contemporary ideal of nondiscretionary adjudication and that it consequently
threatened to defeat the purpose of federal antitrust legislation. He explained:
The plain intention of the law was to protect the liberty of contract and the freedom of
trade. Will this intention not be frustrated by a construction which, if it does not destroy, at
least gravely impairs, both the liberty of the individual to contract and the freedom of trade?
If the rule of reason no longer determines the right of the individual to contract or secures
the validity of contracts upon which trade depends and results, what becomes of the liberty
of the citizen or of the freedom of trade? Secured no longer by the law of reason, all these
rights become subject, when questioned, to the mere caprice of judicial authority. Thus, a
law in favor of freedom of contract, it seems to me, is so interpreted as to gravely impair that
freedom.405
Justice Peckham's majority opinion the next year in the case of United States v.
Joint Traffic Association4° 6 largely addressed such freedom of contract concerns.
Reiterating that freedom of contract was not absolute, Justice Peckham stressed that
the question before the Court was only one of Congress' interstate commerce power,
and not one of policy. 40 7 He concluded that Congress had ample power to regulate the
defendants' anticompetitive activity:
We do not think, when the grantees of this public franchise are competing railroads seeking
the business of transportation of men and goods from one State to another, that ordinary
freedom of contract in the use and management of their property requires the right to
combine as one consolidated and powerful association for the purpose of stifling competition
among themselves, and of thus keeping their rates and charges higher than they might
otherwise be under the laws of competition. 40 o
Freedom of contract and other individual rights repeatedly were addressed as
important issues in later formative era federal antitrust cases as well. 4° Justice John
Marshall Harlan, for example, forcefully reasserted these fundamentals when he
restated established antitrust principles in the 1904 case of Northern Securities Co. v.
United States.4 10 In condemning a holding company established to combine two
competing railroads, Justice Harlan noted the diversity of contemporary American
reactions to economic change. Yet, he strongly affirmed traditional principles as a
matter of congressional intent, even while simultaneously disclaiming any policy
discretion or preference on the part of the Court itself. He noted:
Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome rule
for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need not consider or
determine. Undoubtedly, there are those who think that the general business interests and
405. Id. at 355 (White, J., dissenting).
406. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
407. See id. at 573.
408. Id. at 570-71.
409. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229 (1899), Justice Peckham, for the
Court, declaring:
We cannot so enlarge the scope of the language of the Constitution regarding the liberty of the citizen as to
hold that it includes or that it was intended to include a right to make a contract which in fact restrained and
regulated interstate commerce, notwithstanding Congress, proceeding under the constitutional provision giving
to it the power to regulate that commerce, had prohibited such contracts.
410. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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prosperity of the country will be best promoted if the rule of competition is not applied. But
there are others who believe that such a rule is more necessary in these days of enormous
wealth than it ever was in any former period of our history. Be all this as it may, Congress
has, in effect, recognized the rule of free competition by declaring illegal every combination
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and international commerce. As in the judgment of
Congress the public convenience and the general welfare will be best subserved when the
natural laws of competition are left undisturbed by those engaged in interstate commerce,
and as Congress has embodied that rule in a statute, that must be, for all, the end of the
matter, if this is to remain a government of laws, and not of men. 41'
Seven years later, Chief Justice White again stressed the centrality of basic
economic rights in the Court's seminal "rule of reason" opinions in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States4t2 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.413 Echoing fears he
earlier had expressed with regard to redistributive government regulation of the mere
extent of individual property holding, 4 14 Chief Justice White emphasized that both the
common law and the Sherman Act fundamentally were premised on the need to
respect both property rights and the proper exercise of freedom of contract. In
reviewing the common law in his Standard Oil opinion, for example, he noted:
It is remarkable that nowhere at common law can there be found a prohibition against the
creation of monopoly by an individual. This would seem to manifest, either consciously or
intuitively, a profound conception as to the inevitable operation of economic forces and the
equipoise or balance in favor of the protection of the rights of individuals which resulted....
[P]rohibitions as to individuals were directed, not against the creation of monopoly, but were
only applied to such acts in relation to particular subjects as to which it was deemed, if not
restrained, some of the consequences of monopoly might result. After all, this was but an
instinctive recognition of the truisms that the course of trade could not be made free by
411. Id. at 337-38. Justice Holmes' well-known dissent in Northern Securities expressed pointed doubts regarding
the virtues of universal competition. Justice Holmes feared that the majority's condemnation of the challenged holding
company might call into question the legality of productive, tight combinations in general, down to the level of two-person
partnerships among former rivals. See id. at 410-11 (Holmes, J., dissenting). He declared his firm support for the Court's
earlier opinions in Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n and Joint Traffic Ass'n, see Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 405 (Holmes,
J., dissenting), but distinguished those cartel cases from cases involving the potentially productive "fusion" of former
competitors, id. at 410 (Holmes, J., dissenting), declaring his antipathy to "an interpretation of the law which in my
opinion would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual
atoms." Id. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices Harlan and Holmes differed in the case in large measure because
the former Justice viewed the holding company as essentially a loose arrangement, while Justice Holmes saw it as a form
of tight combination. See R. Botb, supra note 6, at 30-32. It should also be stressed, however, that in general, Justice
Holmes' views on competition, as on many other contemporary issues, tended to be substantially less traditional than did
the views of his colleagues on the bench, as Justice Holmes readily conceded, for example, in his dissent in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409-13 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See id. at 411-12
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I confess that I am in a minority as to larger issues than are concerned here. I think that we
greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article...
as fixing a fair price."). For a discussion of Holmes' views on competition prior to the time he became a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, see supra note 107.
412. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
413. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
414. See Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 364-400 (White, J., dissenting). Therein, Justice White declared that
governmental power
to reasonably control the use of property, affords no foundation for the proposition that there exists in
government a power to limit the quantity and character of property which may be acquired and owned. The
difference between the two is that which exists between a free and constitutional government restrained by law
and an absolute government unrestrained by any of the principles which are necessary for the perpetuation of
society and the protection of life, liberty and property.
Id. at 399 (White, J., dissenting).
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obstructing it, and that an individual's right to trade could not be protected by destroying
such right. 415
At a later point in the same opinion, the new Chief Justice 416 even more strongly
reiterated the traditional perspectives that earlier had been invoked in the 1890 Senate
colloquy on skill-based preeminence. 41 7 Expressing a similar perception of the
sources of concentrated market power, he declared that by omitting any ban on
"monopoly in the concrete," the Sherman Act
indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract when not
unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of
monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the
right to freely contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if
no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful contracts having
a monopolistic tendency were permitted. In other words that freedom to contract was the
essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract.41 8
Subsequently, in American Tobacco, Chief Justice White returned to these themes
and declared that the "rule of reason" approach to Sherman Act interpretation was
essential "to prevent that act from destroying all liberty of contract and all substantial
right to trade, and thus causing the act to be at war with itself by annihilating the
fundamental right of freedom to trade which, on the very face of the act, it was
enacted to preserve. "419
As previously noted, while Justice Peckham and Justice White shared a common
preoccupation with economic rights and a common commitment to the ideal of
nondiscretionary adjudication, they disagreed on the appropriate method for distin-
guishing lawful, rights-based activity from troublesome conduct subject to public
regulation. Justice Peckham sought to separate legitimate, normal economic efforts
from illegitimate behavior through a process of binary classification. Forswearing the
more flexible, and thus arguably more discretionary, approach urged by Justice
White, Justice Peckham declared that the Sherman Act banned every "restraint of
trade. ' 420 If an agreement was of a type falling within that prohibited category, the
agreement was banned. If it was not, the agreement was permitted. When it appeared
that this initial formulation might be unduly rigid, and might fail to satisfactorily
distinguish harmful from economically beneficial conduct, or the sphere of federal
interstate commerce power from the realm of state jurisdiction, Justice Peckham did
not turn to a balancing test weighing economic harms and benefits. Instead, he turned
to a categorical division between restraints that were of a direct type and those that
were of an indirect variety. 42 1
415. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55-56.
416. white became Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1910. See R. HIGHSAW, supra note 385, at
59.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 301-10.
418. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
419. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 180.
420. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897).
421. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
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While Justice White was equally concerned to protect the realm of private right
from governmental encroachment and desired to distinguish rightful from illegitimate
conduct no less strongly than did Justice Peckham, he believed that Peckham's
standard was overly restrictive and unduly rigid. As an alternative, Justice White
advocated a less structured judicial determination of the "reasonableness" of private
action422 echoing the "nondiscretionary" review of the "reasonableness" of govern-
mental action that was at the heart of laissez-faire constitutionalism.423
Over time, Justice Peckham did increasingly consider the actual economic impact
of particular restraints, even while retaining a categorization approach and a strong
commitment to marketplace competition. 424 Simultaneously, Justice White implicitly
moved toward a similar classification of permissible and impermissible restraints
according to type and purpose even while retaining a "reasonableness" articulation,425
despite his initially greater, 426 and to some extent continuing, 427 sympathy for col-
lusive efforts to protect property from the hazards of uninhibited competition. In the
course of such changes, both Justice Peckham's "every direct restraint" approach and
Justice White's "reasonableness" test retained considerable ambiguity. Both, how-
ever, increasingly seemed to exhibit significantly greater concern for distinctions
between reasonably ancillary agreements and anticompetitive, nonancillary arrange-
ments of the kind that Taft had highlighted. 428 Indeed, in practice, the Supreme Court
appears to have quite consistently followed the general lines indicated by Taft's
analysis, summarily condemning agreements perceived as merely naked, nonancillary
restraints, but repeatedly examining the possible merits of restraints believed to be
ancillary to some other beneficial main purpose. 429
When the Supreme Court in 1911 applied the rule of reason to condemn the
specific conduct challenged in Standard Oil and American Tobacco, however, it did
not employ an ancillary/nonancillary articulation. Instead, Chief Justice White, for
the Court, explained the illegality of the defendants' activities largely through a more
direct application of the core concerns of traditional theory. Pursuing the common
contemporary effort to isolate and eliminate artificial interference with the natural,
rights-based economic order, Chief Justice White stressed most fundamentally in
Standard Oil the defendants' apparent
purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal methods
of industrial development, but by new means of combination which were resorted to in order
that greater power might be added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods
422. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at
343-74 (White, J., dissenting).
423. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66. On additional aspects of the doctrinal debate between Justices
Peckham and White, see infra text accompanying notes 952-66.
424. See, e.g., Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 560-65, 567-68.
425. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
426. See Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 361-73 (White, I., dissenting).
427. See, e.g., American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 177 (White, C.J., criticizing the government's view of Sherman Act
interpretation partly because it would condemn "a reasonable and just agreement made for the purpose of ending a trade
war").
428. See supra note 370.
429. See Carstensen, supra note 364, at 73-83.
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been followed, the whole with the purpose of excluding others from the trade and thus
centralizing in the combination a perpetual control of the movements of petroleum and its
products in the channels of interstate commerce. 430
Both congressional and judicial analyses of early federal antitrust issues thus
strongly reflected the same core perspectives of political liberalism and classical
economics that simultaneously played a fundamental role in contemporary laissez-
faire constitutionalism. The intellectual origins of early antitrust reasoning, and the
interrelationship between antitrust and constitutional theory, become even more
clearly and fully apparent, however, if attention is focused not only on federal
developments but also on contemporaneous state activity as well. It is to this highly
illuminating additional context that this Article now turns.
V. STATE JURISPRUDENCE AS A SOURCE OF ILLUMINATION
Scholarly writing on formative era antitrust history has long been preoccupied
with early federal developments, 431 reflecting the later twentieth century preeminence
of federal law in the antitrust field.432 As an earlier article stressed, however, particular
states became very active centers of state antitrust legislation and adjudication during
the Progressive Era and mounted major antitrust challenges to some of the most
powerful interstate combinations of the time. 433 These active states won major vic-
tories, repeatedly obtaining decrees of corporate ouster434 and collecting fines within
individual state jurisdictions equal to or in excess of the aggregate amount of fines
collected in all federal antitrust cases in the same period. 435 State restraint of trade law
also became the foundation for a dramatically increased volume of private litigation
during the same years. 436 Moreover, at least in "active" jurisdictions, state as well
as federal antitrust law played an enormously important symbolic role for Progressive
Era Americans. Americans followed particular state antitrust developments with
tremendous interest, 437 believing that the success or failure of state as well as federal
antitrust efforts likely would have profound consequences for the political, moral, and
economic character of the nation in the years to come. 438
The remainder of this Article focuses on early state developments partly because
of their considerable independent importance, and because they have received so little
scholarly attention in the past. Concentration on state activity and ideology is at least
equally important, however, because state developments provide considerable new
insight into the nature of antitrust activity in general during the Progressive Era.
430. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
431. See, e.g., May, supra note 4, at 497-98, 505.
432. See, e.g., id. at 498.
433. See id. at 497-502.
434. See, e.g., id. at 500-01, 510-17.
435. See id. at 501-02. Aggregate federal criminal antitrust fines amounted to $619,965 by the close of 1914, and
$765,822 by the end of 1919. Texas collected over $1.6 million in a single case, however, and Missouri judges imposed
unsuspended fines totalling $678,000 by the close of 1915. Id. at 502.
436. See, e.g., NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF TE SPECIAL COMMsITrEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTITRUST
Lws 4a (1957) [hereinafter N w YORK STATE BAR]; May, supra note 4, at 503.
437. See generally S. PoTr, THm Atm-Mo\,oPoLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF BIG BUSNESS
TitE MiowEsT (1985).
438. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 664-66.
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The two states examined here have been selected with this potential for larger
illumination in mind. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, New York
and Missouri became leading centers of both laissez-faire constitutionalism and
antitrust legislation and adjudication. Progressive Era jurists and scholars often
cited 439 the landmark constitutional law decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
in such cases as In re Jacobs,440 People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler,44 and People v.
Marcus,442 and of the Missouri Supreme Court in such cases as State v. Loomis,44 3
State v. Julow,44 State ex rel. Garth v. Switzler,445 State v. Cantwell,446 and State v.
Missouri Tie & Timber Co.4 47 Judges in New York and Missouri not only expressed
the principles of laissez-faire constitutionalism in especially striking form, but also
invoked these ideas with particular vigor in scrutinizing contemporary legislative
innovations, condemning challenged enactments somewhat more frequently than did
jurists in general between 1880 and 1918. 448 In the same years, New York and
Missouri both became the scene of substantial popular antitrust sentiment, much
related legislative activity, unusually active enforcement efforts, and a great deal of
antitrust and restraint of trade adjudication. 4 49
The simultaneous presence of these constitutional and antitrust law develop-
ments provides a valuable opportunity to explore the contemporary interrelationship
between constitutional theory and antitrust analysis. The remainder of this Article
undertakes such an exploration by focusing on various important aspects of this
interrelationship. The exploration begins in Part VI by examining the state common
law background to formative era antitrust developments. The Article proceeds in Part
VII to discuss the pattern of popular, legislative, and executive antitrust activity in
Progressive Era New York and Missouri. Part VIII then examines the development of
antitrust jurisprudence in these states in some detail, exploring the strength of judicial
support for antitrust policy in a wide array of ancillary and nonancillary contexts.
Following this exploration of early state developments, the Article concludes by
offering some final thoughts on the magnitude of the changes in constitutional and
antitrust theory that have occurred over the last 100 years and the significance of these
changes for modern antitrust practice and analysis.
439. On the contemporary prominence of New York and Missouri decisions, see C. JAcoBs, supra note 20, at 42,
51, 55, 69; Pound, supra note 20; Urofsky, supra note 22.
440. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (striking down a statute barring cigar manufacturing in tenements in certain circumstances).
441. 166 N.Y. 1, 59 N.E. 716 (1901) (invalidating a measure regulating hours and wages in municipal contracts).
442. 185 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 1073 (1906) (striking down a statute banning the use of "yellow dog contracts").
443. 115 Mo. 307, 22 S.W. 350 (1893) (condemning a Missouri "scrip law" regulating manufacturing and mining
wage payments as unequal class legislation).
444. 129 Mo. 163, 31 S.W. 781 (1895) (striking down a ban on "yellow dog contracts").
445. 143 Mo. 287, 45 S.W. 245 (1898). See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
446. 179 Mo. 245, 78 S.W. 569 (1904) (approving a maximum hours law for miners), aff'd, 199 U.S. 602 (1905).
447. 181 Mo. 536, 80 S.W. 933 (1904) (striking down a general "scrip law" regulating wage payments).
448. See, for example, the overviews of contemporary state court decisions in Pound, supra note 20; Urofsky, supra
note 22. The pattern in both states was always a mixed one, however. See, for example, the Missouri case of State v.
Cantwell, supra note 446, approving a maximum hours law for miners, and the New York case of People v. Lochner,
177 N.Y. 145, 69 N.E. 373 (1904), rev'd sub nom. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (approving the maximum
hours law for bakers that was subsequently struck down by the United States Supreme Court).
449. See infra text accompanying notes 609-66.
[Vol. 50:257
19891 ANTITRUST IN THE FORMATIVE ERA 311
VI. STATE COMMON LAW BEFORE THE SHERMAN Acr
Nineteenth century American common law on contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade formed an important point of reference for legislators
and judges seeking to resolve emerging problems of economic collusion, predation,
and concentration during the Populist and Progressive Eras. Indeed, scholars often
have argued that Congress largely intended to embrace common law doctrines when
it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act450 in 1890. 451 Although the United States Supreme
Court soon freed Sherman Act jurisprudence to follow an independent path by de-
claring that the statute was intended to go beyond common law doctrine, 452 the'English
and American common law heritage remained an important point of reference through-
out the formative period of Sherman Act jurisprudence. 453 Similarly, late nineteenth
and early twentieth century state legislators relied on this same source in formulating
their own antitrust statutes, 454 and state courts often looked to such precedent as an
important source of guidance in developing early state antitrust jurisprudence.
Historians and legal scholars, however, continue to present somewhat differing
pictures of nineteenth century American common law on restraints of trade, 455
debating, for example, the frequency with which American courts adopted a
"reasonableness" test for "nonancillary" restraints instead of condemning such
restraints per se. 456 Much of the debate has focused on the accuracy 45 7 or
inaccuracy 458 of Judge William Howard Taft's classic 1898 restatement of common
law principles in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,459 and it is instructive
to keep that opinion in mind in exploring the state of pre-Sherman Act case law in
New York and Missouri.
This exploration of state jurisprudence usefully contributes to a better under-
450. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
451. See, e.g., W. Lm'wiN, supra note 167, at 95-96; H. THosRaIi, supra note 1, at 228. On the possible inferences
to be drawn from congressional invocation of common law terminology in the Sherman Act, see supra note 269.
452. See. e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897).
453. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-58 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
454. See, e.g., In re Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N.E. 118 (1901) (declaring New York antitrust statute, the Donnelly
Act, to be essentially a codification of common law).
455. See generally, e.g., E. KiNN'R, supra note 15, at §§ 3.3-3.10; W. LErwIN, supra note 167, at 77-81; M.
SK AR, supra note 1, at 93-105; H. TuoREt.u, supra note 1, at 36-48; Arthur, Farewell, supra note 12, at 280-84;
Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies, supra note 107, at 935-38.
456. Compare, e.g., E. KiNR, supra note 15, § 3.3, at 85 ("the great weight of authority recognizes that the Rule
of Reason was limited in its application to ancillary restraints") (footnotes omitted); id. § 3.3, at 87 (noting that majority
of courts held nonancillary restraints void without considering their reasonableness); with M. SKaR, supra note 1, at 98
(declaring that "[b]y the early 1890s" the test of reasonableness was "the general rule of common law with respect to
restraint of trade"); id. at 93-.101 (expanding on this proposition). Despite disagreement on the frequency with which this
standard of review was invoked by 1890, otherwise differing scholars have stressed that nineteenth century courts
condemned the substantial majority of challenged nonancillary restraints, even if adoption of a reasonableness standard
by some courts allowed approval of nonancillary restraints in a minority of instances. See, e.g., M. SK.AR, supra note
1, at 99; H. TitosRaEtj, supra note 1, at 40.
457. See E. KiNT'ER, supra note 15, at 87-88; H. THoRasu, supra note 1, at 469; Arthur, Farewell, supra note 12,
at 280-84.
458. See, e.g., R. BoK, supra note 6, at 27 (declaring that Taft's opinion "was not the restatement it pretended to
be so much as a new structure").
459. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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standing of late nineteenth and early twentieth century legal thought in general. First,
it makes somewhat clearer the extent to which Taft's doctrinal approach was either
expressly articulated or operative in fact in various areas of the country by the time
the Sherman Act was passed. Simultaneously, examination of the pre-1890 New
York and Missouri cases provides an essential point of comparison for subsequent
antitrust developments in these two jurisdictions and clarifies a significant source of
influence on those later antitrust analyses.
A. The Addyston Pipe Restatement
In his famous opinion in Addyston Pipe, condemning a major interstate
bid-rigging conspiracy as a Sherman Act violation, Judge Taft acknowledged that
courts had sometimes upheld and sometimes invalidated private restraints upon
business rivalry. 460 But in the majority of nineteenth century cases, Taft declared,
there was a consistent pattern. No restraint was enforceable unless "merely ancillary
to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in
the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the
dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. "461 Thus, for example,
where litigation involved a beneficial, productive main purpose such as an ordinary
sale of a business along with its developed good will, courts upheld a reasonably
limited ancillary covenant by the seller not to compete with the buyer of that
business. 462 In such cases, the main purpose would indicate the degree of protection
needed to safeguard the benefit of the buyer's bargain and provide "a sufficiently
uniform standard" by which to judge such a restraint.463 If the restraint was broader
than reasonably necessary to fulfill the contract's legitimate main purpose, it was void
because it would needlessly oppress the covenantor and tend to a monopoly.464
Moreover, if the individual ancillary covenant not to compete that was connected
with a particular contract was part of a larger scheme intended to obtain all the
property in a line of business, with an eye to establishing a monopoly, the restraint
also would be void. 465 Under these circumstances, the restraint of competition would
no longer be ancillary but itself would be the main purpose of the contract, and would
be treated in the same way as other "non-ancillary" restraints. 466
In Taft's view, restraints on competition falling within this latter category of
nonancillary agreements were unlawful per se. When the sole object of an agreement
was to reduce competition or raise prices, no beneficial main purpose existed to
justify the agreement, and it would be void as necessarily tending to monopoly. 467 In
such a case, there could be no measure of needed protection to the parties except the
460. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280-93.
461. Id. at 282.
462. See id. at 281-82.
463. Id. at 282.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 291.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 282.
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"vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political
economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain competition. "468 When a nonancillary
restraint was challenged, it was no defense that the parties might have faced
"ruinous" competition, had a small market share, or set only "reasonable"
prices. 469
Taft acknowledged that in some English and American cases courts had departed
from these standards of analysis and erroneously "set sail on a sea of doubt,"
attempting to judge nonancillary restraints according to the judges' own subjective
notions of what degree of restraint of competition was in the public interest. 470 He
found these opinions, however, to be both wrong as a matter of policy and to be
contradicted by other leading cases. 471
Given the emphasis that antitrust scholars and historians have placed on the
Addyston Pipe opinion,472 it is important to ask how closely Taft's restatement
paralleled the actual experience and end result of common law adjudication within
particular jurisdictions by the closing years of the nineteenth century. Did state court
judges clearly perceive basic economic differences between "ancillary" and "nonan-
cillary" arrangements and consistently treat them differently? How uniformly did
state jurists approve ancillary restraints or condemn nonancillary agreements, and to
what extent did they employ a "reasonableness" test or a per se standard in reaching
their decisions? What specific benefits or harms did nineteenth century judges
perceive in various challenged arrangements, and how, if at all, did their perceptions
change over time?
B. The Common Law in New York and Missouri
In the cases decided prior to the July 2, 1890, enactment of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, New York and Missouri judges consistently did uphold ancillary
restraints and indeed significantly expanded the protection granted such arrangements
as time went on. Simultaneously, New York and Missouri judges repeatedly
condemned nonancillary restrictions during most of the nineteenth century, although
Missouri judges addressed such arrangements much less frequently than did jurists in
New York. Only very rarely, however, did these judges ever expressly articulate any
basic doctrinal distinction along the lines stressed by Taft.473 At times, moreover,
they invoked certain general legal tests without regard to the type of restraint at issue
and without any apparent recognition of the potentially differing concerns posed by
ancillary and nonancillary agreements.
The reported opinions grew appreciably in length in the late 1870s and 1880s.
In these later opinions, state judges sought to explain more fully the principles of
468. Id. at 283.
469. See id. at 291.
470. Id. at 283-84.
471. See id. at 283-87.
472. See supra note 364.
473. See Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y.
473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
19891
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
private restraint of trade analysis at the same time that, at least in New York, they also
were expanding their articulated analyses of constitutional issues and contributing
substantially to the contemporaneous rise of laissez-faire constitutionalism.474 These
expanded late nineteenth century restraint of trade opinions in New York and
Missouri embodied a decidedly mixed view of both the merits of economic
competition and the claimed dangers from private restraints, however, and they left
common law analysis in these jurisdictions in a heightened rather than lessened state
of confusion by the summer of 1890.
1. The Virtues of Ancillary Agreements and Vertical Restraints
As Taft's restatement indicated, by the late nineteenth century, reasonably
ancillary restraints had long been accepted as a legitimate and beneficial part of the
free market economy. 475 Enforcement of a seller's ancillary covenant not to compete
ensured that buyers would be willing to pay full value for a business' established
"good will'--its developed reputation and customer base-without fear that the
acquired good will later would be dissipated by the seller's renewed business efforts
in the area. As a result, business owners ostensibly had an incentive to make the
business more effective and successful in order to enhance the value of the business'
good will.476 Conversely, validation of ancillary restrictions on a buyer's use of
particular purchased property in competition with the seller was deemed necessary to
encourage free purchase and sale of property, and was not thought to be anticom-
petitive because it only provided a seller with security against the rise of new
competition of the seller's own making. 477 For similar reasons, ancillary restrictions
on a partner's activities in competition with the partnership itself were thought
legitimate because they better ensured the viability of a joint enterprise "useful to the
community.'"'478 Finally, enforcement of agreements ancillary to an employment
contract, restricting the employee's competitive efforts after leaving the firm, were
deemed justified because they allowed firms to more freely hire the best assistants and
fully instruct them in a way that might be inhibited if the employee could not be
legally stopped from subsequently using acquired trade secrets in rivalry with the
business. 479
As previously noted, New York and Missouri judges only rarely articulated
separate legal tests or standards to be used for ancillary as opposed to nonancillary
arrangements; 480 nor did they maintain any consistent or clear distinctions in
references to "contracts" and "combinations" in restraint of trade, terminology
sometimes said to have corresponded with ancillary and nonancillary restraints,
474. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97, 439-42.
475. See, e.g., H. TnoPuw, supra note 1, at 37.
476. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
477. See id. at 280-81.
478. See id. at 280.
479. See id. at 281.
480. See supra text accompanying note 473.
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respectively.48 1 New York judges, however, did accord ancillary restraints consid-
erably more deference than nonancillary restraints, and almost never found the former
void.482 Until the late 1880s, the New York courts continued to adhere to the test
suggested in the leading English case of Mitchel v. Reynolds.48 3 Under that test,
"general" ancillary restraints, defined as those restraints that were unlimited as to
their geographic scope within the state484 or, later, within the nation, 485 were declared
void. Less geographically sweeping "partial" restraints, however, were valid,
provided there was a good consideration and the restraint was "reasonable and
useful" and not "larger than . . . necessary for the protection of the covenantee in
the enjoyment of his trade or business.'"486
In the late 1880s, the New York Court of Appeals undertook a revealing
reconsideration of the legal treatment of ancillary restraints, in the well-known and
much-cited case of Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber.487 The court's opinion further
liberalizing the treatment of ancillary restraints was based in large part on the court's
understanding of economic change as of 1887. At this time, New York high court
judges perceived market opportunities to be generally expanding rather than
narrowing and believed that competitive new entry remained a pervasive possibility
effectively limiting the likely harm from private restraints. Simultaneously, these
judges also harbored a heightened concern for governmental restrictions on private
contracting freedom, forcefully expressed, for example, in the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in In re Jacobs.488
In Diamond Match a manufacturer and seller of matches had sold its business
and good will to plaintiff's assignor, simultaneously agreeing not to engage in the
manufacture or sale of friction matches for 99 years anywhere in the United States,
except in the state of Nevada and the territory of Montana. 489 When the defendant
subsequently violated this agreement by pursuing rival match manufacturing and
sales efforts within the prohibited territory, the plaintiff sought and was granted an
injunction against such behavior over the defendant's objection that such a sweeping
ancillary covenant not to compete was invalid. 490 Without literally overturning it, the
court vigorously challenged the validity of the long-held distinction between general
and partial ancillary restraints of trade. Judge Charles Andrews, for the court, noted
481. See. e.g., W. LErut, supra note 167, at 39-52; H. THoEu, supra note 1, at 17, 27.
482. The few contrary examples seem to have involved special circumstances. See, e.g., Bingham v. Maigne, 52
N.Y. Super. Ct. (20 J. & S.) 90 (1885) (In a case involving a covenant restricting employee of seller of business from
engaging in competitive efforts within 250 miles of New York, the court stressed the importance of the fact that the case
involved a restraint of the employee rather than of the original seller.); Saratoga County Bank v. King, 44 N.Y. 87 (1870)
(parties conceded the agreement to be void as a general restraint of trade).
483. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
484. See Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.Y. 241,244 (1851); Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
485. See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
486. Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.Y. 241, 244 (1851). In some nineteenth century restraint of trade cases, however,
courts confusingly invoked this "general" and "partial" restraint terminology even where no classic ancillary restraint
was involved. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 515, 598.
487. 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
488. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
489. Diamond Match, 106 N.Y. at 477-78, 13 N.E. at 419.
490. Id. at 486, 13 N.E. at 423-24.
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that criticisms of general restraints in many of the leading cases had been mere dicta,
and he declared that changed economic conditions since the time the distinction had
been established called for a reexamination of its utility. 491 He noted the harms that
the court in the 1711 case of Mitchel v. Reynolds492 had thought general restraints
posed. That English case had stressed the potential loss of the obligor's livelihood,
the community's loss of the obligor's services, and the dangers of reduced
competition. 493 Judge Andrews found such perils to be much less serious under
modern conditions than they might have been in 1711. What were once local markets
had become national and international markets, a vast number of new industries had
opened, and business incorporation had been made freely available to everyone
wishing to take advantage of it. Because of these changes, he did not believe that
"the opportunities for employment and for the exercise of useful talents [are] so shut
up and hemmed in that the public is likely to lose a useful member of society" in a
case like the one before the court any more than when someone sold a local business
with a covenant not to compete locally. 4 9 4
Judge Andrews made note of Chief Justice Tindal's classic test for judging the
reasonableness of contracts in partial restraint of trade, that is, "whether the restraint
is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom
it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public." 495 But.
he declared:
When the restraint is general, but at the same time is co-extensive only with the interest to
be protected, and with the benefit meant to be conferred, there seems to be no good reason
why, as between the parties, the contract is not as reasonable as when the interest is partial
and there is a corresponding partial restraint. And is there any real public interest which
necessarily condemns the one and not the other? It is an encouragement to industry and to
enterprise in building up a trade, that a man shall be allowed to sell the good will of the
business and the fruits of his industry upon the best terms he can obtain. If his business
extends over a continent, does public policy forbid his accompanying the sale with a
stipulation for restraint co-extensive with the business which he sells?496
Judge Andrews did not perceive any significant threat to competition in such an
arrangement. No monopoly was created, he declared, because the contract conferred
no exclusive privilege to engage in the business. 497 The industry remained wide open
to new entrants, and there was "little danger that the public will suffer harm from
lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry.' 49 If a general restraint was bad
when the trade was general, by the same logic, contracts in partial restraint should be
deemed similarly objectionable when the trade was local. 499 In Judge Andrews'
491. Id. at 480-81, 13 N.E. at 421.
492. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
493. Diamond Match, 106 N.Y. at 480-81, 13 N.E. at 421.
494. See id. at 482, 13 N.E. at 422.
495. Id. at 482, 13 N.E. at 421 (quoting Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831)).
496. Id. at 482, 13 N.E. at 421-22.
497. See id. at 483, 13 N.E. at 422. On contemporary understandings of the term "monopoly," see also supra text
accompanying notes 302-10.
498. Diamond Match, 106 N.Y. at 483, 13 N.E. at 422.
499. See id.
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mind, competition simply was no longer a very pressing concern in ancillary restraint
contexts. Indeed, he stated:
We are not aware of any rule of law which makes the motive of the covenantee the test of
the validity of such a contract. On the contrary we suppose a party may legally purchase the
trade and business of another for the very purpose of preventing competition, and the
validity of the contract, if supported by a consideration, will depend upon its reasonableness
as benveen the parties.500
In one of the very few contemporary New York allusions to an ancillary/nonancillary
distinction in restraint of trade analysis, Judge Andrews did tersely concede that
nonancillary restraints might call for a different attention to competition, but here he
was equivocal. "Combinations between producers to limit production and to enhance
prices," he declared without further explanation, "are or may be unlawful, but they
stand on a different footing." 50o
The invocation of public policy to invalidate a covenant like the one before the
court was troubling to Judge Andrews not only because he concluded the alleged
dangers were insubstantial. He further believed that such invocation threatened an
additional value of vital importance. He cautioned that "what public policy requires
is often a vague and difficult inquiry. It is clear that public policy and the interests of
society favor the utmost freedom of contract, within the law, and require that business
transactions should not be trammeled by unnecessary restrictions." ' 50 2 In short, in
1887, at a time of expanding markets and apparently expansive business opportunity,
it was freedom of contract, and not competition, that seemed most vitally at stake
when New York judges considered the legality of even a quite far-reaching ancillary
restriction.
Noting that recent cases had greatly weakened the doctrine that contracts in
general restraint of trade are void regardless of circumstances, Judge Andrews
nevertheless conceded that the doctrine had not yet been abrogated. 50 3 In applying the
doctrine, however, national and not state boundaries were the relevant test for judging
whether a restraint was general because the activity of manufacturing industries
typically extended beyond state boundaries, and Americans owed their civic
allegiance to the nation as well as to the state. 5° 4 Accordingly, the covenant before
the court was not a contract in general restraint of trade but only a partial restraint
because it excepted Nevada and Montana. 50 5 Moreover, the covenant was supported
by a good consideration and was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore
valid. 50 6
500. Id. (emphasis added).
501. Id. (emphasis added).
502. Id. at 482, 13 N.E. at 422.
503. See id. at 484, 13 N.E. at 423.
504. See id. at 485, 13 N.E. at 423.
505. See id. at 484, 13 N.E. at 423.
506. See id. at 486, 13 N.E. at 423.
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Two years later, the New York Supreme Court took the final step that the New
York high court had hesitated to take in Diamond Match itself, upholding a complaint
seeking enforcement of a seller's ancillary covenant not to compete for ten years
anywhere in the United States.50 7 In so doing, the court made no reference to the
specific restraint's potential impact, if any, on competition, and gave no indication as
to what, if any, relevance such issues might have at trial.
Soon after delivering its Diamond Match opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals gave further indication that ancillary restraint analysis was increasingly
coming to be viewed as a realm of private contract law in which competition concerns
had relatively little play. In Hodge v. Sloan,50 8 the court upheld a buyer's covenant
not to sell sand from particular purchased land in competition with the seller of that
land, who had continued in the business of selling sand from other land in the area.
While the arrangement in fact may have posed no significant threat to overall
competition in local sand sales, the court emphatically did not proceed by discussion
of efficiency and competitive concerns and then uphold the restraint on the ground
that competition in fact was not imperiled. The court made no mention of the
relevance of any such issues to the case. Instead, the court viewed the litigation as
simply a case of reasonable protection for the seller's livelihood and preservation of
the benefit of a private bargain in which the seller had accepted a lower price in order
to obtain the buyer's restrictive covenant in addition to the sales price itself.5 9
"Assuming ... the covenant is in restraint of trade," the court declared, "it is still
valid if it imposes no restriction upon one party which is not beneficial to the
other." 510 Most fundamentally, the court reasoned that "the question presented is,
upon the conceded facts, really one of individual right with which the question of
public policy has little if anything to do." 511
The Missouri courts were at least as sympathetic toward ancillary restraints as
the New York courts had been by the start of the 1890s. Indeed, there do not appear
to be any reported cases in which the Missouri courts held such a restraint void prior
to that date.5 12 This general Missouri pattern continued in later years as well. When,
for example, the St. Louis Court of Appeals undertook an important extended review
of common law precedent in 1906, it approvingly quoted the Diamond Match opinion
at considerable length, along with various other opinions, and pointedly went on to
claim that the Missouri courts had embarked upon such an enlightened liberalization
of ancillary restraint law well before the New York judges had done so themselves. 513
507. See Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 58 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (51 Hun.) 157, 4 N.Y.S. 861 (1889).
508. 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887).
509. See id. at 252, 17 N.E. at 338.
510. See id. at 248, 17 N.E. at 336.
511. Id. at 250, 17 N.E. at 337 (emphasis added).
512. Cases upholding such restraints include, for example, Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884); Peltz v. Eichele, 62
Mo. 171 (1876); Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545 (1868); Billings v. Ames, 32 Mo. 265 (1862); Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo.
50 (1853).
513. See Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 121 Mo. App. 226, 98 S.W. 805 (1906).
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Judge Taft's Addyston Pipe opinion had suggested that vertical arrangements as
well as classic ancillary restraints appropriately should be spared the summary
condemnation reserved for nonancillary agreements, 514 and it is useful at this point to
compare the New York and Missouri courts' approach in this area as well. Although
only few vertical restraint cases came to the attention of New York and Missouri
jurists prior to the 1890s, both jurisdictions exhibited significant, if not unvarying,
sympathy for these agreements. The courts in neither state, however, developed any
general analytical framework for handling such arrangements. The New York
Supreme Court, for example, approved a sole outlet contract, invoking principles of
"partial" versus "general" restraint of trade and finding no public harm where there
was no limitation on the volume the seller could produce and supply under the
agreement. 515 A sole outlet and exclusive dealing agreement between an association
of sheep sellers and an association of buyers, limited to the New York market and set
to last three years, similarly was approved with a summary invocation of the principle
that a contract to sell exclusively to a particular person for a limited time is not
invalid. 516 Without undertaking any market share, foreclosure, efficiency, or
competition analysis, the court simply noted that the defendant had not alleged any
purpose or effect of limiting "the energies or productiveness, or usefulness to the
public of either of these corporations. "517 Exclusive dealing also was approved when
it was part of a patent licensing arrangement, even though it led to nonuse of the
patent.5 18 This, as well as the patentee's own nonuse, was simply within the ambit of
the rights guaranteed by the patent monopoly.5 19 On the other hand, a sole outlet
agreement was held invalid when it was one of many such contracts constituting a
scheme by a particular dealer to limit the quantity of coal shipped into New York
State in an effort to enhance the resale price of this commodity.5 20
The Missouri courts developed a somewhat more mixed tradition of vertical
restraint analysis by 1890. The St. Louis Court of Appeals summarily rejected a
challenge to purchase price incentives established by a manufacturer to encourage
adherence to resale price maintenance. 521 In other vertical cases, the Missouri
Supreme Court relied largely upon the particular rights and duties of common
carriers, as well as "partial" restraint of trade principles, to variously approve 522 or
condemn523 exclusive dealing arrangements involving railroads.
514. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 287-88 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899). Addressing a railroad's exclusive dealing arrangement with a company that undertook to provide
sleeping car service, Judge Taft concluded that such an arrangement only did through the service company what the
railroad company rightfully could do itself through its own agent and that it promoted efficiency.
515. See Van Marter v. Babcock, 23 Barb. 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857). The court thus extended "general" and
.. partial" restraint terminology beyond its original classic ancillary restraint setting.
516. See Live Stock Ass'n v. Levy, 54 N.Y. Super. Ct. (22 J. & S.) 32 (1886).
517. Id. at 36-37.
518. See Good v. Daland, 121 N.Y. 1, 24 N.E. 15 (1890).
519. See id. at 8, 24 N.E. at 16.
520. See Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877).
521. See Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885).
522. See Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 73 Mo. 389 (1881). See infra note 585.
523. See Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247, 14 S.W. 106 (1890).
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2. Naked Restraints and the Virtues and Perils of Competition
The New York courts' reaction to anticompetitive arrangements that were not
functionally related to some other productive transaction was dramatically different
than the courts' response to the ancillary restraints just discussed. For most of the
nineteenth century, New York judges consistently and strongly condemned private
nonancillary interference with free market competition even while simultaneously
endorsing ancillary restraints at almost every opportunity. The change over time in
the reported New York cases is every bit as striking, however. Until the 1880s, it
appears that the New York courts invalidated every nonancillary restraint that came
before them, except for the restraints at issue in two cases that arose in the late 1870s
which involved special statutes. Those two cases, however, foreshadowed a very
different judicial climate in the 1880s. In that decade, New York appellate courts
upheld nonancillary restraints coming before them as often as they struck them down.
The change was a dramatic one that cannot be explained simply by the peculiarities
of the facts in the cases arising in that decade. By the time the Sherman Act was
passed, the state's common law policy on naked restraints of competition was
considerably more confused than it had been just ten or fifteen years earlier, and
strikingly more ambivalent in its attitude toward private restrictions of free market
rivalry.
Beginning with a famous labor conspiracy case in 1810,524 New York courts
condemned a wide variety of collective nonancillary restraints involving not only
labor conspiracy, 525 but also bid rigging, 52 6 price fixing, 52 7 profit pooling,528 output
limitation, 529 direct money payments in exchange for cessation of competition, 530
collective restraints of stock sales,53' and concerted manipulation of futures and stock
market transactions. 532 In a few instances, the courts relied upon a New York statute
prohibiting conspiracies "to commit any act injurious ... to trade or commerce. 533
Most cases, however, were common law adjudications. The cases typically declared
such arrangements void without any extended explanation. Prior to the 1880s, New
York jurists never suggested that condemnation of nonancillary agreements depended
on exclusion or coercion of nonparties; nor did they ever articulate any "reason-
ableness" standard for nonancillary restraints or suggest that such arrangements
524. See People v. Melvin, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 262 (1810).
525. See People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
526. See, e.g., Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870); Brisbane v. Adams, 3 N.Y. 129 (1849).
527. See Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62 Barb. 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio
434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
528. See Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870); Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
529. See Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877).
530. See Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863); Hartford & New Haven R.R. v. New York &
New Haven R.R., 3 Robt. 411 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1865).
531. See Fisher v. Bush, 42 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (35 Hun.) 641 (1885).
532. See Leonard v. Poole, 114 N.Y. 371, 21 N.E. 707 (1889); Livermore v. Bushnell, 12 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (5 Hun.)
285 (1875).
533. See Act of Dec. 10, 1828, § 8(6), 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 689, 691-92 (1829). See, e.g., Hooker v. Vandewater,
4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). In addition, one case involved a specialized statute, Act of May 10, 1841, ch. 183,
§ 16, 1841 N.Y. Laws 156, penalizing output limitation and price fixing among manufacturers of salt. See Clancey v.
Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62 Barb. 395, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
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might ever be approved. While the parties in some of the cases seem to have had a
large collective share of the market, 534 the market share involved in other cases is
unclear,535 and the courts never stated that this factor was a critical one. Invalidation
did not require any showing that actual harm had occurred from adoption of such a
restraint. As the New York Court of Appeals reiterated in the 1870 bid-rigging case
of Atcheson v. Mallon:5 36
The true inquiry is, is it the natural tendency of such an agreement to injuriously influence
the public interests? The rule is, that agreements, which in their necessary operation upon
the action of the parties to them, tend to restrain their natural rivalry and competition, and
thus to result in the disadvantage of the public, or of third parties, are against the principles
of sound policy, and are void.5 37
Nineteenth century New York judges believed that competition produced a
variety of highly important benefits, including lower and "fair" prices538 and higher
quality of service.5 39 Preservation of competition was never deemed to require
maintenance of all existing business rivalry, however, and the New York courts were
careful to distinguish productive partnerships and other true joint ventures from naked
cartel arrangements, despite contrary characterizations urged by litigants. 540 At the
same time, elimination of artificial private restrictions also was deemed to have a
534. See, e.g., Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
535. See, e.g., Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870).
536. Id.
537. Id. at 149.
538. See. e.g., People v. Lord, 13 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (6 Hun.) 390, 394 (1876), aff'd sub nom. People v. Stephens,
71 N.Y. 527 (1878). In Lord, the New York Supreme Court condemned a bid-rigging scheme among construction
companies bidding on a public works project, deeming it a violation both of ethics and of the property and exchange rights
of the buyer. Declaring the arrangement "a fraud on the plaintiffs," Lord, 13 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (6 Hun.) at 393, the court
noted that the object of the agreement "was to compel the State, if possible, to pay more for the work than it would have
cost at fair prices or open competition." Id. at 394. The court went on to explain that courts analogously disapproved of
bid rigging among buyers on the grounds
that such an agreement is unconscientious and against public policy, and has a tendency injuriously to affect the
character and value of sales at public auction, and to mislead private confidence; that it operates as afraud on
the sale; that it is contrary to morality and sound policy; that it deprives the person selling of the opportunity
of obtaining a full equivalent for the property.
Id. The court rejected pleas that condemnation of such behavior demanded too high a level of business ethics, concluding
firmly, "lnlot to enter into such combinations is only simple honesty." Id. at 400.
539. See, e.g., Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434, 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848). In Stanton, the court considered a
price-fixing and pooling agreement among numerous transportation lines operating on the Erie and Oswego Canals, made
expressly to establish "fair and uniform rates of freight, and to equalize the business among the members." The court
condemned the arrangement as a pernicious attempt to exempt "the standard of freights, and the facilities and
accommodations to be rendered to the public from the wholesome influence of rivalry and competition." Id. at 440. The
court went on to explain more fully the public harm from such a private restriction of competition, declaring that
the members having thrown their concerns into stock, to derive an income in proportion to the number of shares
they hold, and not according to their merit and activity in business, and safe against the reduction of
compensation that would otherwise follow mean accommodations and want of skill and attention, the public
interest must necessarily suffer grievous loss. Indeed the consequence of such a state of things would shortly
be, that freighters and passengers would be ill served, just in proportion as the carriers were well paid.
Id. at 441. In finding the arrangement void on the basis of both the New York statute penalizing conspiracies to commit
an act injurious to trade, 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 691-92, § 8(6) (1829), and the common law, Stanton, 5 Denio at 443, the
court also noted the additional harm posed to public canal revenue, id. at 441, but never suggested that this factor was
necessary to its ruling. The court otherwise gave no apparent weight to the fact that the defendants were canal boat
operators and never indicated that price fixing in any other context might ever be tolerated.
540. See, e.g., Marsh v. Russell, 66 N.Y. 288 (1876) (finding defendants' pricing understanding to be the ordinary
harmonization of activity among members of a productive partnership rather than price fixing among independent rivals).
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critical ethical dimension and to be necessary to preserve the essential moral integrity
of the economy and of the state itself. Thus, in a leading price-fixing case decided in
1848, the New York Supreme Court explained:
The rule that contracts and agreements are void when contrary to public policy, when
properly understood and applied, is one of the great preservative principles of a state. Sound
morality is the corner stone of the social edifice. Whatever, therefore, disturbs that, is
condemned under that fundamental rule.-'
In the 1870s, as problems of industrial "overcapacity" and "ruinous" compe-
tition began to become more prominent, 542 articulated judicial views on the merits of
competition began to change noticeably. In 1876 the New York Supreme Court
approved the action of the private New York Board of Fire Underwriters in expelling
a member from its ranks for charging less than the uniform rates the board had
prescribed.5 43 The court voiced no concern over the economic impact of such
activity. Instead, it simply noted that one of the board's purposes recited in the 1867
statute by which it was incorporated was "to establish and maintain uniformity
among its members in policies or contracts of insurance.' '544 Because contracts of
insurance covering similar property but charging different rates would, in an
important respect, not be uniform, the board was within its powers. 545
Two years later the New York Supreme Court at Special Term and Chambers
approved a profit-pooling arrangement between two competing New York telegraph
companies and denied a minority shareholder's request for an injunction to restrain
one of the two companies from making payments under the agreement.5 46 The court
conceded that at common law such a plan might be void as against public policy
because of its tendency to prevent competition. 547 It noted, however, that the
legislature had passed a statute authorizing joint activities by telegraph companies
including consolidation and joint construction, maintenance, use, and lease of new
lines. 548 While the activities noted in the statute all seem at least potentially justifiable
as cost-saving integrations of productive efforts, the court read the statute still more
broadly. Because to some extent the activities noted in the act would tend to prevent
competition, the court held the statute should be read as an across-the-board
declaration that the elimination of competition between telegraph companies was not
against public policy.5 49 In the court's view this was a good result because
competition had proved to be detrimental in the telegraph industry, leading to
needless duplication of cost and the reduction of rates below remunerative levels. 550
Where, for example, both firms previously had maintained offices in places "which
541. Stanton, 5 Denio at 441. See also supra note 538.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
543. See People ex rel. Pinckney v. New York Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (7 Hun.) 248 (1876).
544. Id. at 250.
545. Id. at 252.
546. See Benedict v. Western Union Tel. Co., 9 Abb. N. Cas. 214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1878).
547. Id. at 221.
548. Id. at 217-20.
549. Id. at 220.
550. Id. at 220-22.
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could not afford sufficient business for both, an arrangement by which one of these
companies should shut up its office and connect its wires with the office of the other
company, and by which the receipts and expenses of this office should be divided,"
did not seem inappropriate.5S1 Most broadly, the court declared that in light of the
telegraph companies' statute,
no arrangement which [such companies] may make to prevent competition which would be
ruinous to each, being against public policy, there is nothing in the action of the two
defendants, such action being manifestly for the interest of all persons concerned, which
calls for the intervention of the court.552
Judicial sympathy for nonancillary restrictions of competition, even where no
special statute was implicated, became strikingly evident a decade later in a case
decided by the New York Court of Appeals a year after it had liberalized ancillary
restraint law in Diamond Match. In Leslie v. Lorillard,55 3 the court approved an
arrangement whereby one steamship company agreed to pay another steamship
company a monthly fee in return for the latter's forbearance from competing against
the former's New York to Virginia route. In response to a challenge to the
arrangement brought by a shareholder of the paying company, the court reviewed
common law restraint of trade principles to determine whether such an agreement
contravened public policy. In so doing, the court simultaneously gave dramatic
indication of the state of judicial thought in New York as of the late 1880s.
Judge John Clinton Gray, writing for the court, declared that common law
prohibitions on restraints of trade had relaxed over the years as the scope of
commercial and industrial activity had spread, making "such agreements less
dangerous as tending to create monopolies.' '554 Common law judges clearly had
recognized that "[tihe object of government . . . was not to interfere with the free
right of man to dispose of his property or of his labor," 555 but instead was simply to
protect society against the harms that might result where an individual hindered his
own ability to earn a livelihood or society lost the benefits of competition in skilled
labor.5 56 Judge Gray deemed the latter possibility a remote one under modern
circumstances, except in one special situation. "In later times," he reasoned, "the
danger in such agreements seems only really to exist when corporations are parties to
them, for their means and strength would better enable them to buy off rivalry and to
create monopolies." ' 557 He stressed, however, that while corporations posed unusual
dangers, they also promised unusual benefits for society. Although they could
become a "public menace" if allowed "to control and monopolize the avenues to
that industry in which they are engaged," they were also "great engines for the
promotion of the public convenience, and for the development of public wealth.'"558
551. Id. at 220-21.
552. Id. at 222.
553. 110 N.Y. 519, 18 N.E. 363 (1888).
554. Id. at 532-33, 18 N.E. at 365.
555. Id. at 533, 18 N.E. at 366.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
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Accordingly, while restraints on competition should be invalidated if they went
"beyond measures for self protection" and posed a significant threat to the public
good, such invalidation should only occur when there existed "evident grounds" 559
to support it, and courts otherwise should be wary of "interfering with and restraining
the conduct of the affairs of individuals or of corporations." 5 60
Even though the case before the court did involve the "special" situation of
corporate parties to an agreement, the court nevertheless evaluated the arrangement
according to the same restraint of trade principles applicable to individuals and
unincorporated firms. These principles, Judge Gray declared, had been well stated in
Judge Andrews' careful opinion in Diamond Match. Neither sensing nor articulating
any difference between ancillary restraints of the type involved in Diamond Match
and the naked restraint of competition established by the steamship companies in
Leslie v. Lorillard, Judge Gray sweepingly declared that the former case stood for the
proposition that "no contracts are void as being in general restraint of trade, where
they operate simply to prevent a party from engaging or competing in the same
business.' '561 The steamship arrangement did no more to exclude third parties from
competing in the trade than had the agreement between the match manufacturers in
the earlier case. 562 The steamship case thus was deemed to be in no important respect
"different from the simpler case of the sale by an individual of his business and his
right to conduct it in a particular part of the land," and Diamond Match was
controlling. 563
Thus, within the space of a year the liberalized approach established in Diamond
Match to validate self-protective covenants ancillary to other, potentially beneficial
main transactions was transformed by the New York Court of Appeals into a general
rule validating nonancillary self-protection as an end in itself. The court's decision
did not rest simply on a belief that competition was not significantly imperiled by
agreements like the one the steamship companies had made. The opinion also
reflected substantial doubt as to whether competition was in fact always desirable. In
Judge Gray's view,
[w]hether competition in this particular business would be a public benefaction, or its
restraint a source of prejudice, we are unable, of course, to judge. I do not think that
competition is invariably a public benefaction; for it may be carried on to such a degree as
to become a general evil. 564
Such doubts reappeared in a New York Supreme Court case decided soon
thereafter, in which another nonancillary restraint was upheld. In Ives v. Smith,565 the
supreme court at general term adopted a special term opinion566 that had approved a
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 534, 18 N.E. at 366.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. 62 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (55 Hun.) 606, 8 N.Y.S. 46 (1889) (per curiam).
566. 3 N.Y.S. 645 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1888), aff'dper curiam, 62 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (55 Hun.) 606, 8 N.Y.S. 46
(1889).
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private territorial division governing the geographic areas of the Pacific Northwest in
which competing railroads would each build their respective new tracks. Finding the
plaintiff entitled to a temporary injunction against threatened violations of the
agreement, the special term opinion acknowledged that an earlier New York case567
had condemned an agreement under which one railroad company paid another $1,000
per month for continued nondevelopment of a potentially competing railroad line just
north of the Connecticut state boundary. The Ives court sought to distinguish that
opinion, however, as, at most, a declaration against elimination of means of travel
and competition between roads actually built and in operation "or contemplated to be
built on fixed and determined routes. '- 568 It concluded that a different result was
called for when the agreement related to future lines to be built in areas not yet opened
to railroad service. In that circumstance, the agreed elimination of competition
through territorial division was a public good because it promoted development in
new areas which would proceed more rapidly when the companies no longer had to
divert resources into countering the competitive efforts of others in the same
locale.569 Without any further discussion of market share, the extent of potential
unrestrained competition, or of any special "natural monopoly" characteristics of the
railroad industry that might justify a modification of ordinary restraint of trade
principles, the court buttressed its view of the harm that might result if one of the
companies were allowed to invade new territory not assigned to it by citing one of the
leading railroad economists of the age. Should the company not be stopped, the court
declared, millions of dollars might be spent "in what Mr. Adams has termed a 'war
of construction' which he has characterized as a 'folly almost amounting to a
crime.' "570
In the same year, however, the New York Supreme Court did strongly reiterate
a more traditional approach to nonancillary restraints of competition in the classic
case of People v. North River Sugar Refining Co.571 The court condemned a New
York corporation's participation, along with sixteen other companies, in the
price-fixing Sugar Trust, declaring it to be a violation of the state's statutory
prohibition against conspiracies "to commit any act injurious . . . to trade or
commerce.''572 The court distinguished Diamond Match on the basis of Judge
Andrews' assertion in that case that price-fixing combinations "stood on a different
footing" than ancillary restraints of the sort the match manufacturers had made;573
567. Hartford & New Haven R.R. v. New York & New Haven R.R., 3 Robt. 411 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1865). A similar
result also had been reached in Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140, 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (payments of $40,000 per
month for not competing against another steamship company).
568. Ives, 3 N.Y.S. at 654.
569. See id.
570. Id. at 656. While the court gave no citation for the quotation, it likely had in mind the work of Charles Francis
Adams, Jr., who became the leading original member of the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners and a
leading writer on the subject of railroad economics. See T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 1-56. It is possible, but less likely,
that the court was referring to a comment by Henry Carter Adams, who became chief statistician of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. See H. THottLsi, supra note 1, at 320.
571. 7 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1889), aff'd, 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890).
572. SeeNorth River Sugar, 7 N.Y.S. at 411 (quoting Act of Dec. 10, 1828, § 8(6), 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 689,691-92
(1829)).
573. See North River Sugar, 7 N.Y.S. at 413.
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and the supreme court proclaimed without further explanation that Leslie v. Lorillard
was a case whose facts were so different that it simply was inapplicable to the Sugar
Trust scheme. 574 In sharp contrast to the faith in the power of potential competition
displayed by the New York Court of Appeals in those two earlier leading cases, the
supreme court declared potential new entry both unlikely and irrelevant in the
situation before it:
That, in view of the large capital and extended combination already secured, is a very remote
probability; for other manufacturers, brought in competition with this combination, could
easily be driven from the field of trade by it, and its paramount control still maintained and
perpetuated. And the probability that its power would be used in this manner is so decidedly
fortified by experience that capital would be reluctantly placed at the risk of loss by other
persons, with so formidable a competitor to be encountered. But, if it should be otherwise,
the law will not tolerate or excuse the combination; for the interposition of third persons, in
no way connected with it, to counteract its effects, is no excuse or justification for the wrong
this combination has in this manner committed. A wrongdoer is never excused from the
consequences of his wrong for the reason that other parties, not acting under his direction or
authority, may interpose, and in a measure defeat the consequences of the wrong.5 75
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the supreme court's
decision revoking the defendant's corporate charter, in an opinion delivered just one
week before the Sherman Act took effect. 576 The court of appeals did so, however,
solely on the ground that the defendant had exceeded and abused its corporate powers
and violated public policy by evading normal state corporate law controls on the
establishment, management, and operation of corporations. 577 The court of appeals
pointedly declined to reconsider restraint of trade principles or to invoke them as a
basis for condemnation of the Sugar Trust, declaring it "needless to advance into the
wider discussion over monopolies and competition and restraint of trade and the
problems of political economy. Our duty is to leave them until some proper
emergency compels their consideration. ' '578 Thus, it unanimously decided as it did
"[w]ithout either approval or disapproval of the views expressed upon that branch of
the case by the courts below.' ' 579
By 1890 Missouri case law generally was no more hostile to private restraints of
competition than New York precedent had become. Missouri courts continued to
condemn bid rigging at public or private sale, for example, as they repeatedly had
done in prior decades.580 But in the late 1870s and early 1880s certain other
anticompetitive agreements elicited substantial sympathy. The mixture of Missouri
judicial sentiments at this time, and the increasing judicial sympathy for some private
574. See id. at 414.
575. Id.
576. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890).
577. See id. at 623-25, 24 N.E. at 840-41.
578. Id. at 626, 24 N.E. at 841.
579. Id.
580. See, e.g., Engelman v. Skrainka, 14 Mo. App. 438, 441 (1883) (noting earlier cases and declaring: "It is an
uniform rule, founded in public policy, that any contract, the necessary effect of which is to stifle competition in bidding
at public or private sales, or at lettings of public or private work, is void").
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limitations of full-blown business rivalry, became strikingly evident in a series of
opinions rendered during these years by the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
In 1878 the St. Louis Court of Appeals strongly reaffirmed traditional antipathy
to private restraints on competition in a case considering the legitimacy of an
arrangement under which a railroad company had agreed to exclusively employ the
plaintiff ferry company to transport freight and passengers between the Illinois and
Missouri shore opposite St. Louis, in return for the ferry company's transfer of a tract
of land the railroad desired.58 t The court declared that the plaintiff's broad
construction of the contract would render the arrangement void as a restraint of trade
because it would prevent the defendant common carrier from taking advantage of new
forms of ferry transportation that were not used by the plaintiff but that were offered
by other ferry companies, specifically, technological innovations allowing entire
railroad cars to be ferried without any unloading and reloading of their contents. 582
In so holding, the St. Louis Court of Appeals reviewed and strongly reiterated
established common law prohibitions on restraints of trade. Invoking the New York
Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Hooker v. Vandewater583 and other leading
cases, 5 4 the court declared:
The odious nature of monopoly, early recognized by the English law, has become more
apparent as commerce has increased. The law fully recognizes the necessity of competition,
and here again not only takes notice of but enforces a rule of trade.... So agreements or
combinations the effect of which is to prevent or withdraw competition are held to be against
the policy of the law, and void.... In the case at bar, that competition which would ensue
were the three ferry companies allowed freely to compete for such freights as might have
sought the cheapest and best of the three would be destroyed, on the basis of the construction
of the contract of 1864 now contended for. The evidence shows, moreover, that the
appellant was engaged in close competition, at different points, with rival railway companies
having their termini opposite St. Louis. In so far as restraints were imposed upon the
appellant, and its facilities for business abridged, it would be unable to compete with rival
companies not so hampered. The tendency of competition is, indeed, to cheapen values; but
it is also to promote better and do away with inferior methods; to make men use advantages
to the utmost; and its withdrawal implies a loss to the community which is great in
proportion to the importance and volume of the business involved. In no department of
commerce is competition more important, especially in a widely extended country, of
various productions, than in that by which the people of such a country communicate with
each other and exchange the products of their labor. This competition cannot be maintained
if the carrier is seriously weighted in the race; and, indeed, the argument of the respondent,
pushed to its logical results, would end in the abandonment of business by a railway
company and the forfeiture of its franchise.585
581. See Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 5 Mo. App. 347 (1878), rev'd, 73 Mo. 389 (1881).
582. 5 Mo. App. at 370-79.
583. 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). See supra notes 527, 533 and accompanying text.
584. See Wiggins Ferry, 5 Mo. App. at 373-74.
585. Id. (citations omitted). In 1881 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the decision of the St. Louis Court of
Appeals. See Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 73 Mo. 389 (1881). The Missouri Supreme Court pointedly
noted that the defendant was seeking to escape liability for its breach of contract while retaining the benefits of the land
it had received from the plaintiff, see id. at 411-12, and declared that the defendant had not adequately demonstrated that
the contract was against public policy. See id. Invoking principles traditionally applied to judge the legality of ancillary
restraints, see supra text accompanying notes 484-86, the supreme court declared that the arrangement was not an invalid
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This same court, however, two years previously had indicated significantly
greater ambivalence regarding the virtues of competition, and before long would
promulgate one of the leading late nineteenth century opinions upholding self-
protection through cartelization. In 1876 in the case of Koehler v. Feuerbacher,8 6
the St. Louis Court of Appeals had sustained an agreement by three competing park
owners to refrain for twelve months from paying a bonus to any club or society to
induce it to select a particular park for festivities, and to refrain from paying for any
music band employed by such societies. The court noted that conceptions of public
policy changed greatly over time, stressing as an example the way that forestalling,
engrossing, and regrating had once been illegal in England but had since become
firn-mly accepted as a legitimate and beneficial part of trade.5 87 While contracts in
"total" restraint of trade admittedly constituted one of the very few categories of
contracts that were against public policy, the arrangement at issue was not such an
agreement. 588 Indeed, the court reasoned, it was not an agreement to keep up prices,
as the defendants contended, because, if not restrained, the offering of bonuses to
organizations to induce their selecting one park over another would tend to increase
"the price of admission to the entertainment. ' ' 589 The court's decision, however, did
not rest simply on the perceived peculiarities of competition among private park
owners. The opinion reflected at least in part a somewhat broader vision of morality
and of the legitimate moderation of competition in the marketplace:
An agreement to be no longer a party to such a system of unfair competition strikes us as
being eminently in the interest of good morals, fair and free trade, and honest rivalry in
business. If dry-goods houses in a certain town should agree to employ no drummers for
trade, or hotel-keepers to employ no runners, the contract would be much of the same
character, and we see nothing illegal about it. 90
restraint of trade, because it was "not general as to space, but only partial and special." Wiggins Ferry, 73 Mo. at 411.
As the court explained:
The space in which the restriction is to operate is limited to the Illinois shore opposite the city of St. Louis, and
is only a partial restraint in that space, the restriction being not that defendant will not employ any ferry at all,
but that it will only employ that of plaintiff. We can not say from anything appearing in the contract that such
limitation is unreasonable, and it is not, therefore, obnoxious to the rule.
Id. The contract was not deemed unreasonable because the court believed that it would not produce the pricing and
efficiency harms noted in the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The public was protected because while the
defendant had a duty "to secure the transit over the river with facility and dispatch of all persons and property which either
trade or the public interest might demand," id. at 410, the plaintiff was obligated "to furnish and maintain wharf and
steam ferry boats sufficient to do with promptness and dispatch all the ferrying of passengers and freight requiring it."
Id. at 410. The public would not be deprived of the use of new, more efficient car-transfer technology and lower prices
because, in the court's view, the defendant had a right to demand that the plaintiff adopt such technology. As the court
explained, "If the ferrying of freight loaded in cars without breaking bulk had been demanded by defendant because it
was cheaper, safer, and more expeditious than transfer by parcels, it would have been the duty of plaintiff to have provided
boats to meet the demand." Id. at 413.
586. 2 Mo. App. 11 (1876).
587. See id. at 14. On the offenses of forestalling, engrossing, and regrating, which in large measure addressed the
purchase and sale of foodstuffs by middlemen wholesalers, see W. L-rwiN, supra note 167, at 32-39; H. THORMLu, supra
note 1, at 15-17.
588. See Koehler, 2 Mo. App. at 14.
589. Id. at 15.
590. Id.
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Four years later, the same court again expressed considerable sympathy for
competitive restraint in an opinion matching Leslie v. Lorillard for its confusion of
ancillary and nonancillary considerations and its apprehension that the presence or
absence of corporations might alter the analysis. In the well-known 1880 case of
Skrainka v. Scharringhausen,591 the St. Louis Court of Appeals approved a price-
fixing agreement among twenty-four operators of stone quarries located in a particular
part of St. Louis. The court again noted that the old common law doctrines on restraint
of trade had been modified in light of changing social and economic conditions and
improved understanding of the laws of trade. 592 Although contracts in restraint of trade
still were void, the court explained, judicial determinations of which arrangements fell
within that category had evolved over time. 593 The question in each case was the impact
of the agreement. Did the agreement impair a party's livelihood, deprive the public
of useful services, discourage industry, diminish competition, or enhance prices? 59 4
Harm might well result when "large companies or corporations" excluded rivalry and
engrossed markets, thereby "making a corner.' 595 Indeed, as commerce had ex-
panded, "the odious nature of monopoly ' 596 had become increasingly more evident:
The danger to be apprehended from the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of
great corporations, and the abuses by which large capitalists may so combine as to relax or
destroy competition in trade, are matters of public concern, and the essential question is one
of monopoly and of injury to the public.597
But, the court declared, not every restriction of trade could be deemed harmful
or void. Without noting any possible differences between an ancillary restraint and a
price-fixing cartel, the court extended traditional ancillary restraint categories to
nonancillary combinations as well, reiterating that whereas a "general" restraint was
void, a "partial" and reasonable restraint was not when it merely gave "fair
protection to those in whose favor it is made" and did not extend so far as to harm
the general public.5 98
In the court's view, the quarrymen's cartel fell into the latter category of legit-
imate partial restraint. It involved only the quarrymen of one part of one city and not
even all of them. There was no evidence it had caused public harm, and it was not
apparent from its terms that this time-limited agreement tended to deprive people of
employment, unduly increase prices, create a monopoly, or eliminate competition. 599
The court found plausible the small operators' claim that the agreement in fact tended
to advance trade, "because, if competition reaches such a point that goods cannot be
sold at living prices, many manufacturers must be driven out of business."60 Indeed,
591. 8 Mo. App. 522 (1880).
592. See id. at 525.
593. See id.
594. See id. at 527.
595. Id. at 525.
596. Id. at 526.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 527.
599. See id.
600. Id. at 525.
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the court stated that it knew "of no case in recent times in which a contract such as
the one before us has been declared illegal.''601
C. Addyston Pipe and the State of Pre-Sherman Act Common Law
Judge Taft's Addyston Pipe opinion was a brilliant effort to extract analytically
coherent tendencies from the aggregate mass of nineteenth century American
common law precedent. 602 In demarcating majority and minority trends, however,
Judge Taft did not necessarily identify clear differences among jurisdictions as much
as contradictory tendencies within individual state systems. Judging from the New
York and Missouri pattern, it appears that state judges did strongly sympathize with
ancillary restraints in the manner Taft suggested. 60 3 Taft's characterization of
majority and minority approaches to nonancillary restraints, however, is potentially
misleading as a general guide to pre-Sherman Act common law adjudication; for,
despite earlier judicial hostility, tolerance of nonancillary restraints had become not
merely a minority exception, but a powerful trend in at least New York6o4 and
Missouri6 5 by the start of the final decade of the nineteenth century.
Leading accounts of the overall state of nineteenth century American common
law have noted that it supported a policy of free competition more strongly than did
contemporary English case law on restraints of trade. 6° 6 While this may well be true
in general, it is important to keep in mind not only the significant differences among
American jurisdictions, but also the way that doctrine changed within particular
jurisdictions over time. When the new federal antitrust act was passed in 1890, courts
in both New York and Missouri had modified ancillary restraint law in a way that was
very similar to the liberalization contemporary English courts had effected over time
and would soon indicate most strikingly in the classic 1894 case of Nordenfelt v.
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. 60 7 Nonancillary restraint doctrine had
changed even more substantially. Late nineteenth century New York and Missouri
opinions in nonancillary restraint cases at times departed quite dramatically from
traditional economic and legal analyses and arguably had tempered judicial support
for competition even more significantly by 1890 than had the English approach that
was reflected in the leading case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow &
Co.60
8
601. Id. at 527.
602. See R. BoRu, supra note 6, at 26; W. LrwN, supra note 167, at 174.
603. See supra text accompanying notes 480-513.
604. See supra text accompanying notes 553-79.
605. See supra text accompanying notes 586-601.
606. See, e.g., H. TnoRaw, supra note 1, at 39, 52.
607. 1894 App. Cas. 535 (upholding an ancillary restraint barring competitive efforts anywhere in the world for a
period of 25 years). For discussions of the case, see W. LErwiN, supra note 167, at 44-46; H. TnoR11U , supra note 1,
at 20.
608. 21 Q.B.D. 544 (1888), aff'd, 1892 App. Cas. 25 (finding a loose combination engaged in anticompetitive,
predatory behavior to not be an illegal conspiracy even if the collective agreement might be void at common law and thus
not enforceable among the parties to it). For discussions of the case, see W. LErwm, supra note 167, at 49-51; H.
THORELLI, supra note 1, at 34.
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In the late 1870s and 1880s, New York and Missouri jurists heralded the
expansion of markets, the march of industrial progress, and the pervasiveness of
economic opportunity. In these years, the judges in these states tended to express
heightened concern not for private restraint of competition, but instead for govern-
ment restriction of private activity and the potential dangers of excessive, "ruinous"
competition in the face of a newly severe threat of "overproduction" in many
American industries. Yet, as cartelization and concentration increased in the 1880s
and on into the 1890s, and as the power and prevalence of corporate capitalism
intensified, other Americans grew ever more alarmed over the apparent dangers
posed by private anticompetitive conduct. The traditionalist perspectives of these
Americans prompted the passage of a growing body of new state and federal antitrust
legislation which laid the foundation for a large volume of state and federal restraint
of trade litigation between 1890 and 1918. In these cases, New York and Missouri
jurists would be asked to reassess their recent departures from traditional analyses in
a setting of augmented popular concern for private anticompetitive behavior. It is to
the story of this new legislation and litigation that this Article now turns.
VII. THE POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF ANTITRUST ACrIvITY IN
NEw YORK AND MIssoUI
A. New York: Antitrust Law and the Natural Economic Order
During the Progressive Era, New York and Missouri both became unusually
active 6o9 centers of antitrust agitation, investigation, legislation, and adjudication,
frequently gaining national attention from observers elsewhere interested in contem-
porary antitrust enforcement and analysis. 610 Popular concern with the late nineteenth
century rise of large industrial combinations led to repeated New York legislative
hearings on the subject in 1875, 1878, 1880, 1885, 1889, 1892, and 1897.611 Such
concerns also led to the passage of a series of statutes to supplement New York's
1828 general conspiracy statute, 61 2 beginning with an 1890 prohibition against
combinations of corporations "for the prevention of competition.''613 This statute
was followed by a broader 1893 act banning
Every contract or combination in the form of trust or otherwise ... whereby competition in
the state of New York in the supply or the price of any article or commodity of common use
609. See, e.g., NEw YoRK STATE BAR, supra note 436, at 2a, 4a, 6a-15a (noting New York developments); H.
SFAGER & C. GUucK, TRUST AND CoRPORAT'ON PROBLEMaS 339-66 (1929) (highlighting Missouri developments); H.
TtioRE.ta, supra note 1, at 265 (noting the prominence of New York efforts in a survey of state antitrust activity through
1902). See also infra note 661 and accompanying text (noting that Missouri collected antitrust fines in an amount
comparable to the total amount collected in all federal antitrust cases in the same period).
610. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 658.
611. See New YoRK STATE BAR, supra note 436, at 6a.
612. See Act of Dec. 10, 1828, § 8(6), 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 689, 691-92 (1829) (making it a misdemeanor to
.conspire ... to commit any act injurious to... trade or commerce").
613. See Stock Corporation Law, ch. 564, § 7, 1890 N.Y. Laws 1069, amended by Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 688,
§ 7, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1828.
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in said state for the support of life and health may be restrained or prevented, for the purpose
of advancing prices .... 614
New York's most important antitrust legislation was enacted in the late 1890s,
however, in the wake of the hearings and recommendations of a special committee of
the state legislature, chaired by Senator Clarence Lexow, that scrutinized the history
and operations of the sugar, soda, and tobacco "trusts. '615 First enacted in 1897,616
this new legislation was modified in certain procedural aspects relating to discovery
of evidence two years later and reenacted by an overwhelming legislative majority as
the Donnelly Act of 1899.617 The Act declared illegal:
Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby a monopoly in the man-
ufacture, production or sale in this state of any article or commodity of common use is or
may be created, established or maintained, or whereby competition in this state in the supply
or price of any such article or commodity is or may be restrained or prevented, or whereby
for the purpose of creating, establishing or maintaining a monopoly within this state of the
manufacture, production or sale of any such article or commodity, the free pursuit in this state
of any lawful business, trade or occupation is or may be restricted or prevented .... 61s
The statute established a maximum fine of $5,000 and a maximum jail term of one
year,619 and authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief.620
In recommending the legislation that would become New York's principal
antitrust statute, the Lexow Committee's well-known 1897 report62' provided a
remarkably thorough and systematic review of the traditional economic and political
perspectives that pervasively influenced contemporary federal and state antitrust
analysis. 622 Accordingly, the report helps to clarify traditionalist aspects of the
federal antitrust analyses already discussed, and simultaneously provides a useful
preface to the examination of post-Sherman Act state jurisprudence which follows.
The Lexow Committee members and other like-minded legislators did not focus
exclusively on any single economic desideratum such as "consumer welfare" or
productive efficiency, or on the prevention of any single form of economic mischief,
such as the reduction of output. Rather, these New York legislators understood
economic life in more traditional terms, as the integrated product of basic natural laws
and processes, and attributed distortions and defects in economic life to artificial
614. Act of May 17, 1893, ch. 716, 1893 N.Y. Laws 1782. In 1896 the act was amended to expressly cover
corporations and to give the Attorney General power to seek injuncitve relief. See Act of Apr. 15, 1896, ch. 267, 1896
N.Y. Laws 212.
615. See Jo-r Comma. OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY APPOiNTED TO INVESnOArE TRUSTS, REPORT AND PRocEEDINGs
(1897) [hereinafter LExow REPORT]. The establishment and operation of this committee were the subject of considerable
press and public attention at the time. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1897, at 4, col. 3; id. Jan. 26, 1897, at 3, cols.
3-4; id. Feb. 16, 1897, at 3, cols. 1-2; id. Feb. 18, 1897, at 12, cols. 2-5; id. Mar. 10, 1897, at 4, cols. 2-3.
616. Act of May 7, 1897, ch. 383, 1897 N.Y. Laws 310.
617. Act of May 25, 1899, ch. 690, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514. The New York Senate reportedly passed the measure
by a vote of 33 to 2. See NEw YoRK STATE BAR, supra note 436, at 14a.
618. Act of May 25, 1899, ch. 690, § 1, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514.
619. See id. § 2. These were the same maximum penalties that Congress had provided in the Sherman Act in 1890.
See ch. 647, §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982)).
620. Act of May 25, 1899, ch. 690, § 3, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514. A 1910 amendment increased the maximum
penalties for corporations to $20,000. See Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 633, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1672.
621. See, e.g., NEw YoRK STATE BAR, supra note 436, at 7a-10a; H. THORELU, supra note 1, at 354-55.
622. See supra text accompanying notes 198-266.
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interference with this natural economic order. The Committee's report explained the
rise of the new economic concentration in precisely these terms and advocated new
statutory measures as a way to reestablish the natural patterns of economic life that
Committee members thought would protect a variety of important economic, social,
and political values simultaneously.
Like many Americans of the time, 62 3 these state legislators had a mixed view of
economic concentration and sought to distinguish beneficial combinations of capital
from large-scale aggregations that deserved condemnation as abnormal deviations
from normal economic patterns. Combinations of capital, the Committee noted, often
could provide important economies of operation and bring together the best skills and
machinery. 624 The increasing size of these combinations in recent years was not itself
problematic in the Committee's view: "That it is a natural evolution seems clear from
the fact that it is the universal concomitant of progress, marking in fact, to a very
large extent, the progressive stages of commercial development created by the natural
impulse toward better conditions ...."625
Any effort to simply outlaw large combinations, indeed, would threaten not only
economic progress, but also the very bases of natural economic life and the principles
of liberal government. Preservation of natural economic life critically depended upon
respect for liberty, property, and freedom of contract. Stressing the third of these
interrelated rights in particular, the Committee explained: "The right of contract
coexists with and is incidental to the right of liberty and property, and is recognized
in the natural law as the very foundation of human progress and development. It is
a sacred privilege of the citizen which is carefully guarded by the Constitu-
tion .... ",626 Echoing fears of paternalism prominently expressed in contemporary
constitutional case law,627 the Committee declared it essential that "the State should
not exercise parental authority or unduly interfere with the operations of the natural
law. ' 62s At the same time, however, it was critical that the state act to prevent private
parties from interfering with such operations themselves. 629
If ordinary combinations of capital, even on a large scale, were simply the
inevitable product of natural economic evolution, "trusts" were the artificial
perversion of the natural order:
[Me define the trust to be an aggregation, brought about for the purpose of operating against
the natural law of supply and demand, destroying competition by combination and unfair
methods in order to secure control of both product and market, or permitting competition to
exist only colorably and to the extent of refuting the charge of absolute monopoly. The one
623. See, e.g., R. HomsrADna, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 192.
624. See Laxow RE ORT, supra note 615, at 8.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 31.
627. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 186-93.
628. LExow REPORT, supra note 615, at 9. See also id. at 12.
629. On this central aspect of nineteenth century theory more generally, see supra text accompanying notes 130-53.
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moves with the natural law; the other is designed to and does operate against the natural
law. 630
Such artificial combinations of capital generated numerous social and economic
harms. As the New York Senate and Assembly noted in their concurrent resolution
establishing the Lexow Committee:
Combinations of capital in the form of trusts or otherwise appear to exist and to be increasing
in number and influence in this commonwealth, resulting in concentrating in the hands of a
few, various important branches of industry, creating monopolies, shutting out competition,
displacing labor and driving the citizen of moderate means out of business with the effect that
production and price are regulated not by the natural laws of supply and demand, or the rules
of normal and healthy competition, but by the arbitrary decision of combinations operating
together to destroy competition and exact unreasonable charges from the people .... 6-t
The Committee concluded that all these pernicious effects indeed had followed the
establishment of the specific "trusts" it had been charged to investigate. 632 Among
these various specific harms, the Committee stressed most strongly not the damage
done to consumer prices or to productive efficiency, but instead the impediments
raised to equal economic opportunity for competing producers and potential new
entrants. While the Committee emphasized that freedom of contract was the critical
starting point for analysis, this principle was not thought to preclude legislative
restriction of trust combination. Such massive combinations absorbed, destroyed, or
scared off others who otherwise would participate in New York trade. In so doing,
they infringed those persons' rights to trade and exchange, and thus distorted and
diminished the natural state of economic life. 633 Prosperity depended on undimin-
ished commercial investment in the state, which demanded business confidence. 634
This in turn required "an inviolable guarantee" of "the enduring protection of just
and equal laws" and "the fullest opportunity of employment and expansion" for
"[g]enius, capital, and labor." The law would be a mere "hollow mockery" if it
allowed a trust aggregation to monopolize an industry so as to discourage new entry
by others, leading to decreased investment of competing capital and reduced
opportunities for the employment of labor.635 In such a context, restriction of "trust"
combination activity did not violate the principle of freedom of contract, for that
principle had never been deemed to be one without limit or qualification:
The law which protects the individual in the acquisition and use of property and guarantees
to him the fullest opportunity for its enjoyment couples with this protection a guarantee and
condition that such use shall not be oppressive .... Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is
a maxim as old as civilization itself and illustrates the proposition that the sacred right of
contract and the incidental privilege of combination are both subject to the qualification that
630. LExow REPORT, supra note 615, at 10.
631. New York S. Doe. 1897, Vol. VII, No. 40, at 3-4 (as quoted in NEw YORK STATE BAR, supra note 436, at
8a n.51.
632. See LExow REPORT, supra note 615, at 12.
633. See id.
634. See id. at 12-13.
635. See id.
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they shall be exercised so as not to prejudice the rights of others or the interests of the
people. 636
The Committee rejected countervailing arguments that "trusts" generated
important economic benefits. In so doing, it treated anticompetitive, yet assertedly
efficient, combinations in a manner quite similar to the approach taken by
congressional antitrust advocates in 1890 when they were faced with the same
potential threat to traditional theory. 637
The Committee dismissed the possible significance of trust-generated cost
savings on the ground that there was no evidence that trusts lowered prices to
consumers to the full extent of their new savings, 638 declaring that, indeed, there was
evidence that prices had sometimes risen despite such savings. 639 While the advent of
trust combination may have led to more stable prices, this was an "abnormal and not
a natural condition," one that "revolutionize[d] the law of supply and demand" and
kept prices at higher levels while perniciously creating "inequality among the
people.-640 There was no evidence that trust activity improved the quality of goods,
and logically its natural tendency would be the reverse, because the spur of
competitive pressure was missing once market control was attained. 641 Finally, the
evidence disproved any claim that the establishment and operation of trust combina-
tions increased wages or improved the consistency of employment. In fact, trusts
worsened employment conditions when they closed plants and consequently laid off
workers.642
The Lexow Committee members perceived the trust problem ultimately to be a
national problem for which only a federal remedy was ever likely to be wholly
adequate. 643 In their 1897 report, however, they concluded that effective federal
action had been largely thwarted by the United States Supreme Court's 1895 decision
in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,644 which declared that the federal government
did not have constitutional authority to challenge the monopolistic consolidation of
sugar manufacturing. 645 Accordingly, the Committee declared, the state would have
to act to fill the enforcement void itself.
But in fashioning a remedy, how could the legislature distinguish potentially
beneficial combinations protected by the principle of freedom of contract from
pernicious trusts? This could be done, the Committee stated, by scrutinizing the
overall pattern of acts undertaken, even where each in isolation might have been
perfectly lawful, and by judging the series of acts according to whether or not they
were undertaken "for the purpose of securing an object prejudicial to public
636. Id. at 39. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
637. See supra text accompanying notes 319-20.
638. See Laxow REPoRT, supra note 615, at 16.
639. See id.
640. Id. at 17-18.
641. See id. at 16.
642. See id. at 17.
643. See id. at 30.
644. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
645. See LExow REPoRT, supra note 615, at 29, 30.
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interests."646 By such an approach, lawful combinations readily could be separated
from "trusts" of the sort the Committee had studied. Each of these "trusts," the
Committee found, had obtained a market share of at least eighty percent and had been
formed with the purpose of gaining such market dominance by means of a
combination of all the important competitors, with the ultimate aim of then limiting
production and fixing prices. 647
As already noted, the Lexow Committee went on to recommend new legislation
to address specific bad acts committed within the state and to strengthen the state's
ability to obtain evidence. It also simultaneously considered the feasibility of a
number of other possible remedies. Domestic corporate charters might "impose
limitations upon the volume of stock to be issued; but in the absence of similar
provisions in the laws of other States a discrimination would exist injuriously
affecting domestic corporations.' '64 Intrastate business licenses of monopolistic
foreign companies might be revoked, perhaps even in a civil action brought by a
private citizen, although such a private action remedy was so "drastic" it required
further study.649
In concluding its report, the Committee strongly rejected claims that "compe-
tition was ruinous to legitimate enterprise and . . . becoming obsolete" 650 and
reiterated its central concern with the maintenance of economic opportunity. In so
doing, the Committee firmly proclaimed its belief in the parallelism of fundamental
political and economic liberty. The Committee declared:
Political oppression is the refusal of equal rights; commercial oppression is the denial of
equal opportunities; both are repugnant to the people. The spirit that resisted the one and
wrote the shibboleth of equal rights into the organic law of the nation, will not permit the
other to take enduring root by tolerating the substitution of monopoly for equal opportunity.
The field should be free to all. In the conflict of commercial rivalry, genius, labor and
capital should have the largest liberty of expansion and employment, and the fullest
opportunity of entrance into every field of industrial activity. No one should be permitted by
unfair and oppressive methods to build an impregnable trocha around any industrial pursuit,
and rest its claims to special privilege on abuse of power of concentrated wealth of abnormal
magnitude. 65'
Between 1890 and 1918, at a time of such increased legislative concern and
activity, the New York courts repeatedly faced restraint of trade issues in a large
number of common law and statutory cases brought both before and after enactment
of the Donnelly Act. These public and private cases involved both local conspiracies
and some of the largest interstate combinations of the Progressive Era, including
some of the combinations addressed by the United States Supreme Court in early
federal antitrust litigation. 652 Examination of these New York cases, along with
646. Id. at 34.
647. See id. at 34-35.
648. Id. at 36.
649. See id. at 37.
650. Id. at 37-38.
651. Id. at 38-39.
652. Thus, the "Sugar Trust" that was addressed in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), was also
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contemporary antitrust opinions from Missouri, offers a revealing glimpse of an
important aspect of Progressive Era state jurisprudence and an enlightening counter-
point to the familiar story of United States Supreme Court antitrust analysis during the
same period. Before turning to the antitrust jurisprudence of both of these two states,
however, it is important to first note briefly the rather different context of antitrust
jurisprudence in Progressive Era Missouri.
B. Missouri and the Antitrust Crusade
While antitrust concern played an important role in New York legislation and
litigation, in Missouri such concern sparked a decades-long moral and political
crusade that sought to challenge the power and legitimacy of the greatest industrial
aggregations of the age. 65 3 Spurred by intense popular sentiment and journalistic
agitation, 654 the Missouri legislature passed a series of strongly worded antitrust acts
beginning in 1889.655 Simultaneously, state enforcement officials actively prosecuted
considered in People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890), although at an earlier phase
in the sugar combination's history. The American Tobacco combination challenged in United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), was also challenged in People v. Duke, 19 Misc. 292, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1897),
and Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 290 (1909). The national resale price maintenance system
condemned in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), was earlier analyzed in John
D. Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Drug. Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).
653. Important treatments of antitrust sentiment and activity in Progressive Era Missouri include B. BRINHURST,
ANrmsusr AND Ta OIL MoxopoLy: THE STANDARD Os. CASES, 1890-1911, at 89-107 (1979); S. Piorr, supra note 437;
D. TuEN, PATHS Or RasisrANcE: TRADnmoN AND DIrrIrv N INDUSTRALIztEG MissouRi 201-31, 238-65 (1986).
654. See, e.g., S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 45; D. THEt.EN, supra note 653, at 243.
655. The 1889 statute condemned commodity price fixing and output limitation as "conspiracies to defraud."
Individuals could be punished by a fine of no less than $500 and no more than S5,000 and by imprisonment for one year
in the county jail. See Act of May 18, 1889, §§ 1, 3, 1889 Mo. Laws 96. Corporations faced a fine of between one and
twenty percent of their capital stock. See id. § 3. The act also prohibited corporate participation in combinations through
use of the trust device, see id. § 2, declared any agreement in violation of the act to be absolutely void, see id. § 4, allowed
purchasers to escape liability for the price of articles bought from sellers violating the statute, see id. § 5, and provided
for the forfeiture of the charters of domestic corporations violating the act, see id. § 6. Finally, the new legislation required
officials of all corporations doing business in the state to swear to an affidavit stating whether their corporation was part
of any unlawful trust, combination, or association. See id. Although state constitutional problems raised by this last
provision's potential for self-incrimination led to its invalidation by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1892, see State v.
Simmons Hardware Co., 109 Mo. 118, 18 S.W. 1125 (1892), the state legislature anticipated such difficulties in 1891
and reenacted the 1889 prohibitions with a provision granting immunity for matters disclosed in the affidavits, such
affidavits now to be required annually. See Act of Apr. 2, 1891, § 8, 1891 Mo. Laws 186-89. The 1891 act
simultaneously changed the authorized penalties to consist solely of a forfeiture of $100 for each day of continued
violation for both corporations and individuals and eliminated any provision for imprisonment. See id. § 3.
Heightened popular pressure for antitrust action as a result of economic depression in 1893, ongoing collusive fire
insurance rate fixing in the state, and widespread corporate resistance to antitrust affidavit requirements prompted passage
of a third statute in 1895. See S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 36-40. While this statute extended the state's existing antitrust
provisions to the business of fire, lightning, and storm insurance, the state insurance lobby, see id. at 40-41, was able
to secure an exemption for collusive agreements regulating insurance rates on property situated in Missouri cities with "a
population of one hundred thousand inhabitants or more," Act of Apr. 11, 1895, § 2, 1895 Mo. Laws 237-40, i.e., St.
Louis and Kansas City. See S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 41. The legislature simultaneously amended the statute to provide
for forfeiture of the intrastate business privileges of foreign (out-of-state) corporations that violated the act, in addition to
forfeiture of the charters of domestic corporate lawbreakers. See Act of Apr. 11, 1895, § 6, 1895 Mo. Laws 238. Two
years later, the law was strengthened by adding new bans on exclusive dealing arrangements and agreements "designed
or made with a view to lessen or which tend to lessen full and free competition in the importation, manufacture or sale
of any article, product or commodity" in the state. See Act of Mar. 24, 1897, § la, 1897 Mo. Laws 208-09.
When the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the 1895 insurance exemption provision, see State ex rel. Crow v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 150 Mo. 113, 51 S.W. 413 (1898), the legislature responded yet again with new antitrust legislation in 1899,
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antitrust conspiracies, not only attacking various local cartels and consolidations, 656
but also seeking the ouster of many of the leading interstate combinations of the
time. 657 These actions repeatedly focused national attention on Missouri's antitrust
initiatives, 65 8 and helped to spur important state and federal antitrust efforts
elsewhere. 659 Missouri enforcement officials obtained favorable judgments in almost
every one of the antitrust cases they brought, 660 as well as the imposition of antitrust
fines in an amount comparable to the total amount of fines imposed in all federal
antitrust cases during the same period. 661 Antitrust enforcement remained a central
issue in Missouri politics throughout the years prior to the First World War, and two
eliminating the exemption in question, see Act of Apr. 18, 1899, § 1, 1899 Mo. Laws 314, strengthening the state's power
to compel the testimony of witnesses, see Act of Mar. 31, 1899, 1899 Mo. Laws 320-22; Act of May 4, 1899, 1899 Mo.
Laws 318-19, and adopting new antitrust prohibitions on price fixing, output limitation, exclusive dealing, and concerted
refusals to deal, see Act of May 10, 1899, § 1, 1899 Mo. Laws 316-17, that were designed to supplement and not repeal
existing antitrust standards. See id. § 5. The legislation empowered the state to seek injunctive relief to enforce the new
prohibitions, see id. § 2, and allowed private persons to sue for treble damages for injuries resulting from violations of
the new act. See id. § 4.
Increasing popular pressure arising in part from developments in the state's case against Standard Oil prompted the
legislature to adopt expanded new legislation in March of 1907. The new act retained the prohibitions of earlier legislation,
although it now designated such anticompetitive conduct as conspiracies "in restraint of trade" rather than as conspiracies
"to defraud." See Act of Mar. 19, 1907, §§ 8966-68, 8973, 8975, 1907 Mo. Laws 377, 378-79. It also added a new
general prohibition extending the same conspiracy label to "any pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation or
understanding . .. in restraint of trade or competition" in any product, commodity, or article. See id. § 8965. While
earlier public and private remedies essentially were preserved, see id. §§ 8970, 8972, 8974, and antitrust affidavits
continued to be required, see Act of Mar. 20, 1907, 1907 Mo. Laws 374-77, the legislature decreed that henceforth
individual violators would be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine of between
$500 and $5,000, or both. See Act of Mar. 19, 1907, § 8969, 1907 Mo. Laws 377-79. The act also authorized ouster
as well as additional property forfeitures and corporate fines, without any indicated maximum, as penalties for corporate
violations. See id. § 8971. The state legislature thereafter acted one more time to revise pre-war antitrust legislation. In
1913, it added a ban on predatory local price discrimination, see Act of Mar. 14, 1913, 1913 Mo. Laws 555, and declared
that a prima facie case of violation of other antitrust provisions would be established if an insurance company or its agent
was shown to have used in writing insurance any rate or ratebook prepared or furnished by any other person or association
connected with other insurance companies. See Act of Mar. 29, 1913, § 10313a, 1913 Mo. Laws 549-55.
656. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sager v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 259 Mo. 578, 169 S.W. 126 (1914); State ex rel.
Barker v. Assurance Co. of Am., 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640 (1913); State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage &
Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 151 S.W. 101 (1912); State v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 182 Mo. 287, 81 S.W. 395 (1904); State
ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899).
657. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382 (1915); State exr el. Major
v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am.,
237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672 (1911), affd, 234 U.S. 199 (1914); State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1,
116 S.W. 902 (1909), affd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); State ex rel. Crow v. Armour
Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903).
658. See, e.g., B. BItmNURST, supra note 653, at 92; S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 120-21; D. THt.EN, supra note
653, at 242.
659. See, e.g., S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 121-23; D. THELEN, supra note 653, at 243.
660. See cases cited supra in notes 656-57.
661. Federal antitrust fines amounted to $619,965 by the close of 1914 and $765,822 by the end of 1919. See
Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 392 (1970). Unsuspended Missouri fines
amounted to at least $678,000 by the end of 1915. See State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176
S.W. 382 (1915) (five defendants each fined $25,000); State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169
S.W. 145 (1914) (the Yellow Pine Mfrs. Ass'n case) (four defendants fined $50,000 each; one fined $30,000; one fined
$25,000; one fined $20,000; two fined $10,000 each; one fined $8,000; nine fined $5,000 each; two fined $3,000 each;
and four fined $1,000 each); State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672
(1911) (defendant fined $25,000); State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909) (three
defendants each fined $50,000), affld sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); State ex rel. Crow
v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903) (four defendants each fined $5,000).
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Progressive Era Missouri governors were elected to that office on the strength of their
records as antitrust prosecutors. 662
Missouri's most celebrated antitrust case commenced early in 1905 when
Attorney General Herbert Hadley began a searching examination of the nature and
methods of the Standard Oil Company. Hadley sought proof that Standard Oil of
Indiana, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, and the Republic Oil Company not only
were guilty of anticompetitive collusion and predation within Missouri, but also that
such activities were traceable to the companies' common control by Standard Oil of
New Jersey. To obtain such proof, Hadley initiated quo warranto proceedings in the
Missouri Supreme Court and began extensive hearings in both Missouri and New
York that became a widely reported national sensation. 663
Contemporary observers widely believed that success in the state's pathbreaking
case against Standard Oil had tremendous symbolic and practical importance and that
the suit raised basic issues not only of efficiency and competitive pricing, but also of
economic and political opportunity and the rule of law itself.66 4 Hadley's own
importance in the eyes of Missouri citizens soared, and even before the Missouri
Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case, the Republican Hadley was
catapulted into the state governorship by a greater electoral victory than had ever
before been achieved in the state. 665
In the state's brief to the Missouri Supreme Court, Hadley forcefully articulated
widely shared contemporary fears. Insisting that the outcome of the case would affect
the foundations of national life as few decisions ever had before, Hadley stressed:
This case, which is now submitted for decision, is, with the possible exception of the
Northern Securities case, the most important that has come before a court in this country
662. These two were Republican Herbert Hadley, elected in 1903, and Democrat Elliott W. Major, elected in 1912.
See, e.g., D. THE5EN, supra note 653, at 250, 260.
663. To escape public hostility, Standard Oil had gone to great lengths to operate various controlled companies,
including Waters-Pierce and Republic Oil, on the pretense that they in fact were independent. Republic Oil, indeed,
regularly ran advertisements with such banner proclamations as "Absolutely Independent" and "No Trust." See B.
BtrzGituptsT, supra note 653, at 90. To avoid admitting the truth of corporate affiliation, Standard Oil officials in New
York similarly went to great lengths to avoid Hadley's process servers and, once in the New York courtroom, sought to
slow Hadley's progress. See id. at 92-93; S. Ptorr, supra note 437, at 121. Henry H. Rogers, Standard Oil of Indiana's
chief financial planner and a director of the company, see D. THEt.EN, supra note 653, at 242, stunned even relatively
conservative observers and provoked considerable unfavorable commentary, see, e.g., S. Ptorr, supra note 437, at 121,
when he refused even to concede that he knew the location of Standard Oil of Indiana's New York office, which happened
to coincide with the address of Standard Oil of New Jersey, declaring bluntly: "It is quite immaterial to me what the
Supreme Court of Missouri desires me to say .... " See Morse, The Taming of Rogers, 62 Am. MAG. 227, 235 (1906).
Hadley thereupon turned to the Missouri tribunal that Rogers had scorned. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected Standard
Oil's claim that the question of corporate affiliation was immaterial to the quo warranto suit and ordered Standard Oil
officials to respond to Hadley's inquiries. See State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 194 Mo. 124, 158, 91
S.W. 1062, 1072 (1906). Whereupon, back in New York, Standard Oil officials for the first time conceded Standard Oil
of New Jersey's control of Standard Oil of Indiana, Waters-Pierce, and Republic Oil, even if "for the purposes of this
case only." See Morse, supra, at 237-38.
Hadley's two-year investigation had dramatic impact not only in Missouri. It provided a basis for state actions against
Standard Oil in five other states, see D. Tnatss, supra note 653, at 243, and federal authorities pored through Hadley's
evidence before filing the Sherman Act case against Standard Oil in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri in November of 1906. See S. Ptorr, supra note 437, at 123.
664. See S. Piorr, supra note 437, at 129-30.
665. See D. THELas, supra note 653, at 250.
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since the Dred Scott case. It involves the decision of questions of fundamental importance
in business, legislation and jurisprudence. ....
History shows that the greatest danger to the existence of free institutions and the rights
of the individual are the influences that come from the power wielded by combined and
concentrated wealth. This power has existed at times by the assistance and through the
efforts of oppressive rulers; but in the struggle of mankind for personal liberty and free and
equal opportunities, he has found his most powerful and unrelenting opponent in the power
which comes from wealth unlawfully secured and unfairly used.
... For the first time in its history, the greatest of these combinations is brought face to
face with the law and the courts for a decision as to the legality of its plan of organization
and its business methods. If upon it shall come a condemnation commensurate with the
offenses of which it has been shown to be guilty, then will be accomplished more for the
industrial freedom of this country-more for the protection of the individual against wrong
and oppression-more for the securing of equal rights and equal opportunities-than has
been accomplished by the decision of any court in the history of this commonwealth. 66
It was in this setting of intensified antitrust anxiety and activity that New York
and Missouri judges again turned to restraint of trade analysis after the 1890
enactment of federal antitrust legislation. While the opinions rendered in such earlier
cases as Leslie v. Lorillard and Skrainka v. Scharringhausen complemented well the
concerns for "excessive" or ruinous competition that were prominent in the 1880s,
they potentially threatened to undermine new antitrust initiatives seeking competitive
revitalization. Accordingly, a crucial question became the extent to which New York
and Missouri judges would maintain or extend their recent competitive analyses or,
alternatively, would proceed in a different, more traditionalist, direction more in tune
with developing antitrust sentiment.
VIII. ANTITRUST AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURTS
Throughout the Progressive Era, state judges played an important role in the
ongoing efforts to check or accommodate massive economic change. Beginning in
the 1890s, at a time of greatly increased cartelization, concentration, and public
apprehension, New York and Missouri judges developed antitrust and restraint of trade
jurisprudence with considerably greater concern for the possible economic, moral,
and political dangers of private anticompetitive behavior than they had displayed
in the 1880s. In the three decades following passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
these state jurists again and again sought to protect a traditionally conceived economic
and political order from both the contemporary governmental excesses addressed
in laissez-faire constitutionalism 667 and the private abuses targeted by antitrust
legislation. 668 In doing so, they strongly affirmed their deep commitment to the
666. See Statement of Facts, Brief and Argument of State of Missouri in Reply to the Briefs and Arguments of
Respondents at 126-29, State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909).
667. See supra text accompanying notes 20-78, 152-97, 440-48.
668. See supra text accompanying notes 216-66.
[Vol. 50:257
ANTITRUST IN THE FORMATIVE ERA
interrelated principles of economic opportunity, security of property, freedom of
contract, competition, and political freedom, and maintained their strong belief in the
complementary ideal of nondiscretionary adjudication.
As the next two sections of this Part relate, while the New York and Missouri
courts consistently continued to support efficiency-related ancillary restraints, they
firmly returned to earlier nineteenth century approaches condemning nakedly
anticompetitive arrangements and strongly affirmed the importance of new antitrust
protections. As the succeeding section stresses, however, Progressive Era judges in
New York and Missouri increasingly sought to preserve not only traditional
principles, but also the economic benefits of contemporary economic innovations.
Like the federal and state legislators who enacted new antitrust provisions, these state
judges sought to develop approaches to skill-based predominance and to dominant,
multifirm combinations that would protect both basic values and economic growth.
At the same time, as the final two sections of this Part explain, these jurists repeatedly
struggled to delineate the scope of basic rights, and the possible competitive
consequences, implicated as well in a wide variety of concerted refusals to deal and
vertical arrangements, two additional types of activity that raised basic issues of
contemporary theory in a particularly striking way.
A. Ancillary Restraints and the Question of General Standards
In the decades following Sherman Act passage, New York and Missouri judges
increasingly articulated an ancillary/nonancillary distinction in antitrust and restraint
of trade analysis. 669 Indeed, they did so to a significantly greater extent than did the
United States Supreme Court during the same period, and they explicitly highlighted
and applauded 670 Judge Taft's Addyston Pipe671 opinion in a way that the Supreme
Court never did. 672 Approving nearly all the examples of traditional ancillary restraints
coming before them,673 New York courts continued to adhere to the liberalized
approach established in the 1880s 674 and even noted with pride that English juris-
prudence had lagged somewhat behind New York law in this regard.675 While the
Missouri Supreme Court did invalidate a restraint extending to the entire United States
in 1902, it appears important that this case involved a restraint on an employee rather
669. See, e.g., Excelsior Quilting Co. v. Creter, 36 Misc. 698, 74 N.Y.S. 361 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1902).
670. See, e.g., State er reL Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 41-44, 52 S.W. 595, 607 (1899); Brett
v. Ebel, 51 N.Y.S. 573 (App. Div. 1898).
671. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
672. The Supreme Court did not discuss, much less adopt, Judge Taft's ancillary/nonancillary terminology when it
affirmed the court of appeals' decision in the case, see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899),
nor did it ever adopt Judge Taft's approach in later cases.
673. See, e.g., McCall v. Wright, 198 N.Y. 143, 91 N.E. 516 (1910); Tode v. Gross, 127 N.Y. 480, 28 N.E. 469
(1891); Ru Ton v. Everitt, 54 N.Y.S. 896 (App. Div. 1898).
674. See supra text accompanying notes 487-511.
675. See Ru Ton v. Everitt, 54 N.Y.S. 896 (App. Div. 1898). The New York courts, indeed, further extended their
support for ancillary arrangements by upholding covenants that were reasonably ancillary to sales of business good will
where there was no accompanying transfer of physical assets. See Wood v. Whitehead Bros. Co., 165 N.Y. 545, 59 N.E.
357 (1901); Brett v. Ebel, 51 N.Y.S. 573 (App. Div. 1898).
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than on a business seller.676 Missouri courts uniformly approved the ordinary ancillary
restraints involved in other cases in these years;677 and as noted previously, Missouri
jurists not only quoted Diamond Match with approval but claimed that New York
liberalization had lagged behind similar but earlier Missouri developments. 678
Although New York and Missouri courts treated such ancillary arrangements
with considerably greater sympathy than nonancillary agreements, only a distinct
minority of the decided cases explicitly espoused an ancillary/nonancillary standard
as a general framework for restraint of trade cases as a whole. New York cases
usually did not address the question of an overarching analytic framework. Instead,
analysis focused on particular statutory language 679 or, more frequently, on judi-
cially-formulated doctrinal principles specifically applicable to particular types of
conduct such as price fixing. 680 Although Missouri cases, too, usually focused
primarily on more specific doctrines, 681 the Missouri Supreme Court did repeatedly
declare general overall antitrust standards, essentially following those announced in
federal antitrust jurisprudence. Thus, the Missouri court first embraced Judge Taft's
Addyston Pipe analysis, 682 then later declared invalid all direct restraints, 63 3 and
finally, after the middle of 1911, debated internally the nature and validity of Chief
Justice White's rule of reason formula 684 as announced in Standard Oil.685
This difference in the approach of the New York and Missouri courts reflected
differing perspectives on the relation between new state antitrust legislation and the
common law. While New York courts characterized the Donnelly Act as essentially
a codification of common law principles, 686 Missouri case law paralleled federal
676. See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Nemnich, 169 Mo. 388, 69 S.W. 355 (1902).
677. See, e.g., Glover v. Shirley, 169 Mo. App. 637, 155 S.W. 878 (1913); Wills v. Forester, 140 Mo. App. 321,
124 S.W. 1090 (1910); Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 121 Mo. App. 226, 98 S.W. 805 (1906).
678. See Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 121 Mo. App. 226, 98 S.W. 805 (1906).
679. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 37 A.D. 618, 56 N.Y.S. 288 (1899).
680. See, e.g., People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 34 N.E. 785 (1893). See infra text accompanying notes 705-06.
681. See, e.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903).
682. See State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 41-44, 52 S.W. 595, 607 (1899).
683. See State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 378-79, 116 S.W. 902, 1018-19 (1909), af 'dsub
noa. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
684. In State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 392, 141 S.W. 672, 676 (1911),
the court embraced the "rule of reason" the United States Supreme Court had recently announced in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), declaring that the rule decreed an inquiry into the power for anticompetitive harm
created by a combination regardless of the self-restraint the combination actually exercised. A year later, however, in State
ex rel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 221-22, 151 S.W. 101, 118-19 (1912), the court
criticized the Supreme Court's rule of reason in Standard Oil as essentially obiter dicta not relevant to Missouri antitrust
cases. The Missouri court declared that in the language of the state's antitrust law there was "no ambiguity. The statute
condemns every direct restraint of trade, great or small. It closes the only door through which doubts as to its construction
could enter by positively prohibiting defined combinations without regard to what the courts may think as to the extent
of their effect." Id. at 221-22, 151 S.W. at 118. Three years later, in State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265
Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382 (1915), Judge Bond, concurring in part and dissenting in part, returned to the question of the
applicability of the rule of reason in Missouri antitrust litigation and declared that International Harvester had resolved
the issue in favor of the rule's adoption. In stressing the need to give antitrust legislation a reasonable interpretation, he
praised Chief Justice White's Standard Oil opinion, declaring:
That decision, when made, met a downpour of rant and was assailed by blasts of flatulent criticism, but, being
founded on the rock of reason, it withstood both the rain and wind of verbosity, and emerged from the storm,
in the serene light of correct thinking, as an enduring canon of legal science.
Id. at 178, 176 S.W. at 398 (Bond, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
685. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See supra text accompanying notes 412-18.
686. See In re Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N.E. 118 (1901).
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jurisprudence in declaring that Missouri antitrust legislation was a significant
expansion beyond earlier common law prohibitions. 687 Indeed, Missouri jurists
declared that despite its substantially greater specificity, Missouri antitrust legislation
was in fact in pari materia with the Sherman Act. 688
B. Naked Restraints and the Perceived Importance of Antitrust Law
In both common law and statutory cases during the Progressive Era, New York
and Missouri jurists consistently expressed strong support for the policies underlying
contemporary antitrust legislation. As an earlier article noted at length, state judges
in these years repeatedly supported state antitrust activity in the face of numerous
constitutional challenges, rejecting the overwhelming majority of commerce clause,
equal protection, and due process attacks mounted against state antitrust efforts. 689
New York and Missouri jurists expressed their firm support for antitrust philosophy
not only in such constitutional analyses, but also in the consistent pattern of
adjudicated decisions rendered in nonancillary restraint cases after 1890, and in
explicit commentary on the contemporary dangers necessitating antitrust and restraint
of trade prohibitions.
In both New York690 and Missouri, 69t a few lower court decisions did approve
particular naked, nonancillary agreements. The high courts of both states, however,
uniformly and summarily condemned the nonancillary, loose arrangements that
came before them 692 regardless of the size of the parties involved or the scope of
their anticompetitive behavior. 693 By a wide margin, the most frequent type of
nonancillary restraint to be challenged was price fixing, 694 although profit pool-
687. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 424-25, 116 S.W. 902, 1034 (1909), affd
sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
688. See State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 286, 169 S.W. 126, 168 (1914).
689. See generally May, supra note 4.
690. See, e.g., Kohart v. Skou, 147 N.Y.S. 509, 510 (App. Div. 1914) (approving a price-fixing agreement among
two dealers of fixtures for schools and other public buildings where the dealers did not control the supply, there was no
evidence the price was "excessive," and the agreement was formed to end a "losing and disastrous competition"); Export
Lumber Co. v. South Brooklyn Sawmill Co., 54 A.D. 518, 67 N.Y.S. 626 (1900) (no evidence the parties had sufficient
collective market power to fix price for exported lumber or harm public).
691. See Vandiver v. Robertson, 125 Mo. App. 307, 102 S.W. 659 (1907) (money payment to discontinue
publication of rival newspaper, not ancillary to any purchase of business or good will or to any other main transaction).
692. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382 (1915); State ex rel. Major
v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co.,
246 Mo. 168, 151 S.W. 101 (1912); Finck v. Schneider Granite Co., 187 Mo. 244, 86 S.W. 213 (1905); State ex rel.
Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903); State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152
Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899); People v. Dwyer, 215 N.Y. 46, 109 N.E. 103 (1915); Cohen v. Berlin & Jones Envelope
Co., 166 N.Y. 292,59 N.E. 906 (1901); Cummings v. Union Bluestone Co., 164 N.Y. 401, 58 N.E. 525 (1900); People
v. Milk Exch., 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 1062 (1895); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 34 N.E. 785 (1893).
693. Many of the challenged schemes involved participants with a large collective market share. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672 (1911) (80-90%), afftd, 234 U.S. 199
(1914); State exrel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 151 S.W. 101 (1912) (75-90%), affd
234 U.S. 199 (1914); Cohen v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 166 N.Y. 292, 59 N.E. 906 (1901) (85%). This factor was
not declared to be essential, however, and anticompetitive arrangements falling short of market control were condemned,
see State ex rel. Sager v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 259 Mo. 578, 169 S.W. 126 (1914) (40-50%), despite a few
contrary resolutions at the lower court level, see Export Lumber Co. v. South Brooklyn Sawmill Co., 54 A.D. 518, 67
N.Y.S. 626 (1900); People v. Baff, 98 Misc. 547, 164 N.Y.S. 709 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917).
694. See, e.g., State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); Euston v. Edgar,
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ing, 695 output limitation, 696 and territorial division697 also were attacked. In
condemning such behavior, the high courts employed the same doctrinal principles
repeatedly invoked by the United States Supreme Court. It was not necessary to
demonstrate an explicit anticompetitive purpose; it was sufficient that the necessary
or natural effect of an arrangement was to restrain trade. 698 Indeed, the critical
question was the power attained to restrain competition, not the actual use of that
power or the effects yet generated in practice. 699 Complete monopoly power was not
essential. It was enough that an arrangement "tended to that end. ' '700
High court judges in Progressive Era New York and Missouri condemned such
nonancillary arrangements per se. Unswayed by contemporary depictions of carteliza-
tion as legitimate self-protection, they uniformly refused to entertain any defense that
prices had been set at reasonable levels, 70 that collective restraint was necessary to
avoid ruinous competition 70 2 or, in one case, ruinous litigation, 70 3 or that such ar-
rangements were justified because they saved the parties trouble or expense. 7°4 The
rationale for such an approach was most clearly expressed by the New York Court of
Appeals in the much-cited 1893 case of People v. Sheldon.70 5 Alluding to the economic
and moral harms of anticompetitive behavior, the court rejected a "reasonable price"
justification for price fixing on the ground that
[i]f agreements and combinations to prevent competition in prices are or may be hurtful to
trade, the only sure remedy is to prohibit all agreements of that character. If the validity of
such an agreement were made to depend upon actual proof of public prejudice or injury, it
would be very difficult in any case to establish the invalidity, although the moral evidence
might be very convincing70 6
207 Mo. 287, 105 S.W. 773 (1907); Finck v. Schneider Granite Co., 187 Mo. 244, 86 S.W. 213 (1905); Cohen v. Berlin
& Jones Envelope Co., 166 N.Y. 292, 59 N.E. 906 (1901); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 34 N.E. 785 (1893).
695. See, e.g., People v. Dwyer, 215 N.Y. 46, 109 N.E. 103 (1915); Judd v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105, 34 N.E.
790 (1893).
696. See, e.g., State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); People v. Milk
Exch., 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 106 (1895).
697. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909), affd sub nom. Standard
Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
698. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897); State ex rel. Major v.
Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 314, 169 S.W. 145, 177 (1914).
699. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1897); State ex rel Hadley v.
Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1,450, 457, 116 S.W. 902, 1043, 1045-46 (1909), aTd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v.
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 263-64, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (1893).
700. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904); United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895); State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 391, 73 S.W. 645, 653 (1903); Judd
v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105, 110, 34 N.E. 790, 791 (1893).
701. See, e.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356,388-90,73 S.W. 645, 652 (1903); People
v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 264, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (1893).
702. See, e.g., State ex reL Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 391-92, 141 S.W. 672,
676 (1911); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251,262-63, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (1893).
703. See Strait v. National Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 233-34 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1891).
704. See Judd v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105, 110, 34 N.E. 790,791 (1893). In Missouri, the high court also rejected
a "good consequences" defense proffered in 1903 by leading national meat-packers who had been sued for price fing.
Rather than seeking to disprove the charges, the defendants instead largely stressed the increase in their in-state business
volume over the previous 10 years, the number of persons they employed, and the wages they paid, among othereconomic
benefits they assertedly generated. The court declared that none of these constituted any legal justification. See State ex
rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 386-87, 392, 73 S.W. 645, 651-53 (1903).
705. 139 N.Y. 251, 34 N.E. 785 (1893).
706. Id. at 264-65, 34 N.E. at 788.
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During the three decades following Sherman Act passage, New York and
Missouri jurists generally treated such condemnation of naked restraints as a
long-established principle that did not require extensive explanation. Rather than
overruling such earlier cases as Leslie v. Lorillard70 7 and Skrainka v. Schar-
ringhausen,708 high court jurists simply proceeded in a quite different direction
without explicitly highlighting the apparent inconsistency between their new ap-
proach and the sympathy for nonancillary restraints that had been expressed in the
1880s. 709
Missouri judges, unlike their New York counterparts, often discussed general
questions of antitrust policy and contemporary economic change in detail, thereby
clarifying the traditionalist bases of their antitrust decisions. In Missouri's very first
public antitrust action, for example, brought in the late 1890s to challenge price
fixing by over seventy fire insurance firms, the state high court vigorously supported
antitrust enforcement efforts. Writing for the court in 1899, Judge William C.
Marshall sharply condemned the defendants' activity, declaring:
In the olden times such practices were called contracts in restraint of trade. Now-a-days they
are called trusts. There is no difference in the principle. There is a difference in the extent
and methods. Those the courts condemned long ago were as mere saplings compared to the
mammoth oaks, when considered alongside of those of to-day. When the evils to the public
interests that flow from these trust combinations are attempted to be described, words
become mere weaklings in their power of expression, and one stands appalled at the
helplessness of the people outside of judicial aid.710
Four years later, in the state's successful quo warranto suit against the leading
national meat-packing firms, Judge Marshall, again writing for the court, pointedly
stressed the fundamentality of competition and starkly depicted the multiple political,
economic, and social evils simultaneously produced by giant anticompetitive
combinations. He explained:
"Competition is the life of trade." Pools, trusts and conspiracies to fix or maintain the
prices of the necessaries of life, strike at the foundation of government; instill a destructive
poison into the life of the body politic; wither the energies of competitors, blight individual
investments in legitimate business; drive small and honest dealers out of business for
themselves, and make them mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for the trust; raise
the cost of living and lower the price of wages; take from the average American freeman the
ability to supply his family with necessary, adequate and wholesome food; force the boys
away from school, and into the various branches of trade and labor, and the girls into
workshops and other avenues of business, and make them breadwinners while they are yet
almost infants, because the head of the house can not earn enough to feed and clothe his
family.
707. See supra text accompanying notes 553-64.
708. See supra text accompanying notes 591-601.
709. Indeed, statements from these earlier opinions declaring support for anticompetitive, nonancillary behavior
occasionally did reappear in later opinions. They did so, however, in significantly different contexts and were not invoked
by high court jurists to uphold arrangements thought to be equally anticompetitive. See, e.g., Wood v. Whitehead Bros.
Co., 165 N.Y. 545, 59 N.E. 357 (1901), discussed supra note 675. See also Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N.Y.
430, 439, 38 N.E. 461, 463 (1894).
710. State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 44, 52 S.W. 595, 607-08 (1899).
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The people are helpless to protect themselves. The powers that be must protect them, or
as surely as history records the story of republican government in Rome, so surely will the
foundations of our government be shaken and its perpetuity threatened. 7 "
In the great 1908 case of State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co.,712 the court
reiterated that "there are few acts which individuals may engage in that are more
harmful in their effects upon the interests of the public generally than trusts and
combinations concerning the commodities useful to mankind. '"713 Quoting Judge
Marshall's graphic statement of threatened evils announced five years previously,
Judge Archelaus Woodson, for the court, declared that the voluminous record in the
Standard Oil case was "a fulfillment of the prophetic remarks" that Judge Marshall
earlier had made. 714 Accordingly, in a decision extending to nearly 500 pages in the
state reports, the court found the Standard Oil defendants guilty, ousting Standard of
Indiana and Republic Oil from the state, imposing a suspended ouster against
Waters-Pierce, and fining each of the three companies $50,000.715
Vivid, if increasingly more abbreviated, allusions to the evils requiring effective
antitrust relief continued in Missouri716 and New York7 17 opinions in later years.
Other strains grew increasingly loud, however, as time went on.
Over time, Missouri and New York judges repeatedly were forced to confront
theoretical and practical dilemmas that had been minimized or denied when new
federal and state antitrust provisions were enacted. Like the congressional proponents
of antitrust legislation in 1890,718 Progressive Era judges in Missouri and New York
maintained a strong traditional antipathy to government restrictions based solely on
innocently acquired market preeminence. These judges found it increasingly difficult,
however, to dismiss market-dominating, but efficient, "tight" combinations as
merely another example of pernicious, abnormal interference with the beneficent
processes of natural economic life.7 19 Increasingly concerned for the possible impact
of antitrust adjudication on local prosperity, 720 these jurists labored hard to maintain
traditional principles without losing the benefits of the very combinations that
traditional theory seemed to condemn.
711. State ex reL Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 387, 73 S.W. 645, 652 (1903).
712. 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909). The court rendered its initial decision on Dec. 23, 1908. This initial opinion
subsequently was published along with the court's opinion on motions for rehearing and the court's final decree in early
1909.
713. Id. at 381, 116 S.W. at 1019.
714. Id. at 462, 116 S.W. at 1047.
715. See id. at 464-69, 116 S.W. at 1048-50. See also infra text accompanying notes 735, 761-72, 793-99,
995-99.
716. See, e.g., State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 400, 141 S.W. 672, 679
(1911).
717. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 833, 834, 1038, 1044; see also supra text accompanying notes
705-06 (earlier New York opinion).
718. See supra text accompanying notes 301-10.
719. See supra text accompanying notes 316-20, 637-42.
720. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 737, 751-53, 762-63, 807-10.
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C. Innocent Monopoly and the Dilemma of Efficient "Trusts"
1. Property Rights, Freedom of Exchange, and Legitimate Market Dominance
Contemporary constitutional and antitrust theory came together powerfully when
state jurists confronted the possibility of private challenges premised purely on market
predominance without any showing of improper conduct. Such a possibility implicated
the broader question of the permissible bases of government regulation that had been
posed by the United States Supreme Court's controversial 1877 opinion in Munn v.
Illinois, which upheld rate regulation of Chicago grain elevators deemed to constitute
a "virtual monopoly," on the ground that those businesses were "affected with a
public interest.''721
While Missouri jurists were appalled by what they saw as abnormal, illegitimate,
and pernicious behavior on the part of powerful "trusts," they never were opposed
to "bigness" per se; and they were aghast at the idea that size alone could subject
private property to judicial regulation. Such concerns were made clear, for example,
a year after Judge Marshall's initial praise of antitrust enforcement, when the Missouri
Supreme Court resoundingly rejected a newspaper publisher's petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Associated Press to stop its refusal to deal with the
publisher. 722 Stressing the commercial importance of such news service reports, the
publisher sought to justify its request on the ground that the Associated Press was a
virtual monopoly and therefore should be deemed a public employment. 723
This line of argument prompted Judge Thomas Sherwood, writing for the court,
to launch into a very vigorous and quite lengthy attack 724 on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Munn. Quoting at length from the leading works of
Christopher Tiedemann and Thomas M. Cooley, 725 Judge Sherwood firnmly reas-
serted the fundamentality of freedom of exchange. He emphasized:
Business relations must be voluntary in order to be consistent with civil liberty .... In an
ordinary private business relation, the State can not constitutionally interfere, whatever
reason may be assigned for one's refusal to have dealings with another. It is no concern of
the State or of the individual, what those reasons are. It is his constitutional right to refuse
to have business relations with a particular individual, with or without reason.726
It was only where special privileges had been publicly conferred or property had been
dedicated to public use that the state gained power, for example, to regulate rates.
Without such elements, "no extent or magnitude of such business" could be said to
affect the property "with a public interest" so as to justify its regulation. 727 Sharply
721. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
722. See State ex rel. Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91 (1901).
723. Id. at 419, 60 S.W. at 93.
724. Id. at 424-56, 60 S.W. at 94-104.
725. Id. at 430-38, 60 S.W. at 96-99.
726. Id. at 432-33, 60 S.W. at 97 (quoting C. TtEDEosmNtN, supra note 43, § 92).
727. Id. at 427-28, 60 S.W. at 95.
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distinguishing the American context from an earlier age of English history when
"paternalism was in flower,''728 Judge Sherwood stressed:
Every one is at liberty to gather news; and the fact that one has greater facilities or finances
for gathering and transmitting news, or that the business has grown into one of great
magnitude, wide-spread in its ramifications, or that mere incorporation has been granted a
company organized for the purpose of gathering news, does not and can not of itself give the
State the right to regulate what before incorporation was but a natural right. 729
New York judges similarly rejected the idea that "mere size" altered the scope
or vigor of private rights. Such a view was most clearly stated in an important opinion
by Chief Judge Edgar Cullen of the New York Court of Appeals, concurring in a
decision rejecting a private antitrust challenge to the American Tobacco Company's
sole outlet distribution arrangement within New York. 730 Noting again the general
right of each individual to decide whether or not to deal with particular other persons,
Chief Judge Cullen addressed an argument urged by the New York plaintiff that
e~hoed the Missouri mandamus petitioner's rejected line of reasoning:
It is contended, however, that a different rule should prevail where a single person or
corporation controls substantially the whole production or output of a staple article. I do not
think the extent of the business can affect the rights of the parties. If it is an inherent right
of the owner of property to refuse to sell his property to any particular individual, he cannot
be deprived of that right simply because of the magnitude of his business or his wealth. Nor
do I see how the courts could well draw a line between individuals and corporations who
may exercise their full right of property, and those to whom, on account of their wealth, that
right is to be denied.731
2. The Problem of Market Dominance Through Efficient Combination
As noted previously, the ascendancy of tight, multifirm combinations that
seemingly offered new efficiencies while simultaneously impairing economic oppor-
tunity, property rights, and competitive, free exchange posed a problem for
traditional theory.7 32 Throughout the Progressive Era, Missouri and New York jurists
repeatedly confronted this problem as they sought to reassert familiar principles in the
midst of economic transformation. While largely continuing to adhere to traditional
political and economic perspectives, these state judges increasingly perceived
economic benefits in large-scale economic operations and grew more and more
uneasy about antitrust attacks on even market-dominating combinations, fearing that
such attacks might impair important economic advances.
Increasing judicial commentary on the benefits of large-scale enterprise partly
reflected growing state and national acceptance of an economy dominated by
concentrated corporate capitalism. 733 In Missouri, it also reflected the factual
728. Id. at 450, 60 S.W. at 103 (emphasis omitted).
729. Id. at 455, 60 S.W. at 104 (citation omitted).
730. See Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 565-68, 88 N.E. 289, 289-90 (1909) (Cullen, C.J.,
concurring).
731. Id. at 566, 88 N.E. at 289 (Cullen, C.J., concurring). For further discussion of the Locker case, see infra text
accompanying notes 979-88.
732. See supra text accompanying notes 311-20.
733. See generally, e.g., M. SKLAtR, supra note 1.
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variations in the cases that came to the state high court for adjudication. The earliest
major antitrust suits challenged simple, loose cartels not involving simultaneous
productive integrations. 734 Although state judges frequently perceived the anticom-
petitive conduct challenged in later Missouri cases largely as nonancillary, cartel
activity, it more frequently arose in larger settings that did involve at least arguable
economic efficiencies. For example, in 1908, even as the court resoundingly
condemned Standard Oil and ousted its affiliates from the state for engaging in price
fixing, territorial division, and predatory pricing, the court simultaneously, if briefly,
noted what a shame it was that such relief was required:
[I]f ... such abuses as those complained of are permitted to continue untrammeled, then it
would be only a question of time until they would sap the strength and patriotism from the
very foundations of our government, overturn the republic, destroy our free institutions, and
substitute in lieu thereof some other form of government.
*.. But it is, however, truly regrettable that such useful and beneficial institutions, when
properly directed, should be guilty of such grievous misconduct and usurpation of power as
to require the enforcement of the drastic legislation found upon our statutes regarding such
matters; but, if not restrained in their unwise cupidity, they will inevitably pull down the
temple upon their own heads, as well as upon all others who worship therein, and thereby
add another incident to those where history has repeated itself.735
Three years later the court noted, in somewhat more detail, the substantial
economic benefits arising from the International Harvester consolidation even while
again imposing a judgment of ouster and stressing the critical difference between
power acquired by combination and power as a result of size through internal
growth. 736 The mounting policy dilemma and the difficulties of legislative remedy
were noted with particular effect in this same 1911 case by Judge Franklin Ferriss,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
It cannot be doubted that combinations may be formed to create a monopoly to the injury
of consumers, and yet it must be conceded that the industrial development of the country has
indicated to the minds of practical men that its successful continuation requires the aggregation
of capital in order to cheapen the cost of production and fully develop the possibilities of the
particular industry involved. Economically, it should be to the advantage of the consumer to
have the cost of production reduced to the lowest point practicable. The problem confronting
the Legislature is how to secure the benefit of a lower cost of production to the consumer
without permitting combinations of capital which shall result in oppression....
... To permit combinations to exist and at the same time secure to the people the natural
and legitimate benefits of such combination is a problem not yet solved. To forbid, as the
law in question does, the existence of all combinations that lessen competition compels a
734. See State ex rel Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899); State ex rel. Crow v.
Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903).
735. State er rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1,460, 116 S.W. 902, 1046-47 (1909). The Standard Oil
defendants, who previously had sought to pose as independent companies, see supra note 663 and accompanying text,
did not assert that because they were affiliated they could not be guilty of price fixing and other group behavior in violation
of antitrust law, and the court did not discuss that issue.
736. See State ex reL Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 400-02, 141 S.W. 672, 677
(1911). On the contemporary distinction between dominance through combination and dominance through single-firm
skill, see also supra text accompanying notes 298-320.
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halt in the natural march of industrial development, and deprives the people of the benefits
which should result from improved business methods. However, it is the duty of the court
to construe and enforce the law. In obedience to this duty I concur . ... 737
New York judges also recognized the potential benefits of tighter forms of
combination even while they consistently condemned nonancillary cartel activity. 738
The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, for example, reflected the substantial
sympathy of New York jurists for tighter consolidation739 when it declared in 1900 that
predictions of efficiency and price reduction gains from a particular merger were
"borne out by the observed results of similar aggregations of business enterprises
under one control, which has become one of the economic features of the present
day."74°
Ultimately, Missouri judges accommodated their desire to condemn antitrust
violators with severity while simultaneously preserving the benefits of such violators'
continued in-state presence through their formulation of relief. The pattern and practice
of antitrust relief differed dramatically between New York and Missouri, partly
because of differences in the popular and political contexts in the two states, 74' and
partly because of a key difference in the procedural settings in which the two state high
courts operated. In antitrust and restraint of trade cases, New York appellate courts
considered not only the enforceability of defensively challenged contract provisions,
but also the propriety of injunctive relief and criminal penalties allowed or denied by
lower courts. Appellate discussion, however, was usually confined to the question of
whether any injunction742 or any criminal penalties743 were supportable, and largely
left lower courts free to establish the specific contours of relief in those cases where
some remedy was justified. Only very few of the New York actions were quo warranto
cases seeking corporate ouster. 744 The fashioning of relief even in these suits was
initially a lower court concern because the New York Court of Appeals did not have
original jurisdiction in such cases. 745 Indeed, it was held that the State of New York
could not even bring such an action without an initial judicial determination that
initiation of the suit would be in the public interest. 746
737. International Harvester, 237 Mo. at 419-20, 141 S.W. at 685.
738. See supra text accompanying note 692.
739. See infra text accompanying notes 812-35.
740. Francis v. Taylor, 31 Misc. 187, 190, 65 N.Y.S. 28, 31 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1900), aff'don opinion below,
65 N.Y.S. 1133 (App. Div. 1900). See also, e.g., Venner v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 177 A.D. 296, 164 N.Y.S. 626
(1917).
741. See supra text accompanying notes 609-66.
742. See, e.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Drug. Ass'n, 54 A.D. 223, 66 N.Y.S. 615 (1900).
743. See, e.g., People v. Dwyer, 215 N.Y. 46, 109 N.E. 103 (1915).
744. See, e.g., People v. Milk Exch., 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 1062 (1895); People v. American Ice Co., 135 A.D.
180, 120 N.Y.S. 41 (1909). The near cessation of New York actions to revoke corporate charters after the state's
successful effort in People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890), is noted in NEw YoRK
STATE BAR, supra note 436, at 41a.
745. See, e.g., People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890), aff'g 7 N.Y.S. 406
(Sup. Ct. 1889).
746. For example, in In re Attorney Gen. v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 124 A.D. 401, 108 N.Y.S. 823
(1908), the appellate division perceived no serious danger to be posed by a consolidation of six gas and electric companies
into a new corporation and the corporation's subsequent acquisition of still further companies, and it feared
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In contrast, the overwhelming majority of the leading Missouri antitrust cases of
the period were quo warranto actions brought directly in the Missouri Supreme
Court. 747 Quo warranto procedures provided Missouri jurists with a tremendous degree
of flexibility and discretion in fashioning relief in particular cases. 748 Because the state
in such actions did seek a decree of ouster, however, such litigation forced Missouri
high court judges to confront the potential impact of particular corporations' discon-
tinued intrastate presence when they considered cartel cases, as well as when they
addressed litigation involving tighter consolidation. New York high court judges, on
the other hand, normally were not forced to confront such a consequence so directly,
at least not in cartel litigation which only sought discontinuance or punishment of bad
acts and not corporate removal.
Finley Peter Dunne's fictional character, Mr. Dooley, easily could have been
describing early Missouri antitrust jurisprudence when he satirized Theodore
Roosevelt's ambivalence toward the rise and continued presence of the "trusts." In
a famous passage, Mr. Dooley reported:
"Th' trusts," says he "are heejoous monsthers built up be th' enlightened intherprise iv th'
men that have done so much to advance progress in our beloved country," he says. "On
wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other hand not so fast." 749
Missouri jurists repeatedly condemned the anticompetitive activity brought before
them and firmly asserted the supremacy of the rule of law in the face of the multiple
economic, social, and political evils they believed "trusts" posed to Missouri
citizens.750 Time and again the Missouri Supreme Court levied fines on corporate
violators and adjudged their charters or intrastate business privileges forfeited. But
particularly after the national financial "Panic of 1907" and the economic downturn
which followed it,751 progressive sentiment in both Missouri and the nation exhibited
possible public harm if the new corporation was ousted. Accordingly, over strong dissent, see id. at 828-30 (Laughlin,
J., dissenting), the court denied the Attorney General leave to bring the action. See infra text accompanying notes 816-21.
747. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382 (1915); State ex rel. Major
v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am.,
237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672 (1911); State ex reL Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909); State
ex rel Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903); State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co.,
152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899).
748. Use of this procedure had a number of important implications. Contemporary constitutional law jurisprudence
allowed the states broad power to revoke the charters of domestic corporations and the business licenses of out-of-state
corporations in quo warranto actions. See, e.g., May, supra note 4, at 510-17. States, indeed, were permitted to
accomplish results through quo warranto litigation that they constitutionally could not have achieved through ordinary,
direct regulation. See id. It was, moreover, significant that the Missouri quo warranto suits were common law actions.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 290, 169 S.W. 145, 170 (1914). Antitrust
legislation was relevant in such common law proceedings because the basis for seeking ouster was the abuse of charter
powers or business privileges through corporate violation of state antitrust standards. See id. Although natural persons
could not be sued in these actions along with corporations, see id., common law quo warranto procedures offered state
enforcers a number of advantages. For example, no right to jury trial existed, see id., and there was no limit on the amount
of fines that could be imposed. See, e.g., id.; State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 476, 116 S.W. 902,
1052 (1909) (Lamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, urging a $I million fine).
749. 2 M. SUWVAN, OUR Tise 411 (1940).
750. See supra text accompanying note 692.
751. See, e.g., S. Porr, supra note 437, at 131; D. THEt.EN, supra note 653, at 252.
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increasing concern over the maintenance of economic growth and prosperity, 752 along
with continued antipathy to anticompetitive manipulation and collusion. Increased
concerns of this nature were reflected in the mounting state and national turn toward
administrative, regulatory solutions. 753 They were also reflected in increasing dis-
agreements among Missouri jurists on questions of relief, even as unanimity continued
to prevail on questions of liability, and in the state supreme court's repeated willingness
to hold decrees of ouster in suspension in order to preserve economic prosperity while
ostensibly coercing future corporate good behavior under the continuing supervision
of the court itself.
The developing pattern was visible even in the Missouri Supreme Court's first
major quo warranto adjudication. In State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Insurance
Co. 754 the court ousted all seventy-three corporate defendants from the state, in-
cluding several companies that the court believed had not been shown to have been
connected to the price-fixing conspiracy. 755 They, too, were liable and ousted, the
court declared over dissent, 756 because in arguing the case they had "made common
cause with the other defendants by the pleadings and joint answer. ' '75 7 Yet, soon
thereafter the court allowed the defendants to remain in the state upon payment of
$1,000 fines. 758 Four years later, in State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 7 59
national meat-packing companies were convicted of massive price fixing and formally
ousted, but ouster was again suspended, this time on payment of fines of $5,000
each.760
The Standard Oil litigation generated much more discussion of relief questions
and possibilities, drawn out over a much longer time period. Yet, ultimately, the same
pattern prevailed in this litigation as well. The court had no doubts regarding the
defendants' guilt. Addressing the anticompetitive arrangements between the giant
Waters-Pierce Oil Company and Standard Oil of Indiana, the court declared that "[i]f
that agreement is not in restraint of trade and in violation of the letter and spirit of the
anti-trust laws, then words have lost their meaning, contracts their potency, and the
law its majesty."761 As previously mentioned, however, the court at the same time
recognized the economic benefits that such large corporations produced. 762 In con-
sidering the question of relief, it noted the substantiality of the financial and business
interests potentially affected, conceding that "an assault made upon those vast interests
is also a serious assault inflicted upon the material welfare of the State itself, by
banishing so much capital therefrom and otherwise disturbing the financial
752. See, e.g., W. LarwiN, supra note 167, at 250-53, 265-78; S. Porr, supra note 437, at 131-51; D. Tnaaw,
supra note 653, at 252.
753. See, e.g., W. LEIWIN, supra note 167, at 265-78; S. Pior, supra note 437, at 131-51; M. SKLAR, supra note
1, at 179-441; D. THEL, supra note 653, at 254-65; R. WmBE, supra note 199, at 145-63.
754. 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899).
755. Id. at 50, 52 S.W. at 609-10.
756. Id. at 50-51, 52 S.W. at 611-12 (Gantt, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
757. Id. at 50, 52 S.W. at 610.
758. See S. Porr, supra note 437, at 50.
759. 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645 (1903).
760. Id. at 393, 73 S.W. at 654.
761. State ex reL Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1,447, 116 S.W. 902, 1042 (1909).
762. See supra text accompanying note 735.
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and business interests of the country .... ",763 Nevertheless, the court declared the
Waters-Pierce Oil Company's Missouri charter forfeited, along with the intrastate
business privileges of Standard Oil of Indiana and Republic Oil, and fined each of
the three companies $50,000. 764
A month later, Standard suggested a plan of its own to keep its in-state refinery
in operation while ensuring new antimonopoly protection to Missouri citizens. Under
the plan, a new corporation would be established, taking over the in-state property of
Waters-Pierce and Standard Oil of Indiana. Two trustees, one picked by the state, one
by Standard Oil of New Jersey, would hold all stock for four years and see that the
new company did not operate illegally. The state supreme court would resolve major
disagreements among the trustees. 765 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this
creative regulatory solution, however, in March of 1909, denying the motions for
modification and rehearing made by Standard Oil of Indiana and Republic Oil.766
While the exposed, and now superfluous, Republic Oil faded from independent
existence, 767 Standard Oil of Indiana continued in operation while it appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.768
In the same opinion in which it denied the foreign corporations' motions, the
Missouri Supreme Court also overruled the Attorney General's request to make
absolute the judgment of ouster against Waters-Pierce. 769 A majority of the court
found suspension of ouster to be justified because Waters-Pierce had paid its fine770
and passed a corporate resolution wherein it declared simply:
This company, protesting that it has never consciously or knowingly violated any of the
provisions of the laws of this State, nevertheless, does hereby accept the terms and
conditions of the order or decree of the Supreme Court of Missouri ... and does hereby
express its willingness to abide by the same."'
The court did, however, retain jurisdiction, reserving the power to modify or revoke
its suspension of ouster if Waters-Pierce violated state antitrust law in the future. 772
763. Standard Oil, 218 Mo. at 460, 116 S.W. at 1046.
764. Id. at 465-69, 116 S.W. at 1048-50. The court ordered a temporary stay of execution as to Waters-Pierce,
however, indicating that ouster would be suspended upon payment of the fine, satisfactory evidence that the company had
ceased its connection with the Standard Oil combination and assurance that the company would operate lawfully in the
future. Id. at468-69, 116 S.W. at 1049-50. AsJudge Graves noted in concurrence, revocation of the Waters-Pierce charter
would have terminated the Missouri company's corporate existence, and thus in practice would have been a much more
severe remedy than the revocation of intrastate privileges imposed on the two out-of-state corporations. Id. at 472-73, 116
S.W. at 1050 (Graves, J., concurring). This was a particularly troubling effect because at least some members of the court
perceived the Missouri firm to be comparatively less guilty because its minority shareholder, Henry Clay Pierce, had
protested the designs of the majority shareholder, Standard Oil of New Jersey. Id. at 470-73, 116 S.W. at 1050. Judge
Lamm, concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed that the court should suspend the ouster of Standard Oil of Indiana
as well as of Vaters-Pierce, but urged that a fine of $1 million be imposed. Id. at 474-76, 116 S.W. at 1052 (Lamm,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
765. See B. BoUNGHURSr, supra note 653, at 98.
766. See State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1,477, 116 S.W. 902, 1052 (1909) (opinion on motion
for rehearing).
767. See, e.g., B. BrMoMU.ST, supra note 653, at 99.
768. See, e.g., id.
769. See Standard Oil, 218 Mo. at 477, 116 S.W. at 1052.
770. Id.
771. Id. at 485, 116 S.W. at 1054 (Woodson, J., dissenting).
772. Id. at 478, 116 S.W. at 1052.
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Two years later, while its Standard Oil decision remained on appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court confronted even more troubling relief issues in the 1911 case
of State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Company of America.773 In
upholding the state's challenge to the consolidation of six farm machinery companies,
Chief Justice Leroy Valliant reviewed the state of the market before and after the
consolidation and became troubled by the mixed pattern of negative and positive
effects that he found. Consolidation had led to the elimination of manufacturer price
differentials among the several brands of machinery that previously had been made
by competitors but that were now all manufactured by the new International
Harvester Company. 774 Moreover, the new company now controlled eighty to ninety
percent of all harvester sales in both the United States and Missouri. 775 Yet, prices
had essentially remained constant until 1908 and then only rose in an amount less than
the increase in relevant costs over the same time period. 776 In addition, International
Harvester had greatly increased its business and moved into production of many other
types of farm equipment, thereby benefitting farmers by increasing competition in
those lines. Product quality had greatly improved, and repair material had become
less expensive and easier to obtain. 777 Overall, the court found, International
Harvester had "not used its power to oppress or injure the farmers who are its
customers."778
The consolidation's displacement of the fierce competition prevailing before its
establishment also was not necessarily a bad development, the Chief Justice declared,
because not'all competition had wholesome effects:
[C]ompetition may be of such a character and so designed as to destroy the weaker
competitors, leaving only the giant in the field, who then would have a monopoly of the
market. The law is not interested alone in the consumer, but it has regard also for the
producer and would, if it could, protect a small manufacturer or dealer from the destruction
that the avarice of a powerful rival might design. Therefore, the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondent is not without force, that the competition that existed in 1902 in
the harvester machine market was not the kind of competition that the lawmakers had in
mind when they enacted the anti-trust statutes. 779
Nevertheless, the defendants still could not prevail on such a rationale, because, the
court explained, "it is impossible for the Legislature to prescribe a general rule by
which competition conducive to a wholesome condition of the market can be
distinguished from a competition that is demoralizing and disorganizing.''780
Declaring that Missouri antitrust legislation was similar to the federal antitrust
act in its comprehensiveness and that it applied regardless of the particular form of
contract or combination employed,78' the court looked for guidance to the United
773. 237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672 (1911), affd, 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
774. Id. at 395, 141 S.W. at 677.
775. Id. at 384, 141 S.W. at 673.
776. Id. at 390-91, 141 S.W. at 676.
777. Id. at 391, 141 S.W. at 676.
778. Id.
779. Id. at 391-92, 141 S.W. at 676.
780. Id. at 392, 141 S.W. at 676.
781. Id. at 397, 141 S.W. at 678.
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States Supreme Court's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,782 which had
been announced just a few months earlier. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded
that under that opinion the reasonableness, and hence legality, of a challenged
arrangement depended on the power or potential for competitive restriction apparent
on the face of the particular contract or act. 783 If an excessive potential for restricting
competition was created, it was irrelevant if the parties only intended to or did use it
in "moderate degree. "784 As previously noted, in finding the defendants' combina-
tion to be unlawful under this standard, Chief Justice Valliant emphasized the
traditional distinction between power legitimately resulting from internal expansion
and power arising from abnormal methods. He made it clear that
[tihe statute we are now considering is not designed to limit the amount of wealth one may
lawfully acquire, therefore not designed to limit the influence that wealth may exert, but it
is designed to forbid the acquisition of power for the purpose of influencing the market by
combinations of interests that otherwise would compete in the market. The law regards such
a power acquired by such a combination as dangerous to the rights of the people and forbids
its acquisition.785
If the moderate exercise of a combination's excessive power was no defense to
liability, however, it nonetheless was very relevant in the formulation of appropriate
relief. Chief Justice Valliant found the question of remedy a particularly difficult one,
given the simultaneous presence of such benefits and potential dangers. He explained
that
[a] company of so much strength has the power to temporarily reduce the price of its goods
to such a degree as that all competitors would be compelled to either sell out or quit the
business, and when the field by such means would be cleared the prices would be at the will
of the survivor. There would be no advantage to the people in that. On the other hand it will
not do to say that this company shall not, because of the superior facilities it possesses for
economical manufacturing, put its products on the market at a price that other concerns
possessing less facilities cannot afford, and must therefore leave the field. Nor, will it do to
say that this corporation shall notbuy out the smaller manufacturers and dealers, forthat might
be unjust to the latter, depriving them of an opportunity to sell when they so desired.78 6
The Chief Justice proposed to resolve this dilemma through a decree of ouster, to be
suspended largely on the condition that International Harvester "not use its power
either to force a competitor to sell or drive it out of the market by unfair methods, and
that it ... not raise the prices of the articles it sells beyond a fair profit on their cost
and the expense of marketing the same. "787
While a majority of the Missouri Supreme Court concurred in Valliant's remarks
on liability, none of the other judges were willing to accept such a vague decree.
Instead, a majority of the court endorsed and decreed a suspended ouster of the
International Harvester Company of America, the selling arm of the consolidated
782. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See supra text accompanying notes 412-18.
783. International Harvester, 237 Mo. at 392-93, 141 S.W. at 676.
784. Id. at 393, 141 S.W. at 676.
785. Id. at 394, 141 S.W. at 677.
786. Id. at 400-01, 141 S.W. at 679.
787. Id. at 401, 141 S.W. at 679.
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International Harvester Company, to be conditioned primarily on the former's
severance from the latter, its payment of a fine, forbearance from further anticom-
petitive behavior, and faithful compliance with state antitrust law in the future. 78 8 The
court originally set the fine at $50,000 but subsequently reduced it on rehearing to
$25,000, 7 89 over dissenting opinions alternatively arguing that the final figure was
too low7 90 or too high.79'
Although the court in 1912 affirmed the unconditional forfeiture of the charter
of a Missouri corporation that had served as the mere instrument of a price-fixing
agreement among Kansas City ice dealers, 792 it returned to its pattern of suspended
ouster and ambivalent acceptance of economic concentration in 1913. In 1912 the
United States Supreme Court had affirmed the Missouri court's decision in the state
Standard Oil case and had upheld the state court's unsuspended ouster of Standard Oil
of Indiana and Republic Oil.793 Soon thereafter, Standard Oil of Indiana asked the court
to suspend its decree of ouster, stressing the extent of the company's property in-
vestment in the state and the large number of state citizens it employed. 794 When the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to do so in February of 1913, Standard Oil prepared
to close its important refinery at Sugar Creek, near Kansas City. In response to this
threat, local business leaders sought and obtained new legislation from the Missouri
legislature to allow Standard Oil to stay. 79 5 Although Herbert Hadley, who had just
finished his term as governor, supported the bill, believing that Waters-Pierce had been
left in too dominant a position in the state, 796 Governor Elliot Major vetoed the special
legislation. 797 Local Sugar Creek citizens thereupon asked the Missouri Supreme Court
to reconsider its decree, and Standard Oil of Indiana again urged suspension of ouster,
stressing not only the company's in-state economic importance, but also the severance
of its affiliation with Standard Oil of New Jersey accomplished by the United States
Supreme Court's 1911 dissolution decree in the federal case against Standard Oil. 7 9s
The state supreme court responded to changing Missouri sentiment by appointing a
special commissioner to look into the matter. Upon reviewing the evidence and
arguments submitted on the question, the court finally did agree to suspend its decree
of ouster in July of 1913. In a brief per curiam opinion supplying no explanatory
rationale for its action, the state supreme court conditioned its order solely on a
requirement that the company henceforth "faithfully obey and observe, in the conduct
788. Id. at 417, 141 S.W. at 684-85.
789. Id. at 420, 141 S.W. at 685 (opinion on motion for rehearing).
790. Id. at 420-24, 141 S.W. at 685-87 (Graves, J., dissenting) ("If the original judgment of a fine of $50,000
is not exceedingly reasonable, then my conservatism has indeed been warped."). Id. at 424, 141 S.W. at 687.
791. Id. at 420, 141 S.W. at 685 (Ferriss, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Ferriss believed no
fine should have been imposed.
792. See State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 151 S.W. 101 (1912).
793. See Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
794. See, e.g., B. BFUNoluRsr, supra note 653, at 99.
795. See id.
796. See, e.g., D. THELEN, supra note 653, at 260-61.
797. See id. at 261.
798. See B. BPNGoURST, supra note 653, at 100.
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of its business, all the laws of this State, and especially the anti-trust laws of this
State."799
Five months later, the court again turned to decrees of suspended ouster, along
with varying levels of fines totalling $358,000, when it found numerous companies
affiliated with the Yellow Pine Manufacturers' Association guilty of production
curtailment and price fixing through circulation of nonobjective price lists. 8° ° This
time, however, the court conditioned suspension not simply on obedience to law in
general, but also on compliance with a detailed list of specified conduct
requirements.801
The tension between findings of liability and formal decrees of ouster on the one
hand, and concerns for the practical impact of relief on the other, continued in later
years and was evident as well in the Missouri Supreme Court's final two quo warranto
opinions of the Progressive Era. In State ex rel. Sager v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel
Co.,802 the court found that incorporation of the defendant company, combining four
retail and three wholesale ice dealers to gain forty to fifty percent of local business
in St. Louis, violated state antitrust law. 80 3 But while the court condemned the
corporation's establishment as an unlawful restraint of trade, it simultaneously
declared that the corporation's disappearance would be too severe a loss for the court
to condone. Because the seven constituent companies previously had surrendered
their own charters, the court found that dissolution was not an available remedy and
that ouster simply would mean losing an important competitor in the St. Louis
trade. 80 4 Accordingly, the supreme court imposed a $50,000 fine and suspended
ouster on condition of future compliance with state antitrust law. 805
In its final major antitrust opinion of the formative era, the Missouri Supreme
Court imposed $25,000 fines and suspended decrees of ouster against five major
meat-packing firms that had joined together in an earlier and already defunct holding
company8° 6 that was perceived essentially as a nonancillary restraint generating no
apparent integration efficiencies. In this final case, Chief Justice Woodson, concur-
ring, and Judge Bond, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took pains to reiterate
the concern for overvigorous antitrust enforcement and the desire for economic
growth that had become increasingly important during the preceding decade. Chief
Justice Woodson stressed the importance of not fining the companies any more than
$25,000, particularly because they had abandoned the holding company prior to trial.
He emphasized that "such institutions are absolutely necessary for the well being of
the State and citizens thereof" and that "the policy of the State ... is not to unjustly
or oppressively penalize the business interests of its citizens, but ... to protect and
encourage people to come into this State, establish and conduct legitimate business
799. State er rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 251 Mo. 271, 272, 158 S.W. 601, 602 (1913).
800. State ex rel. Major v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 317-19, 169 S.W. 145, 178-79 (1914).
801. Id. at 320-24, 169 S.W. at 179-80 (opinion on motions to modify judgment).
802. 259 Mo. 578, 169 S.W. 126 (1914).
803. Id. at 609-10, 169 S.W. at 132-34.
804. Id. at 616-17, 169 S.W. at 134.
805. Id. at 618-19, 169 S.W. at 135.
806. See State ex reL Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382 (1915).
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herein.''807 Judge Bond concluded that because the defendants faced substantial
outside competition, the holding company had posed no economic threat even though
it did constitute a violation of state antitrust law. Praising the United States Supreme
Court's 1911 opinion in Standard Oil and stressing the need to give antitrust statutes
"a reasonable interpretation," Judge Bond concluded that the "bare fact that a single
ownership was in contravention of the letter of a section of the antitrust laws, is all
that can be deduced from the evidence in this case.' '808 Accordingly, he declared:
[T]he law will be fully vindicated and the antitrust act wholesomely administered by
ordering ouster of the charter of the one and revocation of the licenses of the others. Such
orders to be suspended upon a showing by respondents that their present business operations
are not conducted by non-competitive methods, and will not be so carried on hereafter.1s 9
There was no just basis, Judge Bond concluded, to impose any fines in such
circumstances. 810
As already noted, judicial commentary on the potential benefits of large-scale
economic combination did not appear in New York primarily in cases challenging
alleged cartel behavior, but in the handful of suits, usually brought by minority
shareholders, that sought to block particular corporate consolidations as such.
Although the New York Court of Appeals did not squarely address such litigation
during the three decades following Sherman Act passage, the lower courts that did
do so proved to be uniformly sympathetic to the consolidations brought to their
attention. In the 1899 case of Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co.,811 the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court rejected a minority shareholder's
challenge to a gas company's stock acquisition of a competitor brought under the
antitrust sections of the state stock corporation law.8 1 2 The court declared that the
arrangement did not create a monopoly because "[n]o exclusive privilege or right
... to manufacture and sell and distribute gas is acquired" 81 3 and noted the absence
of any indication that the acquired plant and properties would not actually be
used.8 14 Most broadly, the court found the acquisition legitimate despite its clear
purpose to eliminate business rivalry, declaring that the purchase would not
necessarily be anticompetitive:
We suppose it to be a lawful purpose of the corporation to secure itself against ruinous
competition whereby its whole business may be destroyed.
... [I]t is urged that the effect of the contract is to prevent lawful competition. It is not
necessarily so. It seems to be a contract which the directors of the Buffalo City Gas
Company regard as necessary, not merely to its prosperity and for the enhancement of its
807. Id. at 159-60, 176 S.W. at 392 (Woodson, C.J., concurring).
808. Id. at 178-80, 176 S.W. at 398 (Bond, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
809. Id. at 179-80, 176 S.W. at 398 (Bond, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
810. Id. at 181, 176 S.W. at 399-(Bond, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
811. 37 A.D. 618, 56 N.Y.S. 288 (1899).
812. Id. at 621, 56 N.Y.S. at 290.
813. Id. at 622, 56 N.Y.S. at 290.
814. Id. at 622, 56 N.Y.S. at 291.
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profits, but to the existence of its business. . . . A contract made to prevent or avoid
destructive competition is not necessarily invalid.8 '5
New York judges similarly failed to see any threat to competition in the con-
solidations that were challenged in later cases.81 6 In 1908, for example, the appellate
division refused to grant the state attorney general leave to bring an action to vacate
the charter of a corporation created through the consolidation of six New York gaslight
companies.817 The court emphasized that no monopoly was created because the field
remained open to anyone who could obtain the required approval of public
authorities.818 Moreover, consumers would be adequately protected against any price
increases or production limitation because the industry was subject to legislative
regulation in these respects.8 19 Citing its own 1899 decision in Rafferty and the court
of appeals' opinion in Diamond Match, the appellate division reiterated that "a
contract or purchase of stock for the purpose of preventing competition is not of itself
necessarily illegal." 8 20 The fears of local economic disruption that repeatedly led the
Missouri Supreme Court to suspend decrees of ouster in quo warranto litigation led
these New York judges to bar even initiation of ouster litigation against the Consol-
idated Gas Company:
No public purpose would ... be served by such a judgment as the Attorney General seeks
to apply for, while most serious disaster would flow from a judgment which would result in
depriving the inhabitants of the city of New York of gas and electricity for lighting purposes
even for a limited period. A judgment vacating the charter of the Consolidated Company
would at once prevent it from carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling gas and
electricity. So far as we are aware there is no other company ready to take up the business
at once, and the erection and installation of the necessary plant to supply the needs of a great
city would necessarily take a considerable time.82'
Finally, in 1917 the same court approved a consolidation of several railway
systems over the protest of a minority shareholder in Venner v. New York Central and
H.R.R. 822 The appellate division stressed that the various railway systems had been
commonly owned prior to the consolidation so that the new arrangement was
primarily a change in the form rather than the substance of control. 823 It also noted
the continued presence of other competitors,8 24 the fact that the various systems
815. Id. at 621-23, 56 N.Y.S. at 290-91.
816. See, e.g., Francis v. Taylor, 31 Misc. 187, 65 N.Y.S. 28 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1900), aff'don opinion below,
52 A.D. 631, 65 N.Y.S. 1133 (1900), rejecting a minority shareholder challenge to the sale of the Wagner Palace-Car
Company to the Pullman Palace-Car Company. The court again stressed that the agreement did not exclude anyone else
from the business and found it likely that the sale would generate efficiencies leading to a reduction in prices charged.
817. See In re Attorney Gen. v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 124 A.D. 401, 108 N.Y.S. 823 (1908).
818. Id. at 404-05, 108 N.Y.S. at 825.
819. Id. at 406, 408, 108 N.Y.S. at 826, 828.
820. Id. at 404, 108 N.Y.S. at 825.
821. Id. at 408-09, 108 N.Y.S. at 828. The court did not recognize any inconsistency between such an expressed
fear for the difficulty of new entry and the faith it expressed earlier with regard to the potential for new entry when it found
no monopoly had been created. Id. at 405, 108 N.Y.S. at 825.
822. 177 A.D. 296, 164 N.Y.S. 626 (1917), affd, 226 N.Y. 583, 123 N.E. 893 (1919).
823. Id. at 304-05, 345, 164 N.Y.S. at 631, 659.
824. Id. at 306-0, 164 N.Y.S. at 632-33.
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primarily were complementary rather than competing lines,8 25 and the protection
against service deterioration afforded by existing public service commission
regulation.8 26
The court believed that such a consolidation offered substantial economic
benefits. It explained:
So railways, themselves, perchance, products of earlier unification, have finally become one
system, whose principal arteries feed and are fed by many lines distributed in diverse
directions. The due development of railways has resulted from such mergers. Nor does the
prevailing thought concerning transportation question the benefit. Indeed, one cannot but
know the evils to all concerned from the several ownerships of physically connecting lines,
isolated in operation and segregated in control .... [T]he experience of all classes of people
using railways is that the possible scope in distance of a bill of lading or passenger ticket should
be unlimited and in inverse ratio to the proximity and accessibility of a known and an
accountable carrier827
To dissolve the consolidation, the court declared, "seems at variance with usual
conceptions of public benefit, and tends to reactionary conditions that would be
regarded as detrimental to the necessities of transportation, and as well subversive of
essential rights of property." 8 28 In so holding, the court took pains to distinguish this
consolidation from those condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States,8 29 Standard Oil Co. v. United States,830 United States
v. American Tobacco Co.,831 and United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 832 The
New York court distinguished those earlier arrangements largely on the basis of the
repeatedly invoked, traditional distinction between normal and abnormal business
conduct that had earlier been stressed, for example, by Chief Justice White in his 1911
rule of reason opinions. The appellate division explained that the arbitrary combination
of competing railroads in Northern Securities, for instance, posed a situation where
"[t]wo different things, made to be used apart, were forced into unnatural union. That
was distortion."8 33 Similarly, the court declared that in Union Pacific, "[t]he union
of the two systems did not blend what would coalesce in ordinary and natural
development, but rather two incongruous and antagonistic entities, characteristically
competitive and coalescing only through compulsion.' '834 In contrast, the activity in
Venner "was a growth begun long since, tried through many years, and not a sudden
arbitrary, conventional, unnatural, amalgamation of two diverse and inharmonious
systems. It was the normal sequence of legitimate extension and expansion in nec-
essary progress." 835
825. Id. at 309, 164 N.Y.S. at 634.
826. Id. at 312, 164 N.Y.S. at 636.
827. Id. at 302, 164 N.Y.S. at 629.
828. Id.
829. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See supra text accompanying notes 410-11.
830. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See supra text accompanying notes 412-18.
831. 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See supra text accompanying note 419.
832. 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
833. Venner, 177 A.D. at 319, 164 N.Y.S. at 641.
834. Id. at 322, 164 N.Y.S. at 643.
835. Id. at 323, 164 N.Y.S. at 643. On one occasion, the Missouri Supreme Court also considered a direct challenge
to corporate consolidation as such. In State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 182 Mo. 284, 81 S.W. 395 (1904),
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The traditionalist concerns reflected in state jurists' strong condemnation of
naked, nonancillary agreements, and in these varied judicial reactions to tight, market-
dominating combinations, reappeared strikingly in the numerous contemporary judi-
cial analyses of concerted refusals to deal and vertical restraints. Such arrangements
repeatedly raised basic issues concerning the interrelationship of economic opportu-
nity, property rights, freedom of exchange, and the natural processes of competition.
And while New York and Missouri jurists did address the more specific costs and
benefits of particular challenged practices, they primarily sought to resolve cases in
these final two categories of activity through purportedly "nondiscretionary" judicial
techniques, in the service of a still firmly embraced traditional vision of political and
economic life.
D. Economic Rights and the Rigors of Competition: The Judicial Treatment of
Concerted Refusals to Deal
In recent years, antitrust scholars836 and the United States Supreme Court837
increasingly have questioned the fact that over the years various forms of collective
activity have been labeled "concerted refusals to deal" or "boycotts" and frequently
have been treated in similar ways despite differing competitive effects seemingly
calling for differing legal treatment. 838 In the formative era, courts also embraced
particular principles and standards for evaluating "concerted refusals to deal" in
general, despite the diversity of such arrangements and the substantial differences in
their potential effects. Such a unitary approach seemed more natural during the
formative era than it does in the 1980s, however; for in the early twentieth century
all collective refusals to deal raised similar fundamental questions of traditional
theory, questions that have long ceased to have much power in antitrust jurispru-
dence, guided as it now is by a very different theoretical orientation.
Between 1890 and 1918, judicial consideration of collective refusals to deal
expanded and changed substantially. While courts had addressed such activities earlier
in the nineteenth century in a number of criminal conspiracy cases, 839 the possibilities
for civil challenge grew considerably after 1890. The final decade of the nineteenth
century and the first two decades of the twentieth century constituted the formative
era not only of American antitrust law, but also of the modern, generalized theory of
the court, in a four-to-three decision, approved a consolidation of terminal railroad corporations over a state challenge
brought under a state constitutional provision prohibiting "a railroad company from consolidating with another company
which owns or controls a parallel or competing line." Id. at 284, 81 S.W. at 395. The majority and the dissenters agreed
on the importance of maintaining competitive conditions but disagreed on the consolidation's likely economic impact as
well as on the correct interpretation of the relevant constitutional language.
836. See, e.g., L. SuLuvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Awrrmsusr § 83 (1977).
837. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Print. Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-94
(1985).
838. For example, a "concerted refusal to deal" undertaken by a number of businesses in the same trade in order
to coerce suppliers or customers to cease dealing with one or more competitors of these businesses may present an
exclusionary threat not necessarily posed by a "concerted refusal" by competitors to deal with potential customers unless
they accept particular terms of sale.
839. See, e.g., People v. Fisher, 14 Vend. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). See also Note, Tortious Interference with
Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HArv. L. REv.
1510, 1517-18 (1980).
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tortious interference with contract. 840 In the first half of the nineteenth century,
potential tort recovery for individual or collective interference with business relations
largely was limited t6 "enticement" actions premised on the existence of a traditional
master-servant relationship 84' and actions charging interference through such inher-
ently bad conduct as defamation, fraud, or coercion. 842 In 1853, the seminal English
case of Lumley v. Gye84 3 expanded tort liability to cover an executory employment
contract not involving a traditional master-servant relation. 844 At the same time, that
decision laid the foundation for the later expansion of tort liability to cover a broader
range of third party interference with contracts in general.8 45 Prior to the 1890s,
however, no English or American court actually upheld a tort claim for interference
with a nonemployment contract in the absence of an allegation that the defendant had
engaged in traditionally recognized forms of independently wrongful conduct. 46
As English and American courts broadened tort liability for both individual and
collective interferences with existing and potential contract advantages, they simul-
taneously stressed that not all third party activities causing a breach of contract or the
loss of a potential contract opportunity should be condemned. 847 Late nineteenth and
early twentieth century judges acknowledged that legitimate competitive efforts
frequently had such adverse consequences for other persons but did not wish to
impede the vigor of ordinary competitive activity. 848 Accordingly, between 1890 and
1918, American judges in tort cases continually struggled to protect the economic
rights of injured persons without impairing natural competitive activity or other
legitimate conduct. 849
In pursuing this goal, American jurists generally did not balance social policies
and interests in the manner prominently advocated by Judge, then Justice, Oliver
Wendell Holmes. 850 Instead, they sought to delineate more formally the boundaries
of relevant, implicated rights, largely, if not invariably, by focusing on the motive
behind the challenged conduct and its likely competitive impact. 85'
These ongoing, general developments in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century tort doctrine paralleled and influenced contemporary antitrust analyses.
Jurists in New York and Missouri generally evaluated concerted refusals to deal in
largely the same manner whether they considered them as examples of possibly
840. See generally Note, supra note 839.
841. See Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335, 336-41 (1980); Note,
supra note 839, at 1511-16.
842. See, e.g., Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583 (1854). See also Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies, supra note 107,
at 923-24; Note, supra note 839, at 1516-17.
843. 2 Q.B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
844. See Note, supra note 839, at 1522-23.
845. See id. at 1523.
846. See id. at 1529-30.
847. See id. at 1529-39.
848. See id. at 1532.
849. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 863-93, 896, 921-23.
850. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
851. See Dobbs, supra note 841, at 342; Note, supra note 839, at 1535-37.
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tortious conduct 52 or as potential violations of antitrust standards.8 53 Although the
relevant New York cases directly involved tort claims, they also implicated important
restraint of trade and antitrust questions. Conversely, while the Missouri cases
typically involved claims based directly on state antitrust law, the Missouri courts
also addressed related common law issues as well.
In the three decades following Sherman Act passage, New York and Missouri
judges considered a wide variety of collective refusals to deal. In some cases,
defendants sought to foreclose competitors from dealing with persons who did
business with the defendants themselves. In other cases, defendants sought to coerce
competitors' compliance with price-fixing agreements. In other instances, partici-
pants collectively refused to deal in order to obtain more favorable action from
suppliers or purchasers. In still other cases, defendants ostensibly acted to protect the
operation of organized exchange markets. Some of the cases involved collective
action by laborers while others dealt only with business activity. New York and
Missouri judges declared, however, that the same general principles applied whether
or not labor activity was involved, 854 even though strikes for higher wages were
deemed legitimate, while boycotts in aid of business price fixing were not.
The New York Court of Appeals set forth its most important analyses of
collective refusals to deal in two labor cases decided in 1897 and 1902. In Curran v.
Galen,855 a nonunion engineer sought damages against members of a local brewery
workers' assembly that was affiliated with the Knights of Labor. The assembly had
entered into an agreement with the Rochester Ale Brewers Association. Under the
agreement, no one was to work at any of the brewing companies in the Association
for more than four weeks without becoming a member of the local assembly. When
the plaintiff refused to join after working for Miller Brewing longer than the
stipulated time, the defendants obtained his dismissal pursuant to the agreement and
allegedly threatened to "make it impossible for him to obtain any employment"
anywhere unless he relented. 856 In a per curiam opinion, the court acknowledged that
workers had the right to organize to obtain such legitimate goals as increased
wages.85 7 It declared, however, that the plaintiff had a paramount right to pursue
freely his lawful trade. Equating the issue posed by the private action of the assembly
with the issue raised by the governmental restrictions addressed in contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence, the court explained:
852. See, e.g., Dueber Watchcase Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 3 Misc. 582, 24 N.Y.S. 647 (Sup.
Ct., Spec. Tem 1893).
853. See, e.g., Walsh v. Association of Master Plumbers, 97 Mo. App. 280, 71 S.W. 455 (1902); Collins v.
American News Co., 34 Misc. 260, 69 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1901), affd, 68 A.D. 639, 74 N.Y.S. 1123
(1902).
854. See, e.g., Walsh, 97 Mo. App. at 289, 71 S.W. at 458; Shinola Co. v. House of Krieg, 75 Misc. 220, 225,
133 N.Y.S. 1015, 1018 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1912); Heim v. New York Stock Exch., 64 Misc. 529, 533, 118 N.Y.S.
591, 594 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1909), affd, 138 A.D. 96, 122 N.Y.S. 872 (1910).
855. 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897).
856. Id. at 34, 46 N.E. at 298.
857. Id. at 36-37, 46 N.E. at 298. As the court conceded, this right was explicitly guaranteed by statute in New
York. See id. (citing N.Y. PENAL COD § 170 (1895)).
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Every citizen is deeply interested in the strict maintenance of the constitutional right freely
to pursue a lawful avocation, under conditions equal as to all, and to enjoy the fruits of his
labor, without the imposition of any conditions not required for the general welfare of the
community. The candid mind should shrink from the results of the operation of the principle
contended for here; for there would certainly be a compulsion, or a fettering, of the
individual, glaringly at variance with that freedom in the pursuit of happiness, which is
believed to be guaranteed to all by the provisions of the fundamental law of the state. 8
In the court's view, such an interference with the economic liberty of other workers
militated "against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions" 59
and conflicted "with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and
exclusive privileges.' '860
Five years later, the court reexamined the question of concerted refusals to deal
in considerably more detail in the 1902 case of National Protective Association of
Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumming.8 6 1 A union had refused to allow its members
to work with others who belonged to a rival labor organization and had threatened a
strike unless those other workers were discharged. A majority of the court declared
that neither the discharged employees nor their rival organization had any right of
action against the union. Both the majority and dissenting judges agreed that each
individual worker had the right to refuse to work for any particular employer and that
"[w]hatever one man may do alone, he may do in combination with others, provided
they have no unlawful object in view.''862 The question was how to distinguish
threatened refusals to work that were within the union members' rights, even though
harming other workers, from refusals that were beyond those rights and unlawful. Both
the majority and dissenting judges sought to resolve this question by focusing on the
defendants' motives, even though Chief Judge Alton B. Parker, writing for the
majority, expressed serious doubts about such a general approach for judging refusals
to deal. He declared:
It seems to me illogical and little short of absurd to say that the every-day acts of the business
world, apparently within the domain of competition, may be either lawful or unlawful
according to the motive of the actor. If the motive be good, the act is lawful; if it be bad,
the act is unlawful. Within all the authorities upholding the principle of competition, if the
motive be to destroy another's business in order to secure business for yourself, the motive
is good; but, according to a few recent authorities, if you do not need the business, or do not
wish it, then the motive is bad; and some court may say to a jury, who are generally the triers
of fact, that a given act of competition which destroyed A's business was legal if the act was
prompted by a desire on the part of the defendant to secure to himself the benefit of it, but
illegal if its purpose was to destroy A's business in revenge for an insult given.
But for the purpose of this discussion I shall assume this proposition to be sound, for it
is clear to me that, applying that rule to the facts found, it will appear that the Appellate
Division order should be sustained.8 63
858. Id. at 37, 46 N.E. at 299.
859. Id. at 37, 46 N.E. at 298.
860. Id. at 37, 46 N.E. at 299.
861. 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
862. Id. at 321, 338, 63 N.E. at 369, 376.
863. Id. at 326-27, 63 N.E. at 371-72.
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In Chief Judge Parker's view, under prevailing principles, a refusal to deal fell
outside the participants' lawful rights only if prompted solely by malice. More
particularly, "if an organization strikes to help its members, the strike is lawful. If
its purpose be merely to injure non-members, it is unlawful.'"' 64 It could not be
assumed that the union in this case had acted for bad reasons. Its refusal was
justifiable partly on the ground that union membership required successful comple-
tion of a competency examination. Accordingly, the union's action helped to ensure
the presence of careful and skilled coworkers, a particularly important consideration,
Chief Judge Parker noted, at a time when the fellow servant rule continued to impede
workers' recovery in tort suits against employers.8 65 More fundamentally, however,
it appeared that the union did what it did to obtain the discharge of other employees
in order that its own members could have the jobs instead.8 66 Such an aim was merely
"the motive which always underlies competition" and was an entirely lawful one in
both business and labor rivalry. Thus, Chief Judge Parker related:
A man has a right under the law to start a store and to sell at such reduced prices that he
is able in a short time to drive the other storekeepers in his vicinity out of business, when,
having possession of the trade, he finds himself soon able to recover the loss sustained while
mining the others. . . . The reason, of course, is that the doctrine has generally been
accepted that free competition is worth more to society than it costs, and that, on this
ground, the infliction of damages is privileged.867
Finally, it made no difference that the union announced beforehand that it would
strike, because everyone had "the absolute right to threaten to do that which they had
the right to do." 868
Judge Gray concurred in a separate opinion, supporting the court's delineation
of rights through his own succinct, if circular, statement of principle. "[M]y view,"
he declared, "is that the respondents had the legal right to accomplish their object by
all methods not condemned by the law." '8 69
Judge Irving Vann, writing for the three dissenters, also sought to delineate
sharply the boundaries of respective rights through an examination of motive. But he
drew an opposite conclusion regarding intent, and he emphasized not the rights of the
union members, but those of the employer and of the discharged workers.
It was not that bad motives and effects outweighed good ones in some balancing
calculus. Rather, for Judge Vann, the critical question was one of categorization.
"Here we have a conspiracy to injure the plaintiffs in their business," he concluded,
"as distinguished from a legitimate advancement of the defendants' own
864. Id. at 326, 63 N.E. at 371.
865. Id. at 324-25, 63 N.E. at 370-71.
866. Id. at 322, 327, 63 N.E. at 370, 372.
867. Id. at 330, 63 N.E. at 373 (citation omitted). For an important exploration of the manner in which competition
increasingly came to be recognized in nineteenth century liberal legal theory as a major form of damnum absque injuria,
see Singer, supra note 83, at 1031-34.
868. National Protective Ass'n, 170 N.Y. at 329, 63 N.E. at 372.
869. Id. at 334, 63 N.E. at 374 (Gray, J., concurring). He distinguished Curran v. Galen on the ground that the
union activity there was more harmful to the plaintiff and more malicious involving, for example, the circulation of false
reports about the plaintiff. Id.
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interests." 870 The union's coercive tactic was a "trespass upon the rights" of the
nonmember workers to work for whom and on what terms they pleased.8 71
Simultaneously, it illegitimately infringed the employer's free choice of employees,
thereby violating the employer's inherent "right to carry on his business in any lawful
way that he sees fit. ' '872 As Judge Vann explained, everyone "has the right to the
utmost freedom of contract and choice in this regard, and interference with that
freedom is against public policy, because it tends not only to destroy competition, but
in a broad sense, to deprive a man of both liberty and property. ' 873
The defendants' activity was not within the realm of normal, privileged,
competitive effort, but impeded the "law of competition and of supply and
demand.''874 Rather than being analogous to vigorous underselling by a business
rival, it was "a tortious act" and "the same in principle as depriving a tradesman of
his customers by unfair means, which has always been held a violation of law." 875
Countering Judge Gray's articulation and application of relevant principle through a
similar, if opposite, declaration, Judge Vann explained that "[h]ere, the means used
were illegal, because they tended and were designed to injure a man in his business,
without lawful excuse." 876
Despite his declaration that employers had a right to run their businesses as they
saw fit, Judge Vann conceded that workers did have the right to organize and strike
to obtain better wages and conditions. Why was the strike threatened in this case not
similarly legitimate as a collective effort to gain more union jobs and enhance union
power to obtain better terms? To answer this question, Judge Vann returned to the
question of proper categorization and emphasized the distinction between direct and
indirect effects. "The object of the defendants," Judge Vann stressed, "was not to
get higher wages, shorter hours or better terms for themselves, but to prevent others
from following their lawful calling." 877 Quoting Arthur J. Eddy's treatise on
combinations, 878 he emphasized that
a threat to strike unless their wages are advanced is something very different from a threat
to strike unless workmen who are not members of the combination are discharged. In either
case the inconvenience and damage inflicted upon the employer is the same; but in the one
case the means used are to attain a legitimate purpose, namely, the advancement of their own
wages, and the injury inflicted is no more than is lawfully incidental to the enjoyment of their
own legal rights. In the other case the object sought is the injury of a third party; and while
it may be argued that indirectly the discharge of the non-union employee will strengthen and
benefit the union and thereby indirectly benefit the union workmen, the benefit to the members
870. Id. at 340, 63 N.E. at 376.
871. Id. at 339, 63 N.E. at 376.
872. Id. at 341, 63 N.E. at 376.
873. Id. at 341, 63 N.E. at 377 (citations omitted). To support this proposition, Judge Vann cited, in part, the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 vall.) 36 (1873).
874. National Protective Ass'n, 170 N.Y. at 339-40, 63 N.E. at 376.
875. Id. at 340-41, 63 N.E. at 377.
876. Id.
877. Id. at 342, 63 N.E. at 377.
878. 1 A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS (1901).
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of the combination is so remote, as compared to the direct and immediate injury inflicted upon
the non-union workmen, that the law does not look beyond the immediate loss and damage
to the innocent parties, to the remote benefits that might result to the union.8 79
In these same years, the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, considered a
number of additional concerted refusals to deal. In a series of revealing opinions, these
supreme court jurists presiding in special term sessions also sought to specify the
proper boundaries of relevant rights and to delineate the factors determining the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of various challenged activities. In Dueber Watchcase
Manufacturing Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co. ,880 the court condemned the
concerted action of various manufacturers who allegedly refused to deal with anyone
who did business with the plaintiff. Accepting on demurrer that the action was taken
to coerce the plaintiff's compliance with the defendants' price-fixing scheme, the court
declared that the case was not one of freedom of trade or the exercise of a legal right,
but instead a malicious attempt to crush a rival who refused to join in an illegal
arrangement and therefore presented a case of tortious conduct for which the plaintiff
could recover damages if it proved its allegations. 81 Eight years later, another special
term opinion rejected a tort challenge to the collective conduct of several newspaper
publishers who refused to deal with the plaintiff news dealer unless he would stop
inserting his own competing advertising circulars in the newspapers he obtained from
these publishers. 882 Declaring that "[w]hat any publisher could lawfully do individ-
ually all the publishers may lawfully combine to do," the court concluded that the
defendants' motives were not malicious but merely self-protective. 883 The defendants,
moreover, had not interfered with the operation of the plaintiff's own business but had
merely refused to help him use the defendants' papers to injure the defendants
themselves. 884 By way of analogy, the court declared that it would be perfectly
legitimate if, in reaction to the economic or political views expressed in the defendants'
newspapers, all the manufacturers of suitable paper collectively refused to sell the
defendants any more paper, even if this caused the defendants great financial losses.
"There is no place in any system of jurisprudence yet devised," the court explained,
"for the principle that a man may be compelled to sell his goods or his labor to one
with whom he does not wish to deal, merely because his refusal to do so may cause
loss to him who wants them.''885
In 1909 the supreme court at special term refused to enjoin the application of
a New York Stock Exchange rule under which New York Stock Exchange members
refused to deal with the plaintiff because he also traded on the rival Consolidated
879. National Protective Ass'n, 170 N.Y. at 344-45, 63 N.E. at 378 (quoting A. EDDY, supra note 878, at 416).
880. 3 Misc. 582, 24 N.Y.S. 647 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1893).
881. Id. at 585, 24 N.Y.S. at 649-50.
882. See Collins v. American News Co., 34 Misc. 260, 69 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1901), aftd, 68 A.D.
639, 74 N.Y.S. 1123 (1902).
883. Id. at 263, 69 N.Y.S. at 641.
884. Id. at 264, 69 N.Y.S. at 642.
885. Id. at 265, 69 N.Y.S. at 642.
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Stock Exchange.88 6 In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the rule constituted an illegal
combination in restraint of trade, the court reiterated that
if the combination not to do business with the plaintiff is for the purpose of injuring and
destroying him, it is illegal; but if injury to him follows as an incident from action sought
to protect, increase and strengthen the business of the associates, then it is as legitimate as
other forms of competition which the law leaves parties and combinations free to indulge in. 8" 7
The court noted that, in part, the New York Stock Exchange members simply were
protecting themselves in a situation where the rival Consolidated Exchange would
have had little business except for its ability to use New York Stock Exchange
quotations. 88 At the same time, the court went on to elaborate further on the legal
status of refusals to deal and declared, in contrast to the sentiments previously
declared in the newspaper case, that a concerted refusal to deal that was based on
personal dislike, or the plaintiff's affiliation with a "particular club, church or
political organization" would be illegal, "for this would be a clear interference with
his liberty and a direct attack upon him." '8 8 9
Finally, in 1912 the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, addressed a
concerted refusal to deal undertaken by jobbers who were seeking to obtain better terms
from a manufacturer of blacking and shoe-polishing outfits.8 90 The manufacturer
sought an injunction, claiming that such activity constituted a conspiracy to injure the
manufacturer's business and to injure and restrain trade.89 ' The court denied the
request, finding the jobbers' activity to be analogous to a labor strike for higher wages
and "by a wide margin, within their strict legal rights," 892 considering the kind of
activity approved in National Protective Association. While the jobbers' action ul-
timately might lead to higher consumer prices, the court noted, this was not its primary
object. The jobbers did not control the means of marketing the plaintiff's product and
did not seek to boycott the plaintiff's goods in the market more generally. Finally, the
court stressed that the jobbers had not engaged in fraud or any efforts to breach existing
contracts and had not sought to coerce any jobber to go along with their concerted
refusal to deal.8 93
The Missouri Supreme Court did not have occasion to address concerted refusal
issues at significant length until 1908. Prior to that time, Missouri case law in the area
was shaped primarily by the St. Louis and Kansas City Courts of Appeal. In 1902 the
St. Louis Court of Appeals condemned as a state antitrust violation a concerted refusal
to deal allegedly undertaken by a plumbers' association, along with manufacturers and
dealers, for the purpose of supporting price fixing and output limitation.8 94 The court
886. Heim v. New York Stock Exch., 64 Misc. 529, 118 N.Y.S. 591 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1909), affid, 138 A.D.
96, 122 N.Y.S. 872 (1910).
887. Id. at 531-32, 118 N.Y.S. at 593.
888. Id. at 532, 118 N.Y.S. at 593.
889. Id. at 531, 118 N.Y.S. at 593.
890. See Shinola Co. v. House of Krieg, 75 Misc. 220, 133 N.Y.S. 1015 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1912).
891. Id. at 223, 133 N.Y.S. at 1016.
892. Id. at 225, 133 N.Y.S. at 1018.
893. Id. at 224-25, 133 N.Y.S. at 1017-18.
894. See Walsh v. Association of Master Plumbers, 97 Mo. App. 280, 290-91, 71 S.W. 455, 458 (1902).
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held that a victimized plumber who did not belong to the association could seek an
injunction at common law even though state antitrust legislation did not provide for
such a private remedy.8 95 Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Bland began his
analysis by setting forth the fundamental principles of potentially conflicting property
rights as stated in a leading Massachusetts decision. That earlier 1871 opinion had
declared:
"Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry,
skill and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition; but he has a right to be
free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbances or annoyance. If disturbance or
loss comes as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum
absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with." 896
Echoing the sentiments expressed in the New York Court of Appeals' National
Protective Association opinion of the same year, Judge Bland went on to note more
fully the permitted consequences of competition and the analytical similarity of
business and labor activity:
[C]apitalists [have] the right to combine their capital in productive enterprises and by lawful
competition drive the individual producer and the smaller ones out of busniess [sic]. And
laborers and artisans have the right to form unions and by their united effort fight
competition by lawful means.8 97
In this case, however, what the defendants allegedly had done went beyond such
limits, and the plaintiff had stated sufficient instances of malice, and indeed violence,
to establish a cause of action.s98
In the same year, the Kansas City Court of Appeals expanded on these principles
of property and competition when it condemned a collective refusal by brewers to sell
to anyone already in debt to another brewer in their group until the debt was paid.
8 9 9
The court declared the arrangement unlawful under state antitrust law as an agreement
tending to lessen full and free competition, because indebted parties lost the benefit
of competition from companies other than the brewer to whom they already owed
money. 900 Such an agreement penalized people for a condition that was "merely
unfortunate," rather than unlawful, and took from them a "common right of
citizenship." 90 1 Once the court concluded that the brewers' acts had the prohibited
effect, it was irrelevant whether or not the brewers may have "only intended a worthy
purpose.' '92 Accordingly, under the state antitrust statute, the defendant had a good
defense when the plaintiff brewer sued on an account for beer sold, because the act
declared that buyers were not liable for the price of articles purchased from companies
violating state antitrust law.90 3
895. Id. at 291-93, 71 S.W. at 458-59.
896. Id. at 289, 71 S.W. at 458 (quoting Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 564 (1871)).
897. Id.
898. Id. at 283-88, 293, 71 S.W. at 456, 459.
899. See Ferd Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo. App. 64, 71 S.W. 691 (1902).
900. Id. at 67-69, 71 S.W. at 692.
901. Id. at 68, 71 S.W. at 692.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 67, 71 S.W. at 692.
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In so holding, the court considered at length the nature of the rights at issue and
their interrelationship. Judge Ellison, for the court, noted that learned judges
elsewhere sometimes had relied upon the proposition that "the lawful right of an
individual, acting singly, could not become unlawful by the combined action of
several to do the same thing.'' 9 4 "But," he declared, "there was never a greater
error."905 In many instances, the potentially greater dangers posed by the power in
numbers justified different legal treatment. For example, a single dealer's effort to
raise prices would be thwarted by competition in the "natural course of trade," while
collective price fixing "interferes with trade and creates distress." 90 6
Determination of which combinations were unlawful depended on inquiry into
their character and purpose and a careful delineation of the boundaries of relevant
rights. The court stated that two different rights were potentially infringed by the
brewers' conduct: a public right and a right of the defendant buyer. To permit this
agreement would condone more generally an agreement blocking all persons in debt
from buying any of the necessaries of life. Such a "disastrous" result clearly
indicated that the brewers' scheme violated the public's right to unrestrained trade. 907
In considering the borders of the respective rights of the plaintiff and the defendant,
the court began by conceding the plaintiff's right to refuse to sell. It then went on to
explain the limits of that right in a striking expression of traditional theory and
turn-of-the-century judicial methodology:
But defendant had the right to buy and plaintiff did not have the right to prevent others from
selling to him by engaging them in a compact not to do so. For by so doing there was an
invasion of defendant's right to buy. Each must exercise his right without infringing on the
right of the other. Defendant can not construe his right to buy in such way as to annul
plaintiff's right to refuse to sell. And neither can plaintiff stretch its right to refuse to sell so
as to interfere with defendant's right to buy of others. When plaintiff sought out other dealers
and procured them not to sell to defendant, it got outside its own right and invaded
defendant's. 9o5
The brewers had perverted the "natural law of trade," 90 9 and their combination
violated both common law and state antitrust prohibitions. Yet, in closing, the court
conceded that a very different case might be posed by an agreement not to sell to
dishonest debtors. 910
The Kansas City court had an opportunity to address refusal to deal issues again
three years later in the case of Gladish v. Bridgeford.911 The Kansas City Live Stock
Exchange expelled the plaintiff as a member for losing a customer's money and,
pursuant to Exchange rules, the remaining members refused to do business with him.
904. Id. at 70, 71 S.W. at 693.
905. Id.
906. Id. at 71, 71 S.W. at 693.
907. Id. at 73, 71 S.W. at 694.
908. Id. at 74, 71 S.W. at 694.
909. Id. at 75, 71 S.W. at 694.
910. Id. at 78, 71 S.W. at 696 ("The statute, while aiming to protect the public from the evils of monopoly, was
not designed to offer facilities for the cheat or fraud.").
911. 113 Mo. App. 726, 89 S.W. 77 (1905).
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The plaintiff sought an injunction to block Exchange efforts supporting this concerted
refusal to deal, claiming it amounted to a boycott that was illegal under Missouri's
1899 antitrust statute. 912 The court rejected this claim on the ground that the members
lacked the requisite anticompetitive intent. 9
13
The court declared that the antitrust statute had not been intended to ban beneficial
or harmless combinations. Distinguishing the brewers' agreement it previously had
criticized, the court noted a number of collective refusals to deal that it concluded
would be lawful and commendable. In particular, the court found laudable a posited
brewers' agreement not to sell to anyone who had sold beer to minors, operated without
a license, or violated Sunday closing laws, and it condoned a hypothetical druggists'
refusal to sell poison except "upon the written prescription of a reputable doctor.' '914
The Exchange members' refusal to deal with someone expelled for dishonesty
was deemed similarly praiseworthy. Indeed, if the members did otherwise, it would
be perceived in commercial circles as an endorsement of the plaintiff as a trustworthy
individual. By standing fast in its efforts to protect the integrity of Exchange trading,
the Exchange would "inspire confidence everywhere and the tendency would be to
increase and not to limit, competition and trade on the said market.' '915
The Missouri Supreme Court finally had an opportunity to comment on the legal
status of concerted refusals to deal in two cases it decided in 1908. In Lohse Patent
Door Co. v. Fuelle,9 16 a carpenters' union allegedly had demanded that the plaintiff
employ only union members and threatened a secondary boycott and strike against
persons buying from the plaintiff. On demurrer, the court reiterated the legitimacy of
labor unions and ordinary strike activity. 9 17 The court then undertook an extensive
review of existing case law relevant to the treatment of secondary boycotts, quoting
at considerable length from the leading cases decided by the Supreme Courts of
California, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. 918 The
court declared that these opinions, and the many other cases in the area, were all in
harmony in their analyses. 919 The fact that an individual might have a right to refuse
to deal did not necessarily validate a collective refusal. As a technical matter, only
groups could constitute a conspiracy and, more fundamentally, individual refusals
threatened dramatically less harm than did collective boycotts. 920 Judge Woodson, for
the court, noted with regard to the latter that, indeed, "[t]he books are full of cases
where such combinations or conspiracies have wrought great injury and loss, and even
wrecked and destroyed great and powerful business institutions, and, if left untram-
meled, would cause the strongest of them to fall, and the very foundation of our
912. Id. at 729-33, 89 S.W. at 77-78. See supra note 655.
913. Gladish, 113 Mo. App. at 732-33, 89 S.W. at 78.
914. Id. at 733, 89 S.W. at 78.
915. Id. at 734, 89 S.W. at 79.
916. 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997 (1908).
917. Id. at 442-47, 114 S.W. at 1002-03. See also Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 32 S.W.
1106 (1895) (summary discussion).
918. See Lohse Patent Door, 215 Mo. at 447-73, 114 S.W. at 1003-12.
919. Id. at 473-74, 114 S.W. at 1012.
920. Id. at 473-74, 114 S.W. at 1012-13.
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government to crumble. "921 The key distinction between permissible and impermis-
sible combinations again centered on purpose. Ordinary labor union activity was
lawful because its direct purpose was protection and promotion of labor interests, and
it only "indirectly and incidentally operate[d] in restraint of trade." 922 Secondary
boycotts of the sort under challenge, however, were unlawful because their direct
purpose and effect was harm to the targeted business. The dismissal of nonunion
workers resulting from such activity only indirectly and incidentally protected and
benefitted the boycotters. 923
In a second opinion that same year, the Missouri Supreme Court made the same
distinction between individual and collective conduct and upheld on demurrer a state
complaint charging the Traders Live Stock Exchange with boycott activity anticom-
petitively seeking to exclude nonmembers from buying and selling in their market. 924
The court distinguished, on such ground of alleged anticompetitive purpose and effect,
the United States Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Anderson v. United States,925 in
which the Supreme Court rejected the federal antitrust challenge to the activities of
this same exchange. While the United States Supreme Court in that earlier case had
found the efforts of the Exchange laudable and no threat to competition, the same could
not be assumed in the state case when considered on demurrer.926
Six years later, the Missouri Supreme Court considered a private treble damage
action brought under state antitrust law by a commission merchant allegedly harmed
by the boycott activities of the same Traders Live Stock Exchange. 927 The court
declared that the 1907 antitrust statute had been passed not only to restore competition
and allow free play to the "old law of supply and demand," but also "to protect the
weak against the strong, or the individual against the combinations." 9 2 8 The plaintiff
claimed that it belonged "to the weak and individual class" and that the alleged
combination was "formed solely to injure the plaintiff's commission business." '929
The court conceded that these allegations presumably were sufficient to state a cause
of action at common law.930 They were not enough to state a cause of action under
the antitrust statute, however, where there was
no pretense that the combination charged ... was intended to or did have any effect upon
competition in the transportation of live stock to Kansas City; that it resulted or could in any
manner have resulted in the restraint of trade, or was intended to or could have fixed or
maintained prices .... 93
921. Id. at 474, 114 S.W. at 1013.
922. Id.
923. Id.
924. See State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Kansas City Live Stock Exch., 211 Mo. 181, 109 S.W. 675 (1908).
925. 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
926. Kansas City Live Stock, 211 Mo. at 195-96, 109 S.W. at 678-79.
927. See Co-operative Live Stock Comm. Co. v. Browning, 260 Mo. 324, 168 S.W. 934 (1914).
928. Id. at 345, 168 S.W. at 938.
929. Id. at 347, 168 S.W. at 939.
930. Id. at 348, 168 S.W. at 939.
931. Id. at 347, 168 S.W. at 939.
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The loss of a single commission merchant like the plaintiff simply could not have an
appreciable impact on the vigor of overall competition in the live stock market, and
the legislature would not be presumed to have intended to allow a private antitrust
damage remedy in such a circumstance.
932
The Missouri Supreme Court took a somewhat more critical view of concerted
refusals to deal on the part of insurance companies. In State ex rel. Barker v.
Assurance Co. of America,933 the state brought quo warranto proceedings not to oust
the defendants, but to fine and otherwise punish them for collectively seeking to
withdraw from in-state business. The companies had entered into a boycott, refusing
to write new fire insurance policies on property within the state in response to the
1913 state antitrust amendment condemning cooperative efforts in writing
insurance. 934 The court overruled the defendants' demurrer and granted a temporary
injunction, 935 reaffirming once again that "two or more persons have no legal right
to unlawfully conspire to injure another, even though each separately had the legal
right to do what the combination had agreed to do."
936
Finally in 1917, the court defended the right to labor by allowing a blacklisted
employee a common law cause of action against insurance companies who had agreed
not to employ for two years anyone leaving employment at another of the companies
in the group. 937
New York and Missouri courts thus approached the varied concerted refusals to
deal that they considered in generally similar ways in both labor and business contexts,
and in both tort and antitrust litigation. Seeking to protect fundamental rights of labor,
property, and exchange without impairing the vigor of normal competitive rivalry,
New York and Missouri jurists consistently sought to delineate the proper boundaries
of individual and collective rights largely through attention to the motives underlying
challenged activity. They did so, morover, even though such an approach generated
varying definitions of the limits of relevant rights and at least some judicial criticism
that foreshadowed the altered doctrinal analyses that American courts would widely
adopt in later years. 938
This judicial approach to individual and collective refusals to deal powerfully
affected early analyses of various vertical agreements as well. These agreements
frequently were pursued or enforced through individual or concerted refusals to deal
and repeatedly raised similar questions regarding the proper scope of basic economic
rights and the integrity of the natural processes of legitimate competition. It is to this
final category of early state antitrust analysis that we now turn.
932. Id. at 347-51, 168 S.W. at 939-40.
933. 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640 (1913).
934. See supra note 655.
935. Assurance Co., 251 Mo. at 302, 158 S.W. at 648.
936. Id. at 291, 158 S.W. at 645.
937. See Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1917).
938. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 841, at 345; Note, supra note 839, at 1537-39.
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E. Vertical Restraints
During the formative era, Congress and several state legislatures enacted new
legislation targeting anticompetitive vertical restraints, and vertical restrictions be-
came the subject of recurring Progressive Era litigation. Courts in both New York and
Missouri repeatedly considered challenges to sole outlet or exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, and New York courts repeatedly considered issues posed by resale price
maintenance schemes as well. The judges resolved these cases largely through a
combination of competitive impact analysis and continued direct articulation of the
nature and limits of rights. In analyzing such litigation, the courts emphasized a
difference between a vertical restraint policy adopted by a single manufacturer and
arrangements involving a horizontal combination of either manufacturers or dealers,
a distinction much stressed in modern antitrust analysis. 939 While state judges were
substantially more sympathetic to purely vertical arrangements than to horizontal
schemes, the courts did not always approve the former, nor did they invariably
condemn the latter. Moreover, analysis frequently was complicated by the influence
of additional factors, such as copyright, patent, or trademark protection. Examination
of these cases further illuminates the continuing power of traditional theory in early
antitrust and restraint of trade analysis in New York and Missouri. Simultaneously,
it also helps to clarify aspects of early Sherman Act case law by providing valuable
additional insight into the thinking of Rufus Wheeler Peckham, the New York judge
who became the chief architect of initial Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence.
1. Exclusive Dealing and Sole Outlet Arrangements
Prior to congressional enactment of section 3 of the Clayton Act in 1914, 940
several states, including Missouri, 94 ' adopted similar legislation to prohibit exclusive
dealing when it posed a threat to competition. 942 The United States Supreme Court
said very little on the subject of exclusive dealing during the formative era itself,
considering its first Section 3 case only in 1922. 94 3 Modern Supreme Court precedent
on exclusive dealing primarily began with the Court's 1949 decision in Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States (Standard Stations).944 In that case, the Court
concluded that exclusive dealing was harmful when used to "foreclose" competition
in a substantial share of a line of commerce. 945 Simultaneously, however, the Court
also noted significant potential benefits from exclusive requirements contracts,
including assurance of supply, reduction of selling expenses, protection against price
fluctuation, and facilitation of long-term planning. 946 During the formative era itself,
lower federal courts and state courts generally approved the exclusive dealing
939. See, e.g., R. Bojuc, supra note 6, at 288.
940. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 729 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982)).
941. See supra text accompanying note 655.
942. See J. DAVIES, supra note 252, at 184-85.
943. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
944. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
945. Id. at 314.
946. ld. at 305-07.
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arrangements brought to their attention, 947 and New York and Missouri jurists
conformed to this broader pattern. When state judges upheld such agreements,
however, they often justified this result on the basis of fundamental economic rights
and the absence of actual or threatened harm, rather than on the ground that
efficiencies had been demonstrated. Moreover, when state judges did find efficien-
cies to be present, these efficiencies often were of a different kind than those noted
in the Supreme Court's 1949 Standard Stations analysis.
The closed-shop agreement in Curran v. Galen, discussed above, 948 was not the
only "exclusive dealing" arrangement condemned by New York jurists. In 1893, the
New York Court of Appeals declared illegal a profit-pooling and mutual exclusive
dealing arrangement between an association of sheep brokers and an association of
butchers. 949 Four years later, the Court of General Sessions for New York County
upheld on demurrer the state's indictment of American Tobacco Company officers,
declaring in part that it would be an unlawful conspiracy for the defendants to refuse
to sell to jobbers and dealers who did not comply with exclusive dealing and resale
price maintenance stipulations, if such refusal was undertaken to restrain trade and
create a monopoly. 950 Finally, in 1910, the New York Court of Appeals declared that
a telephone company's exclusive dealing arrangement with a Syracuse hotel consti-
tuted a contract in restraint of trade and that the telephone company, therefore, could
not obtain an injunction to block another phone company from connecting with the
hotel. The court noted that the value of telephone service rises directly with the number
of people who can be reached by telephone and that exclusive dealing detrimentally
blocked communication with persons served by a rival company. 951
Overall, however, New York judges upheld the great majority of exclusive
dealing and sole outlet arrangements coming to their attention. The New York Court
of Appeals expressed its belief in the potential economic benefits of exclusive dealing
as early as 1893 in an opinion that simultaneously revealed important aspects of Judge
Rufus Peckham's own restraint of trade views prior to his ascension to the United States
Supreme Court. In Matthews v. Associated Press,952 Judge Peckham, for the court,
upheld the defendant's imposition of an exclusive dealing requirement on its cus-
tomers, reasoning that the arrangement promoted efficiency and was analogous to
reasonable ancillary restraints on members of a business partnership. 953 Declaring that
the effectiveness of a news service varies directly with its size, Judge Peckham found
the Associated Press restriction an entirely "natural and reasonable restraint.''954 He
noted:
947. See L. SuwvAN, supra note 836, § 164, at 472.
948. See supra text accompanying notes 855-60.
949. See Judd v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105, 34 N.E. 790 (1893).
950. See People v. Duke, 19 Misc. 292, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1897).
951. See Central N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 199 N.Y. 128, 92 N.E. 206 (1910).
952. 136 N.Y. 333, 32 N.E. 981 (1893).
953. Id. at 340-41,32 N.E. at 983. The Associated Press exclusive dealing requirement previously had been upheld
over a challenge brought by a rival news service in Dunlap's Cable News Co. v. Stone, 15 N.Y.S. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
954. Matthews, 136 N.Y. at 341, 32 N.E. at 983.
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The greater the number belonging to the organization the larger will be its income and the
greater amount it will be able to spend for making the collection of news and the more
efficient and valuable such collection will be. . . . [It would seem most appropriate to
provide that the members of such association should not take news from any other. The
division of the business among two or more associations tends directly towards the making
of the membership in each less valuable than it otherwise would be, and the membership
being less valuable the association itself would tend to decrease in members and to grow less
efficient in service and less capable of fulfilling promptly one of the great objects of its
existence, the procuring and supplying of news to its members. 955
In so holding, Judge Peckham noted the striking recent shifts in judicial opinion
in New York and elsewhere and summarized common law restraint of trade doctrine
in a manner that varied significantly from the famous summary he later would
announce as a United States Supreme Court Justice. Explaining recent developments
in a way that simultaneously reflected the absence of any "reasonableness" test for
nonancillary restraints in traditional nineteenth century New York case law, Judge
Peckham declared:
The latest decisions of courts in this country and in England show a strong tendency to very
greatly circumscribe and narrow the doctrine of avoiding contracts in restraint of trade. The
courts do not go to the length of saying that contracts which they now would say are in
restraint of trade are, nevertheless, valid contracts, and to be enforced; they do, however,
now hold many contracts not open to the objection that they are in restraint of trade which
a few years back would have been avoided on that sole ground, both here and in England.95 6
Four years later, in the United States Supreme Court, when Justices Peckham and
White first articulated their differing approaches to Sherman Act interpretation, they
both looked to the common law to determine what Congress intended when it banned
"[ejvery contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce. ",957 In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,95s both Jus-
tices conceded that state courts had not always invalidated agreements that were
challenged on restraint of trade grounds; but they disagreed with regard to common
law terminology. Justice White, dissenting, declared that common law courts decided
through judicial reasoning whether or not a particular arrangement was an unreason-
able private regulation of commerce. If it was, it was held unenforceable as a "restraint
of trade." If it was not, it would be upheld and would not receive that label of
condemnation. 959 Accordingly, Sherman Act analysis in each case would have to
consist of judicial evaluation of reasonableness or unreasonableness to decide if
challenged agreements were "restraints of trade" and therefore prohibited under the
955. Id.
956. Id. at 340, 32 N.E. at 982-83. As examples of the recent, more tolerant judicial trend in New York, Judge
Peckham cited Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 418 (1887); Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, 17
N.E. 335 (1887); and Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 18 N.E. 363 (1888). Judge Peckham had dissented without a
written opinion in Diamond Match and had not voted in Hodge. For a discussion of these three cases, see supra text
accompanying notes 487-506, 508-11, 553-64.
957. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
958. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See supra text accompanying notes 397-405.
959. Id. at 346-47 (White, J., dissenting).
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statute when interstate commerce was involved. 96° Such an analysis, Justice White
declared, would lead to approval of conduct like the cooperative rate-setting activity
before the Court, which, in his view, "simply provide[d] for uniform classification,
and [sought] to prevent secret or sudden changes in the published rates," 961 results
he believed to be of great benefit to the public. 962 In reviewing common law termi-
nology to support his advocated approach to Sherman Act analysis, Justice White
quoted various state cases indicating that only invalidated agreements had been labeled
"restraints of trade. ,,963 It is perhaps understandable that he found the description of
common law terminology in Justice Peckham's majority opinion somewhat surprising;
for the common law case on which Justice White chiefly relied was the New York
Court of Appeals opinion in Matthews that Justice Peckham himself had written only
four years earlier.964
In contrast to his prior description of common law phraseology, Justice Peckham
in Trans-Missouri Freight Association now declared:
Contracts in restraint of trade have been known and spoken of for hundreds of years both in
England and in this country, and the term includes all kinds of those contracts which in fact
restrain or may restrain trade. Some of such contracts have been held void and unenforceable
in the courts by reason of their restraint being unreasonable, while others have been held
valid because they were not of that nature. A contract may be in restraint of trade and still
be valid at common law. Although valid, it is nevertheless a contract in restraint of trade,
and would be so described either at common law or elsewhere. By the simple use of the term
"contract in restraint of trade," all contracts of that nature, whether valid or otherwise,
would be included, and not alone that kind of contract which was invalid and unenforceable
as being in unreasonable restraint of trade. When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces
as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of
contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in
such language, and no exceptions or limitation can be added without placing in the act that
which has been omitted by Congress. 965
Disturbed by both the practical and jurisprudential implications of Justice White's
approach, Justice Peckham thus embraced a view of common law restraint of trade
terminology that contradicted his own earlier views as a state court judge. Justice
White's position in Trans-Missouri Freight Association alerted Justice Peckham to the
fact that his earlier view of common law terminology, limiting "restraints of trade"
to judicially invalidated agreements, readily could be adapted to a judicial approach
under the Sherman Act condoning quite anticompetitive results. The revised view of
common law terminology that Justice Peckham accepted in Trans-Missouri Freight
Association broadened the sweep of the federal antitrust act to condemn "rea-
sonable" and "unreasonable" restraints alike, and thereby made it more difficult to
uphold the conduct that Justice White would have validated. As previously noted, in
960. Id. at 353-54 (Vhite, J., dissenting).
961. Id. at 371 (White, J., dissenting).
962. Id. at 367-68 (vhite, J., dissenting).
963. Id. at 347-50 (White, J., dissenting).
964. See id. at 348-49 (White, J., dissenting).
965. Id. at 328 (emphasis added) (Peckham, J., for the Court).
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adopting this interpretation of statutory language, Justice Peckham had no desire to
impede normal economic activity. Instead, he merely sought to protect more effec-
tively the natural processes of economic life, through an ostensibly less discretionary
test focused not on "reasonableness" but on "directness. ' 966
A year after the Matthews decision was announced, Judge Peckham dissented
without written opinion from a New York Court of Appeals decision approving
another, rather different exclusive dealing arrangement. 967  In Lough v.
Outerbridge,968 a steamship company concerned with intermittent competition from
a particular British steamer carrying cargo from New York to Barbados responded by
offering a special reduced rate to merchants agreeing to ship exclusively through the
defendant company whenever the British ship was in New York taking on cargo. The
plaintiff commission merchants sued, asking the court to compel the defendant to
grant them the special lower price despite their refusal to abide by the exclusive
dealing requirement. 969 This the court refused to do.
The court stressed that the defendants at all times offered to ship the plaintiff's
goods at the regular forty cents per dry barrel price, which the trial judge had found
to be a reasonable rate. 970 The defendants therefore had fulfilled their public
obligation as common carriers and were not required to allow the plaintiffs the
special, unprofitable rate of twenty-five cents if the plaintiffs refused to comply with
the conditions the defendants stipulated. 971 The court found irrelevant the plaintiffs'
contention that they were the only shippers of goods from New York to Barbados
employing the British ship and that the defendants' purpose was "to suppress
competition in the business, and to retain a monopoly for their own benefit.' '972 The
trial court had not found this contention to be true. Moreover, even if it were true, the
defendants' behavior would not have been unlawful or prejudicial to the public:
The purpose of an act which in itself is perfectly lawful or, under all the circumstances,
reasonable, is seldom, if ever, material.... When the service is performed for a reasonable
and just hire the public have no interest in the question whether one or many are engaged in
it. The monopoly which the law views with disfavor is the manipulation of a business in
which the public are interested in such a way as to enable one or a few to control and regulate
it in their own interest and to the detriment of the public by exacting unreasonable
charges.... I cannot perceive anything unlawful or against the public good in seeking by
such means to retain a business which it does not appear was of sufficient magnitude to
furnish employment for both lines. 973
In subsequent cases, the lower New York courts repeatedly upheld sole outlet or
exclusive dealing arrangements brought before them, despite the absence of any
common carrier issues of the sort present in Lough v. Outerbridge. The most explicit
966. See supra text accompanying notes 420-21.
967. See Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N.Y. 271, 284, 38 N.E. 292, 296 (1894).
968. 143 N.Y. 271, 38 N.E. 292 (1894).
969. Id. at 273-78, 38 N.E. at 293-94.
970. Id. at 276, 38 N.E. at 294.
971. Id. at 279-80, 38 N.E. at 295.
972. Id. at 282, 38 N.E. at 296.
973. Id. at 282-83, 38 N.E. at 296 (citations omitted).
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attempt to address such agreements within a broader, overall framework of restraint
of trade analysis came in the 1902 New York Supreme Court, Special Term case of
Excelsior Quilting Co. v. Creter.974 In that case, the sole manufacturer of a quilting
machine had sold to the plaintiff all eight machines it had on hand and had agreed not
to build any more for use anywhere in the United States or Canada, except Washington
State. The court noted that restraint of trade cases seemed to fall into two groups:
invalid horizontal combinations to regulate a market, and generally valid covenants
by a seller not to compete with the buyer of the seller's business. 975 The court noted
that the agreement before it really did not fall into either category and was "really one
of individual right, with which the question of public policy has little, if anything, to
do." 976 Nevertheless, it found the ancillary restraint reasoning and economic analysis
of Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber to be persuasive and controlling. No threat to
competition was posed because the patents on the machines in question had expired
long ago, and the relevant designs could be obtained by any manufacturer who wanted
to manufacture the equipment. 977 Accordingly, the challenged arrangement fell not
into the prohibited category of invalid restraint of trade, but instead into the protected
realm of freedom of contract. 978
Five years later, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld
another sole outlet arrangement in an important decision subsequently affirmed by the
court of appeals on the basis of the appellate division opinions. In Locker v. American
Tobacco Co. ,979 the appellate division rejected a common law and Donnelly Act
challenge to the American Tobacco Company's use of the Metropolitan Tobacco
Company as its sole sales agent in greater New York City. 98 0 The action had been
brought by an independent jobber who had not been allowed to purchase tobacco
products from either of these two companies, which allegedly controlled ninety
percent of the local market. 981 The court emphasized that the plaintiff had not alleged
that incorporation of the defendant companies was itself unlawful or that any
horizontal combination of competitors was involved. 982 In such circumstances, the
arrangement in question could not be condemned as economically pernicious or
beyond the scope of individual rights. Stressing the critical difference between purely
vertical and horizontal arrangements, the court noted:
The corporate defendants are not, and could not under any circumstances, be competitors;
the one is a producer and manufacturer; the other a non-producing and nonmanufacturing
wholesale and retail dealer. The producer may lawfully sell or refuse to sell to any person;
may establish the sales price and terms of sale of its products, and what it may lawfully do
974. 36 Misc. 698, 74 N.Y.S. 361 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1902).
975. Id. at 699-701, 74 N.Y.S at 361-62.
976. Id. at 700, 74 N.Y.S. at 362.
977. Id.
978. Id. at 706, 74 N.Y.S. at 364 ("The general trade must not be restrained, but the greatest freedom of contract
between individuals, acting within the law, should be assured, so that business may not be trammeled by unnecessary
restrictions.").
979. 121 A.D. 443, 106 N.Y.S. 115 (1907), aff'd on opinions below, 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 289 (1909).
980. Id. at 450-52, 106 N.Y.S. at 119-20.
981. Id. at 445-47, 106 N.Y.S. at 116-17.
982. Id. at 450-52, 106 N.Y.S. at 119-20.
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itself it may lawfully delegate to another, and the exercise of such delegated power by the
other is as lawful as if exercised by the producer itself. If the producer has a monopoly of
its products, the selling through a sales agent adds nothing to it. If it has not such monopoly,
the fact of selling its products through a sales agent is the mere marketing thereof, and does
not create a monopoly. If, therefore, vice existed in this agreement or arrangement, it must
be predicated on its results, namely, the refusal by the Metropolitan Company, through the
exercise of its power as a sales agent, with the knowledge of its principal, to sell the products
of the latter to the plaintiffs to their inconvenience and damage. 983
Such an individual refusal to deal was beyond challenge, however, and a matter
of fundamental right. Indeed, where an individual, as opposed to concerted, refusal
to deal was at issue the action was legitimate regardless of its motivation:
The complaint evidently proceeds upon the theory that the plaintiffs are vested with the legal
right to buy and deal in the merchandise manufactured and controlled by the defendants...
and that a refusal to sell to them is a wrongful and actionable invasion of such right; but we
are unable to discover in this record anything warranting or sustaining such theory. It is the
well-settled law of this State that the refusal to maintain trade relations with any individual
is an inherent right which every person may exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems
sufficient or for no reasons whatever, and it is immaterial whether such refusal is based upon
reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice or malice. It is a part of the liberty of action
which the Constitutions, State and Federal, guarantee to the citizen.9s
As already noted, when the court of appeals affirmed the decision in 1909, 985
Chief Judge Cullen added a separate concurrence strongly endorsing such a view of
inherent rights and stressed that such rights did not vary with the size or power of an
individual or corporation. 986 The arrangement in Locker, Chief Judge Cullen
emphasized, was a case of individual and not collective refusal, and this made all the
difference. "A refusal to sell to any particular individual," he declared,
becomes illegal only when it is done in pursuance of a combination with other owners to
injure the individual with whom they refuse to deal. In other words, it is the combination of
several persons which makes that action illegal which, if done by a single person without any
agreement for joint action, would be legal. 98 7
The fact that rights retained their vitality even for corporations of enormous size and
strength did not need to be cause for public alarm, in Chief Judge Cullen's view. The
state possessed ample authority to deal with any problems that might arise, through
its extensive power over corporate charters and intrastate business privileges:
If the aggregation of enormous industries under a single control is an economic evil, as to
which I express no opinion, the evil can be easily cured by the legislature ...
Both of the defendants are foreign corporations, but the control of the legislature over
them is fully as plenary as in the case of domestic corporations. With the exception of a very
limited class, such as corporations engaged in interstate transportation and the like, a foreign
983. Id. at 451, 106 N.Y.S. at 121-22.
984. Id. at 451-52, 106 N.Y.S. at 121. Judge Gaynor concurred, reiterating the legitimacy of an individual refusal
to deal and stressing the critical absence of any allegation of a combination. Id. at 455-56, 106 N.Y.S. at 124 (Gaynor,
J., concurring).
985. Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 289 (1909).
986. See supra text accompanying notes 730-31.
987. Locker, 195 N.Y. at 566, 88 N.E. at 289 (Cullen, C.J., concurring).
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corporation cannot breathe or exist within the limits of a state except by the consent of the
state. The state may refuse admittance to such a corporation for any reason, and unless the
right has been contracted away, which is hardly possible under the Constitution of this state,
it can equally unceremoniously turn it out. A statute prohibiting any foreign corporation
doing business within a state from removing suits against it to the Federal courts is void...
but though the statute cannot prevent the corporation from removing the suit, it may expel
the corporation because it has removed the suit .... If the case before us does present the
existence of any real economic evil, that evil may be easily dealt with by the legislature. 988
Yet, as noted previously, while the New York judges contrasted individual and
concerted refusals to deal in Locker, at other times they declared that similar
principles governed both individual and concerted refusals, 989 and they sometimes
approved concerted refusals to deal that had been used to support exclusive dealing
demands. 990 For example, in 1907 and 1909 New York courts upheld concerted
activity undertaken by combinations of theatre owners who established multicity
theatre circuits and then demanded that owners of theatrical attractions play their
attractions only in circuit theatres. 991 In both cases, the court stressed the presence of
good motives and the substantial reduction of expense made possible by circuit
booking, which allowed tours to be arranged in as continuous a line as possible and
thereby cut transportation costs dramatically. 992
Missouri judges exhibited similar, if not invariable, support for sole outlet and
exclusive dealing agreements. For example, in 1903 the Missouri Supreme Court
approved a patent licensing arrangement granting the licensee exclusive rights to use
and sell a patented item in eight states and prohibiting the licensee from using or selling
other similar items.993 The court found the agreement not to be a restraint of trade,
declaring that "[p]atented inventions and secrets of art or trade not patentable, are not
within the purview of the rule against restraint of trade." ,994 Five years later, the court
addressed the legitimacy of exclusive dealing in the absence of such factors in its
extensive opinion in State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. In that case, the state
challenged a territorial division of Missouri between Standard Oil of Indiana and the
988. Id. at 566-68, 88 N.E. at 289-90 (citations omitted) (Cullen, C.J., concurring). For an additional example of
judicial tolerance for a "sole outlet" arrangement, see Stemmerman v. Kelly, 150 A.D. 735, 135 N.Y.S. 827 (1912)
(upholding an asphalt manufacturer's agreement not to sell asphalt for street paving in New York City to anyone other than
the defendant for a period of five years), aff'd, 220 N.Y. 756, 116 N.E. 1077 (1917). On state power over foreign and
domestic corporations under contemporary constitutional theory, and its practical limitations, see May, supra note 4, at
502, 510-17. See also supra note 748.
989. See supra text accompanying note 862.
990. See. e.g., Heim v. New York Stock Exch., 118 N.Y.S. 591 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1909), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 886-89.
991. See Roseneau v. Empire Circuit Co., 131 A.D. 429, 115 N.Y.S. 511 (1909); People v. Klaw, 55 Misc. 72,
106 N.Y.S. 341 (Ct. Gen. Seas. 1907).
992. In People v. Klaw, 55 Misc. 72, 106 N.Y.S. 341 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1907), the court also found that rival theatre
owners continued to operate successfully despite the defendant's activity. In Roseneau v. Empire Circuit Co., 131 A.D.
429, 115 N.Y.S. 511 (1909), the court found the defendant's activity lawful even though it led to the destruction of a rival
theatre in Buffalo. One judge in that case, however, found the challenged arrangement to be motivated by malice and not
necessary to achieve efficiency. Accordingly he declared the arrangement invalid, although he concurred in the court's
judgment ordering a new trial, on the ground that the jury's damage award of $66,750 was "grossly excessive." See id.
at 436-43, 115 N.Y.S. at 517-22 (Spring, J., concurring).
993. See Standard Fireproof. Co. v. St. Louis Expanded Metal Fireproof. Co., 177 Mo. 559, 76 S.W. 1008 (1903).
994. Id. at 576, 76 S.W. at 1012.
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Waters-Pierce Oil Company. At the same time, state authorities also attacked a related
practice by which Standard of Indiana sold its refined oil only to Waters-Pierce within
Waters-Pierce territory, and by which Waters-Pierce bought oil only from Standard of
Indiana. 995 The companies argued that Standard Oil of Indiana, as a refiner, had a right
to sell exclusively to a single dealer (itself) in the northern half of Missouri and
exclusively to another single dealer (Waters-Pierce) in the southern half of the state.996
To evaluate this defense, the court reviewed recent federal and state antitrust and
restraint of trade opinions approving exclusive dealing. 997 It concluded that purely
vertical sole outlet and exclusive dealing arrangements were perfectly lawful and
posed no threat to competition. The court explained that such an agreement
in no manner prevents other manufacturers from selling the same class of goods to other
dealers in the same towns in competition with those sold under the supposed contract. There
is nothing wrong legally or morally in such a contract and arrangements. No manufacturer,
in the absence of express legislation to the contrary, should be required to place his own
fabrics in competition with each other. The law is satisfied in that regard if the different
manufacturers of goods are left in reasonable and fair competition with each other.998
The court found, however, that the defendants had gone beyond such purely vertical
arrangements because Standard Oil of Indiana was not only a refiner but also a dealer
in oil like Waters-Pierce. The agreement, therefore, involved a horizontal territorial
division among dealers and violated state antitrust law. 999
The Missouri Supreme Court's final major analysis of vertical restraint issues
involved one of the numerous contemporary contracts by which a local telephone
company agreed to allow a single long-distance telephone system exclusive physical
interconnection with the local network, and further agreed to deliver to that
long-distance system all telephone traffic destined for the points it served, whether or
not those points were served by other systems as well. In Home Telephone Co. v.
Sarcoxie Light & Telephone Co., °°° the local company allegedly had breached such
an agreement by granting the rival Bell Telephone Company a physical connection to
the local network and by transmitting to Bell messages that were destined for points
the plaintiff served. The court found that these allegations stated a good claim and if
proved would entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief. Holding directly contrary to a
St. Louis Court of Appeals decision that had addressed a parallel situation just a year
995. State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 38-40, 116 S.W. 902, 908 (1909), aff'd sub noa.
Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
996. Id. at 404-05, 116 S.W. at 1027.
997. Id. at 405-16, 116 S.W. at 1027-31. The court particularly relied on the case of Whitwell v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903). That case had declared, in part, that such activity was merely the exercise of
,"unquestioned rights which are indispensable to the existence of competition or to the conduct of trade." Standard Oil,
218 Mo. at 409, 116 S.W. at 1029.
998. Standard Oil, 218 Mo. at 416-17, 116 S.W. at 1031.
999. Id. at 417-18, 116 S.W. at 1032. In modem antitrust terminology, the condemned agreement thus involved
"dual distribution." In recent years, federal courts have differed significantly in their antitrust analyses of arrangements
involving "dual distribution," sometimes treating them as essentially vertical activity, sometimes as horizontal. See, e.g.,
H. HovENKAmP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW § 9.4, at 271 (1985). As previously noted, supra note 735, in
the Missouri case, the defendants did not argue that any different analysis might apply because the companies were
affiliated, nor did the Missouri Supreme Court address that issue in invalidating the arrangement.
1000. 236 Mo. 114, 139 S.W. 108 (1911).
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previously,1oot the Missouri Supreme Court rejected charges that the contract in
question violated antitrust standards or was otherwise contrary to public policy. In the
court's view, the contract, when made, was procompetitive. By linking the plaintiff's
and defendant's complementary lines, it established a competitive alternative to
Bell's existing, monopoly long-distance lines. 1002 While all telephone companies had
a legal obligation to receive and transmit all messages coming to them, the defendant
had no obligation to provide all interested individuals and companies with a physical
connection between its own lines and theirs.1°03 Indeed, "such a contention, if
sustained, would absolutely deprive a corporation of all property rights in its own
business."'1o4 Accordingly, the contract provisions granting the plaintiff exclusive
connection and traffic rights were perfectly lawful and were enforceable against
Bell's attempt to link itself to the local network. 105
2. The Status and Contexts of Resale Price Maintenance
State and federal courts repeatedly grappled not only with exclusive dealing
concerns but also with resale price maintenance issues throughout the Progressive Era.
Congress did not pass new legislation specifically directed to resale price maintenance,
and only a few states enacted such measures. °06 Yet, the practice nevertheless became
the target of frequent challenge under more general antitrust provisions, particularly
as firms in certain lines of trade increasingly promoted resale price maintenance to
counter intensified price competition from large discount dealers. 107 Prior to 1911,
state and federal courts frequently declared particular examples of resale price main-
tenance to be lawful, often on the ground that these arrangements were within the scope
of relevant intellectual property, or analogous, protections. I°° In 1911, however, in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. ,009 the United States Supreme
Court condemned a system of resale price maintenance established by a manufacturer
of unpatented proprietary medicines, finding the system's impact to be analogous to
that of a price-fixing cartel among dealers. oo
1001. See Home Tel. Co. v. Granby & Neosho Tel. Co., 147 Mo. App. 216, 247-48, 126 S.W. 773, 782-83
(1910).
1002. Sarcoxie, 236 Mo. at 128, 139 S.W. at 11. Apparently, at the time of the contract, Bell had its own separate
phone booths for long distance calling rather than offering long distance service through interconnection with local service
lines. Id.
1003. Id. at 133, 139 S.W. at 113.
1004. Id. at 137, 139 S.W. at 114.
1005. Id. at 138, 139 S.W. at 114. For examples of additional Missouri exclusive dealing cases, see First Nat'l Bank
v. Missouri Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 401, 152 S.W. 378, 386 (1912) (approving a collective exclusive dealing
requirement under the federal Sherman Act); Pope-Turnbo v. Bedford, 147 Mo. App. 692, 697, 127 S.W. 426, 428
(1910) (declaring invalid an agreement to use plaintiff's hair remedy exclusively).
1006. See J. DAVIEs, supra note 252, at 183.
1007. See, e.g., T. McCRAw, supra note 5, at 101-08 (describing the efforts of Louis Brandeis in support of resale
price maintenance).
1008. See, for example, the review of these cases set forth in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th
Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908).
1009. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
1010. The Court also rejected claims that: 1) only an agency arrangement was involved, rather than a system of sales
with resale restrictions, id. at 395-99, 2) resale price maintenance was valid when such restrictions related to proprietary
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Although Missouri courts did not have occasion to address resale price
maintenance during the Progressive Era, New York judges rendered an important
series of opinions on resale price maintenance that were given prominent consider-
ation in the leading United States Circuit Court of Appeals decision that preceded and
substantially influenced the Dr. Miles opinion itself. 011 In these New York cases,
state judges confronted recurring issues of purely vertical versus horizontal combi-
nation, competitive impact, the scope of pertinent property and contract rights, and
the relevance of copyright, patent, and trademark concerns. The cases exhibited a
mixed reaction to resale price maintenance. Even supportive opinions, however, were
premised on grounds different from the output enhancement and services-promotion
rationales often stressed in recent scholarly justifications of such arrangements. 01 2
New York judges approved resale price maintenance in two cases decided by the
appellate division of the supreme court in 1899. In Murphy v. Christian Press
Association Publishing Co.,o1013 the court held that a copyright owner had the right to
establish minimum retail prices to be charged by a company publishing the copyrighted
work. Such an arrangement, it declared, could not be void as a restraint of trade
because "[t]he principle that contracts in restraint of trade are against public policy,
and, therefore, illegal, has no application to the publication of a copyrighted book or
a patented invention." 01 4
A few months later, the appellate division upheld resale price maintenance
outside an intellectual property setting. In Walsh v. Dwight,'0'5 a manufacturer of
saleratus and soda allegedly offered a rebate to those dealers who agreed not to sell
either the manufacturer's product or any other brands of saleratus and soda at less
than certain stipulated prices. The court rejected a challenge to this practice brought
by a rival manufacturer of a lower priced brand who claimed to have suffered $50,000
in damages because of the practice.101 6 In the court's view, the defendants clearly
could have employed agents to sell their goods at whatever prices the defendants
set. 10 17 The adoption of exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance, when
distribution was accomplished through independent dealers, similarly was legitimate
in the court's estimation, for neither practice could be deemed anticompetitive or
monopolistic:
medicines manufactured under a secret process even if the product was neither patented nor copyrighted, id. at 401-04,
and 3) the power to set resale restrictions was implicit in the property rights and liberty of the manufacturer, id. at 404-05.
1011. See John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 35-38 (6th Cir. 1907) (discussing the New York cases),
cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908). In Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court expressly noted Judge Lurton's careful review
of resale price maintenance issues in Hartman and the lower court's justified reliance upon it in Dr. Miles. Dr. Miles, 220
U.S. at 399-400, 409. Judge Lurton himself had written the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Dr. Miles as well
as in Hartman, see Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803, 804 (6th Cir. 1908), aff'd, 220 U.S.
373 (1911), and had joined the Supreme Court by the time the high court rendered its own opinion in 1911. Having
decided the case below, he took no part in Supreme Court consideration or voting. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409.
1012. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 288-91; H. Hovenc.QaP, supra note 999, at § 9.2.
1013. 38 A.D. 426, 56 N.Y.S. 597 (1899).
1014. Id. at 430, 56 N.Y.S. at 599.
1015. 40 A.D. 513, 58 N.Y.S. 91 (1899).
1016. Id. at 515, 58 N.Y.S. at 92.
1017. Id. at 516, 58 N.Y.S. at 93.
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If a dealer in articles of this kind, for his own advantage, agrees to confine his business to
a particular line of goods, or agrees with the manufacturers to charge a particular price for
the articles which he sells in his business, such an agreement is not illegal as in restraint of
trade or as tending to create a monopoly, as there is nothing in the agreement to prevent
others from engaging in the business, or the manufacturer [sic] of other articles from selling
their products to any one who is willing to buy. 018
Accordingly, resale price maintenance by a single manufacturer did not violate state
antitrust law.101 9 Without noting the fact that the defendants' alleged activity went
beyond purely intrabrand restrictions and directly targeted interbrand price compe-
tition, the court stressed that the state antitrust statute was directed not at vertical
arrangements by single firms, but instead at anticompetitive behavior by groups of
manufacturers or combinations of dealers. 10 20
Soon thereafter, however, both the appellate division and the court of appeals
upheld resale price maintenance in a case where horizontal combination was present;
indeed, in a case involving the same contract system later condemned by the United
States Supreme Court in Dr. Miles. In John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National
Wholesale Druggists' Association,'0 2 1 the court of appeals affirmed by a four to three
vote an appellate division decision 0 22 dismissing a challenge to concerted activities
of the National Wholesale Druggists' Association. The activities in question allegedly
had prompted large numbers of manufacturers and proprietors of "patent" or
"proprietary" medicines to agree to adopt resale price maintenance and to charge
uniform prices to all wholesale dealers. When the plaintiff dealer refused to abide by
such resale price maintenance restrictions, the manufacturers refused to sell medi-
cines to it and the plaintiff sought injunctive relief. 0 23
Judge Albert Haight, for the court, emphasized the importance of the issue posed
by the case, noting that resale price maintenance had been adopted in many lines of
commerce where manufacturers were concerned about maintaining the reputation of
trademarked goods. 10 24 He concluded that the defendant wholesalers had a right
collectively to encourage the manufacturers to adopt practices in the wholesalers'
interests. 0 25 The manufacturers had not been compelled,10 26 and individual manu-
facturers, having the exclusive right to manufacture their own goods, had a right to
adopt the suggested practices if they became convinced that they were "more
advantageous to them and more fair and just to the public."'' 0 27 Each manufacturer
1018. Id.
1019. In addition, the court stressed that the plaintiff had not alleged that the defendants had entered into any
agreements with the plaintiff's customers or with anyone other than the defendants' regular customers. Id. at 515, 58
N.Y.S. at 92. The court also emphasized that the affected dealers were not prevented from dealing in rival commodities
but merely were given an incentive to equalize the sale price of the various brands. Id. at 516, 58 N.Y.S. at 92.
1020. Id. at 517, 58 N.Y.S. at 93-94.
1021. 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).
1022. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Drug. Ass'n, 54 A.D. 223, 66 N.Y.S. 615 (1900), aff'd,
175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).
1023. John D. Park, 175 N.Y. at 5-7, 67 N.E. at 137-38.
1024. Id. at 7-8, 67 N.E. at 138.
1025. Id. at 8, 67 N.E. at 138.
1026. Id. at 10, 67 N.E. at 139.
1027. Id. at 9, 67 N.E. at 138.
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continued to set its own separate sale and resale prices, 02 8 and the plaintiff had not
accused the manufacturers of any direct, horizontal price fixing among themselves.
Judge Haight concluded that the new industry distribution plan could not be deemed
to be in restraint of trade.102 9 He explained:
It is true that it does away with the competition among dealers as to prices, but it creates no
restriction upon them as to the quantities that they may be able to sell or the territory within
which they may confine their transactions; but upon the question of prices we must bear in
mind that the goods are covered by patent rights and trade marks, which give the proprietors
the exclusive right of specifying prices at which the articles shall be sold, and following this,
the right also to require dealers to maintain the prices specified. The plan does not operate
to restrict sales in any localities, but contemplates a ready method of distributing the goods
throughout the entire country. It is, in effect, the creating of an agency on the part of the
proprietors, by which every druggist throughout the United States may receive the goods and
dispose of them as agents of the principal, receiving the commissions agreed upon
therefor. 10 30
Finally, the plaintiff could not complain of any "boycott" by manufacturers, because
it could, "at any time, avail itself of the right to purchase upon the contract plan by
complying with the requirements of the proprietors." 0 31
Judge Celora Martin, writing for the three dissenters, disagreed strongly with
both the factual and legal analyses set forth in Judge Haight's majority opinion. In
Judge Martin's view, the manufacturers had been compelled to adopt the new
practices "to protect themselves with the wholesale dealers, 1' 032 and the plaintiff's
pleading sufficiently alleged that the plaintiff had been the victim of an unlawful
boycott by manufacturers and dealers. 1033 Whereas Chief Judge Parker, in concur-
rence, found the challenged activities to be analogous to the behavior approved in
National Protective Association of Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumming, 0 4 Judge
1028. Id at 15, 67 N.E. at 141 (Parker, C.J., concurring).
1029. Id. at 9, 67 N.E. at 138.
1030. Id. at 9, 67 N.E. at 138-39. Judge Haight also strongly endorsed the wholesalers' right to persuade
manufacturers to charge uniform prices to distributors. Id. at 14, 67 N.E. at 140. The plaintiff had claimed that the
challenged practices had been advocated because the defendant wholesaler and jobbing druggists "were unable to handle
the goods as cheaply" as the few large companies like the plaintiff itself, which previously had purchased large quantities
at reduced rates. Id. at 13, 67 N.E. at 140 (emphasis deleted). Judge Haight did not clearly indicate whether the plaintiff's
prior purchasing advantage had resulted from cost savings to the manufacturer in handling large orders or simply from the
plaintiff's market power. Yet he strongly implied that the latter was the case, see id., and declared that elimination of the
previously existing pattern of competition was not against public policy:
An active competition and rivalry in business is, undoubtedly, conducive to the public welfare, but we must not
shut our eyes to the fact that competition may be carried to such an extent as to accomplish the financial ruin
of those engaged therein and thus result in a derangement of the business, an inconvenience to consumers, and
in public harm. While public policy demands a healthy competition it abhors favoritism, secret rebates and
unfair dealing and commends the conduct of business in such a way as to serve all consumers alike.
Id. at 9, 67 N.E. at 139.
1031. Id. at 11, 67 N.E. at 139. Chief Judge Parker concurred, finding no purpose to raise consumer prices or
manufacturer or dealer profits and reaffirmed that "the proprietor of patent medicines has the right to fix the price at which
his article shall go to the consumer." Id. at 17, 67 N.E. at 141 (Parker, C.J., concurring). In Chief Judge Parker's view,
the whole matter was simply "a controversy between opponents in business, neither side trying to help the public. Nor
will the public be the gainer by the success of either." Id. at 21, 67 N.E. at 143 (Parker, C.J., concurring).
1032. Id. at 25, 67 N.E. at 144 (Martin, J., dissenting).
1033. Id. at 44, 67 N.E. at 145-47 (Martin, J., dissenting).
1034. Id. at 18, 67 N.E. at 143 (Parker, C.J., concurring). For a discussion of that case, see supra text
accompanying notes 861-79.
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Martin invoked the earlier labor case of Curran v. Galen as the appropriate
parallel 0 35 and condemned the court's disparate treatment of labor and business.
Such treatment, he declared,
would result in a discrimination in favor of capital or business which could not be sustained
upon any just or legal principle known to or established by statute or common law. With the
existing conflict between capital and labor, such a distinction would not only be unjust, but
extremely unfortunate, especially as it can be justified upon no principle of ethics, law or
equity. 0 36
In Judge Martin's view, the majority's decision approved a combination with an
obviously anticompetitive purpose, and thus undermined the fundamental policy of
competition. 0 37 That policy, he emphasized, ultimately was not necessarily harmful
even to the smaller dealers who might feel threatened by it. He noted:
While this principle has not been thus firmly and universally settled without discussion as to
whether it does not work a greater hardship than advantage by crushing out weaker
competitors and causing disaster to others by reduction of prices, yet, notwithstanding these
arguments, the consideration which the question has received has led to the conclusion that
public policy requires the continuance and enforcement of the rule of competition as a
principle controlling business affairs in the various commonwealths. This principle of
political economy is not based alone upon the theory that combinations to prevent
competition will, of necessity, enhance the price, as there are notable instances where such
combinations have, even permanently, reduced the price of articles thus traded in or
manufactured, but it is founded upon the theory that such combinations may, as they usually
will, enhance the price and also drive small and worthy dealers out of business. 0 38
Where the complaint charged that manufacturers had been compelled against their
will to refuse to sell to the plaintiff unless it adhered to resale price maintenance, it
was irrelevant "that the medicines may have been patented or copyrighted." 0 39
Subsequently, the court of appeals had occasion to address resale price
maintenance in a second context of horizontal combination, and to clarify the
meaning of its John D. Park & Sons holding, in its 19041040 and 19081041 decisions
in Straus v. American Publishers' Association. In the 1904 case, the owners of
Macy's department store challenged concerted activity by the members of the
American Publishers' Association, who reportedly constituted ninety-five percent of
the publishers in the book trade and did ninety percent of the business in that
1035. Id. at 40-41, 67 N.E. at 150 (martin, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Curran v. Galen, see supra text
accompanying notes 855-60.
1036. John D. Park, 175 N.Y. at 41, 67 N.E. at 150-51 (Martin, J., dissenting).
1037. Id. at 34, 67 N.E. at 148 (Martin, J., dissenting).
1038. Id.
1039. Id. at 42, 67 N.E. at 151 (Martin, J., dissenting). Compelling the manufacturers to adopt a uniform price for
sales to merchants, "without regard to the expense of delivery or the amount of the sale," also was troublesome to Judge
Martin, who believed it was merely an undue interference with the manufacturers' business freedom. Id. at 32-33, 67
N.E. at 147-48 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Cullen also dissented. He believed that compelling adoption of uniform
prices to merchants was lawful, but that pressuring manufacturers to adopt resale price maintenance was not. "It is in this
respect," he declared, "that the agreement is vicious and operates in restraint of trade, for it destroys competition among
the jobbers." Id. at 45, 67 N.E. at 152 (Cullen, J., dissenting).
1040. Straus v. American Pub. Ass'n, 177 N.Y. 473, 69 N.E. 1107 (1904).
1041. Straus v. American Pub. Ass'n, 193 N.Y. 496, 86 N.E. 525 (1908).
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trade.1°42 The publishers collectively refused to sell either copyrighted or uncopy-
righted books to any dealers who did not comply with the resale price maintenance
restrictions separately established by each of the various publishers. 1043 The court of
appeals, per Chief Judge Parker, condemned this arrangement as a violation of state
antitrust law, explaining John D. Park & Sons as a holding premised on the presence
of intellectual property rights. The arrangement in Straus was unlawful, Chief Judge
Parker declared, because it went beyond the scope of such rights and adversely
affected the plaintiffs' right to sell uncopyrighted books at the price they chose. 04 4
Two judges vigorously dissented. Judge Gray found the impact on sales of
uncopyrighted works to be merely an incidental effect of legitimate efforts within the
scope of copyright rights. 1045 Judge Bartlett agreed, stressing the economic and social
dangers of the loss-leader practices of department stores and the legitimacy of private
efforts to combat such practices. He declared that the case
discloses one of the saddest phases of our modern business life.
It is a well-known fact that the great department stores of the country have encroached
upon many lines of trade entirely distinct from the main and legitimate business in which
they are engaged. As an illustration, a dry goods establishment. . . concludes, in order to
promote its principal trade, to offer for sale books, furniture, druggists' sundries and
numerous other articles . . . at cut prices, representing only the cost of production, and
oftentimes far below it. The inevitable effect of this policy is to draw a large number of
people to these establishments, and in the final result the dealer makes good his losses in the
outside trade by the prices he obtains in his legitimate business.
The result is [that] a large number of retail dealers in the various kinds of articles thus
undersold are driven out of business, many of them at a time of life when they are unable
to reinstate themselves in some other calling.
It also results in great damage to manufacturers, producers and wholesale dealers in loss
of customers who have been driven into insolvency.
It is, of course, true that the proprietors of department stores have the legal right to offer
to the public goods of any kind at prices below production, or, indeed, may donate them to
their customers. It is, however, equally true that the manufacturers, producers and wholesale
dealers may say to the men whose policy is thus carrying ruin and destruction to their
business and that of their customers, that if you persist in this disastrous cutting of rates we
will sever all business relations absolutely. These are mutual and inherent rights, in the
nature of things, so long as self-defense and the privilege to exist survive among men. 1046
Subsequently, the defendants altered their agreement, making it applicable
exclusively to copyrighted books. A bare majority of the court of appeals thereupon
found this modified arrangement lawful in December of 1908.1047 Five years later,
however, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, declaring
1042. Straus, 177 N.Y. at 480, 69 N.E. at 1109.
1043. Id. at 477-78, 69 N.E. at 1108.
1044. Id. at 477, 69 N.E. at 1108.
1045. Id. at 488-91, 69 N.E. at 1112-13 (Gray, J., dissenting).
1046. Id. at 492-93, 69 N.E. at 1114 (Bartlett, J., dissenting).
1047. See Straus v. American Pub. Ass'n, 193 N.Y. 496, 498, 86 N.E. 525, 526 (1908). In so doing, the court
distinguished the very recent United States Supreme Court decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1903).
In that case, the Supreme Court declared that a copyright holder's efforts to maintain the sales prices of a copyrighted book
by means of a printed notice on the copyright page went beyond the rights conferred by federal copyright law. Id. at 350.
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that the New York court had "erred in holding that the agreement was justified by the
copyright act." 10 48
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court, in its 1911 Dr. Miles
opinion, ruled in favor of the price-cutting John D. Park & Sons Company and
invalidated the contract system that the New York high court had approved in
1903.0 49 In part, the Supreme Court did so because it rejected claims to intellectual
property protection that the New York judges had accepted.10 50 In addition, the
Supreme Court expressed greater concern for the anticompetitive potential of resale
price maintenance even when adopted by a single manufacturer than was expressed
in early New York precedent. 10 51 The contrast easily can be overstated, however, for
the Supreme Court's opinion in Dr. Miles constituted a less sweeping condemnation
of resale price maintenance than is usually supposed.
In modern antitrust writing, Dr. Miles is commonly cited as an opinion declaring
resale price maintenance unlawful per se.10 52 It is true that the Supreme Court
dismissed the plaintiff's asserted justifications for using resale price maintenance and
that the Court saw the situation in Dr. Miles as economically analogous to a harmful
dealers' cartel. 10 53 Nevertheless, the Court's opinion did not explicitly declare that
resale price maintenance always was unlawful regardless of purpose or context. And
it is important to remember that Justice Hughes' opinion for the Court was in very
substantial part an explicit adoption and restatement 10 54 of Judge Lurton's lower court
analyses in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman° 55 and in Dr. Miles105 6 itself,
analyses that stopped substantially short of declaring resale price maintenance illegal
per se.
As a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge
Horace Lurton had concurred in Judge Taft's opinion in the Addyston Pipe case. 1057
Nearly ten years later, Judge Lurton still adhered to this basic approach to antitrust
analysis, and, accordingly, he sought to evaluate the contract arrangements at issue
in Hartman and Dr. Miles within Judge Taft's reasonably ancillary/nonancillary
framework. Judge Lurton did not declare that resale price maintenance was invariably
pernicious. Rather, he explained his condemnation of the practices in these two cases
in terms of the share of the market affected and the insufficiency of the particular
justifications proffered by the parties to the litigation. For example, Judge Lurton
stressed that
1048. Straus v. American Pub. Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222, 236 (1913).
1049. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911).
1050. Id. at 400-04.
1051. Id. at 407-08.
1052. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 33 ("A rule of per se illegality was thus created ... ); H. HovENAmP,
supra note 999, § 9.3, at 258.
1053. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08.
1054. Id. at 409.
1055. 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
1056. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 804 (6th Cir. 1908), aff'd, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
1057. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
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we are to consider that we are not here dealing with a single contract. The complainant has
made a multitude of them in identical terms, and the opposite parties comprehended,
according to his bill, a large majority of the wholesale and retail druggists in the United
States. The reasons which might uphold covenants restricting the liberty of a single buyer
might prove quite inadequate when there are a multitude of identical agreements. The single
covenant might in no way affect the public interest, when a large number might. So, also,
the question as to whether the restraint was necessary to the retained business, and therefore
ancillary to the principal purpose of the agreement, or whether the restraining covenants
were not the principal rather than the ancillary matter, would largely depend upon the
general sweep and result of a multiplication of identical contracts .... The question here is
therefore one of a totally different character from that which would arise if the question was
the more simple one presented by a breach by a single covenantee. 05 8
Judge Lurton concluded that the widespread price maintenance systems in Hartman
and Dr. Miles effectually eliminated all wholesale and retail price competition in the
particular manufacturer's product. 059 But in Hartman he made it clear that the
individual manufacturer's market share nevertheless was important in evaluating the
legality of such a result:
It is true that the complainant is not in a combination with other makers of "Peruna." There
are no others. If there were, there would not be a complete or general restraint; for it might
then happen that these others, not being bound by any covenants, could supply the public.
If the supply to come from them was adequate for the public demand, the public might be
in no wise affected. 106
Judge Lurton did not assert that no justification ever could support a resale price
maintenance system. Rather, he stressed the inadequacy of the pleadings in the cases
before him. He explained:
Prima facie the contracts are plainly in restraint of trade. It was for the complainant to show
that the covenants were not larger than necessary for his protection against an unjust use to
the injury of complainant's retained business .... This the bill does not do, unless the court
is to be content with general averments that the competition methods called derisively the
"cut rate" or "cut price" system had "demoralized," "confused," "troubled," and
"damaged" the complainant's business.... [S]uch an averment as this can be of no legal
consequence, for it is no more than to say that a noncompetitive system of conducting trade
and traffic in the line of articles made by complainant is of more advantage than the ordinary
competitive system. . . .The whole economic system which has made our civilization is
founded upon the theory that competition is desirable, and the common-law rules against
restraints of trade rest upon that foundation. . . .How the suppression of competition
between his vendees and subvendees is to secure to him the enjoyment of the legitimate
fruits of his contracts of sale, to which the restrictive covenants are supposed to be ancillary,
or to protect him against an unjust competition, is not clear, and the bill states no facts from
which we can determine whether these covenants are necessary and reasonable.1061
1058. Hartman, 153 F. at 41. Elsewhere in the same opinion, Judge Lurton similarly noted: "A general system of
contracts... involves very different questions from those which arise when a single contract only is involved and when
the action is between the contracting parties for a breach .... ." Id. at 43.
1059. Id. at 42; Dr. Miles, 164 F. at 806-07.
1060. Hartman, 153 F. at 42.
1061. Id. at 44. See also Dr. Miles, 164 F. at 807 ("All that we said in respect to the Hartman system is applicable
here. ").
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Justice Charles Evans Hughes' opinion for the United States Supreme Court in
Dr. Miles appears to have consciously followed the lines of Judge Lurton's analysis,
even if it was much less explicit with regard to the relevance of market share and the
extent of future judicial willingness to consider possible justifications for resale price
maintenance. Justice Hughes, indeed, concluded his opinion by praising Judge
Lurton's careful analysis in Hartman.10 62 Justice Hughes stressed that Dr. Miles
involved a widespread system eliminating all wholesale and retail price competition
in the affected products and cited Judge Lurton's description of such a system at this
point. 1063 He emphasized that the Court was not "dealing with a single transaction,
conceivably unrelated to the public interest."1064 Justice Hughes, like Judge Lurton,
dismissed the plaintiff's general claims "that confusion and damage have resulted
from sales at less than the prices fixed." 1 6s In so doing, however, he did not
necessarily declare that no justification for resale price maintenance could ever be
found in other contexts. Instead, Justice Hughes, like Judge Lurton, believed that the
plaintiffs were really just objecting to the normal process of competition itself, and
believed that such an objection could fare no better when raised by the plaintiff than
it would if raised by members of a dealers' cartel. 
1066
IX. CONCLUSION
Once in America there was a powerful, widely shared vision of a natural,
rights-based political and economic order that simultaneously tended to ensure
opportunity, efficiency, prosperity, justice, harmony, and freedom; and laissez-faire
constitutionalism and antitrust law were deemed to be crucial, complementary
vehicles for its realization. This general, traditional vision never held universal sway
among all observers,10 67 nor did traditionally-minded Americans ever fully agree on
the correct application of shared traditional principles. 1068 Moreover, diversity of
perspective and application markedly increased in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as the growing importance of economies of scale and consequent
problems of "overproduction"' ' 0 69 sparked accelerated cartelization and concen-
tration, 1070 along with expanded state and federal regulation.1071
In the midst of these developments, the familiar, general perspectives of political
liberalism and classical economics continued to provide a powerful frame of
reference for a great many Americans seeking to comprehend and respond to the
1062. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409.
1063. Id. at 399-400.
1064. Id. at 407.
1065. Id.
1066. Id. at 407-08. In this connection, Justice Hughes explained: "The complainant having sold its product at
prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent
traffic." Id. at 409.
1067. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200, 206.
1068. See supra text accompanying notes 201-05.
1069. See supra text accompanying notes 220-23.
1070. See supra text accompanying notes 224-30.
1071. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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ongoing processes of national economic change. 10 72 Contemporary legal reasoning
strikingly reflected the continuing power of traditional perspectives, and Progressive
Era legislators and judges repeatedly reaffirmed the basic, traditional rights of labor,
property, and exchange, 10 73 and the fundamental, related principles of compe-
tition074 and "nondiscretionary" adjudication, 10 75 in both constitutional 10 76 and
antitrust 077 analysis throughout the formative era.
Over time, the power of this traditional vision declined as Americans came to
terms with the newly arisen patterns of concentrated corporate capitalism and
expanded government regulation, 0 78 and as twentieth century intellectual thought in
general increasingly turned away from the grand, natural law perspectives of the prior
century. 0 79 By the close of the Progressive Era, antitrust law no longer lay at the
center of American political debate and public concern in the way it had during the
presidential election of 19121080 and the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton
Act debates of 1914.1081 As Richard Hofstadter noted, as Americans widely came to
accept the new, more concentrated patterns of economic life and increasingly came
to appreciate the benefits believed to result from these patterns, the antitrust
"movement" died, and antitrust theory in subsequent decades primarily became the
domain of a more specialized group of lawyers, scholars, and enforcement
officials. 1082
Over the decades, antitrust analysis increasingly diverged from the premises and
methods of constitutional theory even as judges, scholars, and legislators continued
to assert parallels between the two fields. In his 1933 opinion for the Court in
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 0 8 3 for example, Chief Justice Hughes, the
author of the Court's 1911 opinion in Dr. Miles, 1084 prominently described the
Sherman Act as "a charter of freedom" possessing a "generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."' 10 8 5 During the
same decade, however, the Supreme Court dramatically altered its approach to
constitutional adjudication in a way that severely eroded the original symmetry of
constitutional and antitrust analysis. Beginning in 1937, the Court abruptly reversed
the strongly conservative trend that had prevailed in Supreme Court jurisprudence
1072. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
1073. See supra text accompanying notes 86-129.
1074. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
1075. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
1076. See supra text accompanying notes 20-78, 154-97.
1077. See supra text accompanying notes 267-430, 609-1066.
1078. See, e.g., M. SKi.AR, supra note 1, at 33-40, 431-41.
1079. See generally E. PuRC.LL, supra note 66.
1080. See supra text accompanying note 236.
1081. See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note I, at 324-32.
1082. See R. HoFsTADrrR, Antitrust Movement, supra note 85, at 189, 193-95.
1083. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
1084. See supra text accompanying notes 1009-10, 1062-66.
1085. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 359-60. Some modern commentators severely criticize Chief Justice Hughes
for this emphasis on the generality and flexibility of the Sherman Act, believing that his opinion led to substantially greater
judicial discretion than had been the accepted norm during the formative era itself. See, e.g., Arthur, Farewell, supra note
12, at 306-08.
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since the close of the First World War, 0 86 and drastically reduced the power of the
longstanding principles of laissez-faire constitutionalism, 0 8 7 as it moved to support
the expanded governmental activity of the New Deal era. 1088 After 1937 the Court
almost never sustained due process or equal protection challenges to business
regulation.1089 Beginning in the early 1930s, the focus of constitutional debate and
analysis changed as the Court increasingly emphasized not the precepts of laissez-
faire constitutional doctrine, but instead the civil liberties and civil rights of
minorities seeking greater freedom of political expression and more adequate
protection against various forms of public discrimination.t0 90
Accordingly, when the Court in its 1958 opinion in Northern Pacific Railway
v. United States'0 91 described the fundamental nature and purpose of the Sherman
Act in a manner that echoed the traditional economic perspectives of the formative
era, 10 92 it did so at a time when constitutional analysis largely had shifted to a
different, "noneconomic" set of priorities. This divergence between constitutional
and antitrust law repeatedly became evident during the 1960s. Although the Supreme
Court expressed heightened concern for individual rights in both constitutional and
antitrust adjudication in these years, 10 93 it no longer stressed precisely the same rights
in these two types of litigation. 10 94
The Supreme Court explicitly highlighted this difference in the 1972 case of
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. t0 95 In that case, while the Court again
emphasized a parallel between constitutional and antitrust adjudication, it expressly
declared that the two fields protected different sets of basic rights. In a frequently
quoted passage, the Court explained:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the
1086. See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HsAmso.; & H. BEtz, supra note 20, at 459-65, 487-94; J. SEIONCHE, supra note
23, at 423-26.
1087. See A. KELLY, W. HAismoN & H. BEtz, supra note 20, at 509-10; J. SEtoNcHE, supra note 23, at 426.
1088. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Il1 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
1089. See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HAnisoN & H. BEz, supra note 20, at 509-10.
1090. See, e.g., id. at 534-49, 602-62. Although the Court has expanded such protection in general over the last
fifty years, it has nevertheless seriously limited minority rights in particular cases during this period. See, e.g., Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
1091. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
1092. The Court strongly affirmed that the Sherman Act sought to promote simultaneously a number of basic
economic and political goals of the sort frequently reiterated during the formative era, declaring:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Id. at 4.
1093. See, e.g., Kauper, The "'Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67
Mitc. L. R v. 325, 334 (1968).
1094. See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HARsisoi & H. Bm.z, supra note 20, at 614-16, 620-34; Kauper, supra note 1093,
at 333-34.
1095. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster.1096
By the 1960s the political and economic vision that once had been central to both
constitutional and antitrust analysis no longer established the general frame of
reference for legal and economic theory, 109 7 and the Supreme Court's reinvigorated
affirmation of economic rights in the antitrust field generated substantial opposition.
In the 1970s and 1980s antitrust scholars and practitioners, operating within a very
different theoretical context than that of formative era analysts, frequently have
criticized such a "constitutional" or "rights" focused orientation as largely an
incoherent, open-ended balancing of the inconsistent interests of various groups
according to the particular subjective preferences of each individual antitrust
judge.10 98 In the late 1980s constitutional and antitrust law have come to be perceived
almost as archetypical opposites. 1099 Whereas antitrust analysis in 1890 substantially
focused on the protection of basic rights of labor, property, and exchange as a means
to attain not only efficiency but also opportunity, prosperity, justice, and freedom,
leading present-day analysts have promoted an antitrust law focused solely on
efficiency and have found little or no place for rights-based analyses of the sort
generally still conceded to be relevant in constitutional jurisprudence.' 100
In the later twentieth century, none of the differing "schools" of antitrust
analysis and practice can accept even implicitly the full formative era vision of a
natural, harmonious, rights-based economic order simultaneously tending to maxi-
mize opportunity, efficiency, wealth, fairness, and political freedom through the aid
of "nondiscretionary" judicial elaboration. Over time, this original theoretical vision
fragmented, as a belief that all these elements were interdependent and simulta-
neously essential increasingly gave way to a perception of conflict among these
principles. Antitrust analysts now commonly accept the inevitability of "tradeoff"
choices emphasizing some goals over others. In the wake of this change, various
scholars, judges, and enforcement officials have selected from among the various
parts of the original whole those elements that have seemed most compelling, and
have stressed the historical imprimatur of those particular subparts. Some scholars,
wary of the substantial judicial discretion they now perceive to be inherent in any
multivalue approach, urge an antitrust law of optimal efficiency alone, under the
banner of "consumer wealth maximization."1101 Other scholars declare that Con-
gress cared primarily, if not exclusively, about distributional questions and subordi-
nated the additional general goals of opportunity, efficiency, wealth maximization,
1096. Id. at 610 (citation omitted).
1097. On the change in economic theory, see generally, for example, Kennedy, Law in Economic Thought. supra
note 105, at 958-67; Rowe, supra note 5.
1098. See, e.g., R. BoP, , supra note 6, at 24-25, 41, 46-47; Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law, supra note 15, at
1216-19, 1235-36.
1099. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 13, at 555.
1100. See generally, e.g., R. Born, supra note 6.
1101. See, e.g., id. at 90-91.
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and political freedom when it passed formative era antitrust legislation.110 2 Still other
analysts are more willing to accept substantial judicial discretion in order to preserve
an antitrust law that simultaneously does pursue opportunity, efficiency, prosperity,
fairness, and political freedom. 1 0 3 Yet even these scholars implicitly or explicitly
have tended to view these concerns largely as independent, separate "economic" and
"noneconomic" goals' ° 4 rather than as intrinsic components of a coherent whole of
the sort posited in nineteenth century theory. Recently, still other scholars have
despaired of the outcomes of an antitrust law focused on questions of broad general
goals at all, and have advocated an alternative "statutory" approach to modern
adjudication, relying more narrowly on congressional debate denunciations of
specific types of conduct.1 05
As the centennial of the Sherman Antitrust Act draws near, antitrust scholars,
judges, and practitioners continue to seek coherent approaches to antitrust law within
an economic and intellectual environment that differs greatly from the economic and
intellectual environment of the formative era itself. Because the basic principles of
political liberalism and classical economic thought provided a powerful, widely
accepted conceptual framework for early antitrust reasoning, the current embrace of
late twentieth century theory in antitrust analysis cannot be deemed merely the
injection of science into an intellectual vacuum, providing a theoretical underpinning
for antitrust prohibitions that originally lacked one. 110 6 For the same reason, the
application of modern theory cannot be considered simply a more detailed extrapo-
lation of a theory already essentially accepted in a less detailed form in 1890. The
changes in general theory that have occurred since 1890, however, are so fundamen-
tal and so pervasively accepted that it appears impossible now to adopt an "original
intent" jurisprudence embracing the full range of formative era hopes and assump-
tions, premised as they were on late nineteenth and early twentieth century theoretical
perspectives.
Within these constraints, the challenge facing modern interpreters and enforcers
of formative era antitrust legislation remains the formulation and application of an
approach reasonably faithful to the animating economic, moral, and political
concerns of that initial period of antitrust legislation and adjudication. As scholars,
judges, and practitioners seek to meet this challenge in the opening years of the
Sherman Act's second century, enhanced understanding of the nature, vigor, and
difficulties of the changing theoretical visions that have played a central role in
antitrust analysis from the very beginning will remain a highly important consider-
ation. It is to such greater appreciation of the historical role of general theory in
antitrust analysis that this Article has sought to contribute.
1102. See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALUt. L. REv. 1580, 1592 (1983);
Lande, supra note 15, at 68-69.
1103. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, supra note 9.
1104. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 242 (discussing this tendency).
1105. See generally Arthur, Farewell, supra note 12; Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law, supra note 15; Clark, supra
note 15.
1106. See May, supra note 4, at 589-92. On the recent scholarly tendency to minimize the role of general theory
in early antitrust analysis, see also supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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